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TERRORISM RISK IN A POST-9/11 ECONOMY:
The Convergence of Capital Markets,
Insurance, and Government Action
Robert J. Rheet
ABSTRACT: September l1th changed the American economy and the
global insurance market. The insurance industry no longer covers terrorism
risk for 'free. " The traditional insurance mechanism alone cannot spread
the risk of repeated catastrophic losses. Beyond the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002 lingers the questions of a long-term solution and
government's role therein. Government can assume different roles:
reinsurer, wealth (re)distributor, regulator, or a combination thereof This
article suggests that the government should foster a regulatory and tax
environment in which the private sector can develop a capital market
solution for terrorism risk. Securitization is an alternative to traditional
reinsurance and can transfer risk to the deep pool of the global capital
markets. Presently, this concept is just a theoretical possibility. Legal
reforms must first reduce the cost of securitization and enhance the
investment appeal, making terrorism bonds more price competitive with
reinsurance. Even if such reforms are sown, a bond market will take many
years to grow. Such a market, however, is impossible without the regulatory
precursors, which are needed now.
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I. INTRODUCTION
September 11 th was a paradigm-shifting event. Terrorism can no longer
be considered an isolated political or law enforcement problem. ' The
specter of terrorism now pervades every aspect of the global, political,
economic, cultural, and legal institutions.' Terrorism has the power to not
only change the course of political history,3 but also the economic order.4 Its
1. I make this statement from an American perspective, which did not consider terrorism
a systemic threat to homeland and economic security. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT:
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES 71-107, 361 (2004) [hereinafter THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT] (noting the earlier
treatment of terrorism as a discrete law enforcement problem and the new post-9/l 1 view that
"terrorism has become, beyond any doubt, the top national security priority"). The Middle East
and Western Europe have a long history of suffering from terrorism. See infra tbl. 1 and notes
447, 448.
2. The Latin term terror means "great fear, dread." THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF
ETYMOLOGY 1127 (Robert K. Barnhart & Sol Steinnetz eds., 1988). Terrorism took on modem
usage when terroriste was used to describe the Jacobins and the Reign of Terror (1793-1794)
during the French Revolution. 17 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 821 (2d ed. 1989).
Terrorism now has many definitions. See id. ("'A policy intended to strike with terror those
against whom it is adopted; the employment of methods of intimidation .... ') (quoting the
FBI); infra note 97 (stating the definition under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002);
NAT'L SEC. DIv., FBI COUNTERTERRORISM THREAT ASSESSMENT & WARNING UNIT,
TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1996), available at
www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terroris.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2005) ("[T]he unlawful use of
force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.") (quoting
the FBI); AURIELA ZANETTI ET AL., SWISS RE, SIGMA No. 1/2002, NATURAL CATASTROPHES
AND MAN-MADE DISASTERS IN 2001: MAN-MADE LOSSES TAKE ON A NEW DIMENSION 16
(Thomas Hess ed., 2002) ("Terrorism means an act or threat of violence or an act harmful to
human life, tangible or intangible property or infrastructure with the intention or effect of
coercing any government or putting the public or any segment of the public in fear.").
3. See, e.g., Marc Champion et al., Political Fallout of Bombs Hits US. and Europe,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2004, at Al (noting that the Madrid train bombing of March 11, 2004,
"probably played a major role" in the electoral defeat of Prime Minister Josd MariA Aznar). Of
course, 9/11 led to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States, and will define in
a large measure the legacy of President George W. Bush.
4. See PATRICK LENAIN ET AL., THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM (Org. for
Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Working Paper No. 334, 2002) (discussing the substantial
economic costs of terrorism). The impact of any act of terrorism on the economy cannot be
underestimated. For instance, a terrorist attack in the Mall of America or a Walmart superstore
would probably have a relatively small impact on the insurance losses, but it would have a
significant short-term effect on retailers throughout the nation. See John Kimelman, Wall Street
Assesses Terrorism: Is the Overall Risk Reflected in Market?, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 4,
2003, at 10, available at 2003 WL 59126437 ("'Imagine a person going into a shopping mall or
movie theater with a bomb. That could paralyze the economy."') (quoting Kari Bayer Pinkernell
of Merrill Lynch). The anthrax attacks of late 2001 showed that an attack with minimal
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effect on the insurance industry is no less dramatic. In a single day, the
attacks inflicted about $30 billion in insurance losses,5 the single largest
occurrence in insurance history.6 While the solvency of the industry was
never in serious doubt since the industry was well capitalized, 7 market
disruptions followed in the wake of 9/11. That terrorism can inflict such
severe losses came as an information shock. 8 The industry reacted by
exiting the market for terrorism risk, resulting in capacity (supply) reduction
and premium (price) increases. The costs of these market distortions
trickled down to the economy, which saw increased costs of goods,
increased financing costs, delayed or cancelled real estate projects, and lost
jobs.9
In response, Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002,
a three-year federal reinsurance program in which the government would
bear a substantial portion of terrorism losses up to a $100 billion cap.' The
statute sought to stabilize the insurance market in a time of great market
turbulence." Its effectiveness has been mixed, however. The market has
since stabilized but there remains a question as to cause and effect.
Moreover, the industry is no closer to a long-term solution to the problem of
catastrophic terrorism risk. Although the statute is in the final year of
legislative life, the inertia of expectation has taken root and lobbying for the
statute's extension has begun. The fear is that a temporary government
stabilization measure has altered the political and market dynamics. The
question is whether we have learned from 9/11, or whether an ex ante
government program or ex post subsidies are inevitable conclusions.
Insurance weaves through the fabric of the global economy and society. 2
Risk-taking is a fundamental driver of a market economy. 3 The process of
casualties and virtually no direct economic losses can still deeply affect the nation and its
economy.
5. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
6. See infra tbl.3 (stating that Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge Earthquake resulted
in insurance losses of $20.9 billion and $17.3 billion, respectively).
7. See David Pilla, The Cost of Terror (Sept. 11 Terrorist Attacks Expected to Bring the
Largest Insurance Claims Ever), 102 BEST'S REv. 6 (2001), available at 2001 WL 12285740
("[W]e are not considering widespread insurer bankruptcies as a likely or even remotely
possible outcome . . . .") (quoting Alice Schroeder of Morgan Stanley). The 9/11 attacks
resulted in only a few bankruptcies. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part II.C.
11. See infra Part II.B and accompanying text.
12. See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL
THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1946) (proposing a theory of insurance
in the context of law and public policy); Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance
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disaggregating, reconstituting, and transferring various forms of risk is a
vital function.' Insurance spreads fortuitous risk so that economic actors
can undertake more enterprise and financial risks, and it is one of the key
mechanisms to distribute compensation. If large enough, catastrophes,
whether natural or manmade, can impart an exogenous shock to the
insurance system. 5 Such shocks present a systemic threat to the stability of
the insurance market as currently configured, posing broad ranging
economic ramifications in the United States and elsewhere.' 6
Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471 (1961)
(proposing that insurance weaves through the fabric of our social, political, and economic
institutions). In 2003, worldwide insurance premium volume was about $3 trillion, constituting
8% of the aggregate global GDP or $470 per capita. ULRIKE BIRKMAIER & CAMILLE CODONI,
Swiss RE, SIGMA No. 3/2004, WORLD INSURANCE IN 2003: INSURANCE INDUSTRY ON THE ROAD
TO RECOVERY, 33 (Thomas Hess ed., 2004). Premium volumes for life and nonlife insurance
were $1.67 trillion and $1.27 trillion, respectively. Id.
13. Keynes observed that "enterprise will fade and die" without the risk taking drive of
"animal spirits." JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST
AND MONEY 162 (Harcourt Brace & Co. 1964) (1936).
14. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERICAL PRACTICES § 1.1(a), at 2 (1988) ("Insurance
may well be an essential system for risk distribution in any industrialized society .... "). Both
the capital markets and the insurance industry facilitate the sale and purchase of risk, though the
methods of transfer differ.
15. Catastrophes vary in degrees. While billion dollar losses are significant events, they do
not pose a systemic risk to the economy. This article uses the term catastrophe as insurance
events that are in the order of 9/11, Hurricane Andrew, and the Northridge earthquake, a mega-
catastrophe for lack of a more articulate term. See infra notes 447 & 449. Recently, mega-
catastrophes have attracted the attention of legal scholars. See RICHARD A. POSNER,
CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2004). While there is no hard and fast rule on what
constitutes a mega-catastrophe, the data suggests that single events inflicting losses of $20
billion or more present unique challenges to the industry. See Harry Shuford, Understanding
Cycles and Shocks in the Property and Casualty Insurance Industry, 39 BUS. ECON. 38, 39
(2004). This is an arbitrary sum, but is referenced to previous catastrophes that injected
exogenous shock to the industry. See infra note 449. Of course, the impact of a catastrophe
depends on not only the loss, but also on the frequency and the duration between events. With
this said, I do not discount the true costs of any terrorist act on the economy. See, e.g., supra
note 4.
16. See BIRKMAIER & CODONI, supra note 12, at 33 (noting that North America and
Western Europe generated premium volume of $2.17 trillion, constituting 72% of the world
market). The insurance dimension of terrorism has primarily been a Western problem.
American or Western European insurers and reinsurers suffered the brunt of the 9/11 losses.
Western countries, and their institutions and allies, have suffered the most in terms of lives and
property. See infra tbl. 1 (noting that the U.S. and the U.K. suffered eight of the top ten attacks
in terms of property losses). Nevertheless, the ramifications on the global economy are
significant. See, e.g., Insurance Cos Offering Terrorism Cover: Bankruptcy Feared, PAKISTAN
PRESS INT'L INFO. SERV., Jan. 19, 2002, available at 2004 WL 60796922 (stating that Pakistani
insurers fear catastrophic losses from terrorism); Non-Life Insurers Face Rough Time, KOREA
37:0435] 439
ARIZONA STATE LA W JOURNAL
September 11 th exposed the vulnerability of the insurance system to
catastrophic terrorist attacks. While the industry has fully recovered from
the financial shock, it cannot withstand multiple blows on the scale of 9/11
under the current industry model. The problem is one of capacity at
economically feasible levels. If terrorism is a long-term political problem
and the world will continue to suffer from it, the private market or
government (or both) must develop an alternative form of insurance capital
to address extreme risk. As currently configured, the economy has only
three primary sources of compensation: insurance proceeds, government
subsidies, and tort recoveries. Litigation is the most inefficient mechanism
to deliver compensation and therefore should be avoided; 7 and the fallout
from 9/11 exposed the weakness in the insurance sector. 8 These limitations
would seem to suggest that only the government has sufficient capital to
absorb large losses.
This article discusses the insurance dimension of terrorism risk as a long-
term economic problem. It addresses two basic issues: Can the private
sector increase economically feasible capacity? What should be the
government's role? The regulatory policy toward these questions is still
unsettled. This article suggests, as others have, that the government is not as
competent as the private market in assessing catastrophic risk and that ex
ante subsidies tend to undermine market efficiency. 9 This is not to suggest
that market solution and legislative action are mutually exclusive. In times
of crisis, government can and should intervene with subsidies and other
temporary measures to stabilize the market when appropriate.2" But this
form of government action is not the type of a structural change in the
underlying economics of the insurance industry. There are two chief
drawbacks of an ex post approach: it is unpredictable, often subject to a mix
of political motivations, sympathy, and perceived (if not always correct)
economic needs; and it often has the unintended consequence of distorting
the ordinary workings of the market.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2001, available at 2001 WL 25565952 (noting the trickle down effect of
increased premium rates from overseas reinsurers on the Korean insurance market).
17. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
18. The insurance industry is but a small component of the global capital market. See infra
note 348 (noting that the global market capitalization is about $34 trillion). The combined
market capitalization of the global insurance industry is about $1 trillion. OXFORD METRICA, A
SHAREHOLDER VALUE ANALYSIS OF THE GLOBAL (RE)iNSURANCE INDUSTRY 5 (2003) (data as of
2001).
19. See infra Part III.C.
20. See infra Part III.B.
440 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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The government should seek to reconfigure the insurance market. The
goal should be to increase the pool of capital, thus increasing capacity and
decreasing prices. To this end, some of the risk should be transferred from
the limited capital base of the insurance sector to the capital markets
through the process of securitization (a structured financial transaction)."'
For many years, securitizations have provided vast amounts of cheaper
capital to financial institutions in the consumer and mortgage lending
sectors. Insurance securitization has been touted as an alternative form of
capital, but the insurance-linked bond market has not developed into a
substantial alternative to traditional reinsurance, comprising only a tiny
fraction of the capital that supports catastrophic risk.22 The securitization of
terrorism risk, though theoretically promising, has been described as a
"farfetched" possibility in the near future. 3 A bond market cannot exist
without the necessary precursors: an efficient risk transfer structure, the
development of generally accepted information and modeling techniques, a
measure of price parity with traditional reinsurance, a reduction in the
regulatory costs of securitization, a reduction of the tax burdens, and an
appropriate "gestation" period during which investors and other market
participants learn to analyze the investments and risks.24
There is a disconnect between the promise of theory and the reality of
greater costs and uncertainty.25 The government should bridge this gap by
promoting regulatory and tax policies that would better promote price
efficiency, i.e., price that mirrors the actuarial risk as adjusted by an
appropriate risk premium. " The primary regulation of catastrophe
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part IV.C. If reforms are made to foster a securities market in terrorism risk,
the same changes could be made applicable to natural catastrophe securitizations. During the
1990s, natural catastrophes, which present a similar problem for the insurance industry,
significantly increased in frequency and severity. See infra notes 314, 449 and accompanying
text and tables. The longterm prospects of global warming and extreme climate events may tax
the existing capital based of the insurance sector, necessitating alternative risk transfer outlets.
23. See infra note 370 and accompanying text.
24. See infra Part V.D.
25. "Yet some academic theorists still insist that the private market will create new capital
supply for terrorism insurance, despite the fact that sophisticated capitalists who actually
operate in the market have not come forward with capital." Ensuring Economic Security in the
Face of Terrorism: A Public-Private Partnership, AM. INS. ASS'N ADVOCATE (Am. Ins. Ass'n),
Mar. 3, 2005, at 3 [hereinafter AM. INS. ASS'N ADVOCATE].
26. Because regulatory costs and tax burdens are so high, most natural catastrophe
securitizations have been done offshore in tax havens such as Bermuda and the Cayman Islands.
See infra Part IV.B. Securitization is only one method in a class of nontraditional insurance
solutions called alternative risk transfer ("ART"). Other solutions include captives, finite risk,
multi-integrated insurance products, contingent capital, and insurance derivatives. See generally
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securitization should be federalized to reduce the regulatory uncertainties
and costs. Tax incentives should also be provided to enhance investment
appeal. Although the government is always free to provide ex post subsidies
pursuant to economic necessity or political expediency, the private market
is a more efficient means to spread risk. The government's role should be to
facilitate a convergence of insurance and capital markets, thereby
reconfiguring an insurance system that is increasingly vulnerable to natural
and manmade catastrophic risk.27
II. A "NEW" INSURANCE PROBLEM
A. Paradigm Shift
It is now almost trite to say that 9/11 was unprecedented. The terrorists
strategically targeted the world's most important commercial and political
centers. They killed 2,976 people, displaced 1,025 businesses employing
more than 75,000 people, disrupted another 18,000 businesses employing
563,000 people, 28 inflicted over $30 billion in insured losses,29 and another
MUNICH RE ART SOLUTIONS, INSURANCE DERIVATIVES-CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MARKETS
AND INSURANCE MARKETS (1999); WERNER SHAAD, SWISS RE, SIGMA No. 2/1999,
ALTERNATIVE RISK TRANSFER (ART) FOR CORPORATIONS: A PASSING FASHION OR RISK
MANAGEMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY? (Esther Baur ed., 1999) (describing these ART
products); Christopher M. Lewis & Peter 0. Davis, Capital Market Instruments for Financing
Catastrophe Risk: New Directions?, 17 J. INS. REG. 110 (1998). It is beyond the scope of this
article to discuss this panoply of ART products or risk management other than catastrophe
securitizations, which have emerged as one of the primary sources of alternative capital.
27. See infra tbls. 1-4.
28. LLOYD DIXON & RACHEL KAGANOFF STERN, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE,
COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES FROM THE 9/11 ATTACKS 15, 103 (2004).
29. For convenience, the estimated loss is noted as $30 billion throughout this article. The
loss estimate is a moving target. Earlier estimates were higher with a larger spread. See
HOWARD KUNREUTHER & ERWANN MICHAEL-KERJAN, THE WHARTON SCHOOL OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEALING WITH EXTREME EVENTS: NEW CHALLENGES FOR
TERRORISM RISK COVERAGE IN THE U.S. 5 (2004) (estimating $40 billion); ALICE SCHROEDER,
MORGAN STANLEY, REBROADCAST: UPDATE ON WTC-RELATED ISSUES 34 (2001) (givng a
midpoint average of $45 billion); WERNER SHAAD, SWISS RE, TERRORISM-DEALING WITH THE
NEW SPECTRE 3 (UC, Technical Communications, Chief Underwriting Office ed., 2002)
(estimating $30 billion to $58 billion in losses); Mark A. Hoffmann & Meg Fletcher, Loss
Picture Still Unclear, BUS. INS., Sept. 9, 2002, at 10 (estimating $35 billion to $75 billion);
Alison R. Orlans, Terrorism Insurance and Commercial Real Estate: The New Frontier, 7 N.C.
BANKING INST. 93, 100 & n.60 (2003) (estimating $60 billion to $100 billion). Recent estimates
are lower with a tighter range. See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, PUBLIC POLICY MONOGRAPH, P/C
TERRORISM INSURANCE COVERAGE: WHERE Do WE Go POST-TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT?
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$50 billion more in uninsured losses.3 ° These figures do not include the
indirect economic costs stemming from the attacks which, according to the
OECD, were about $500 billion dollars.3 September lth stands as the
largest insurance loss arising from a single event.32
Before 9/11, the conventional wisdom in the insurance industry mirrored
the broader society's assumption that terrorism posed a discrete risk of low
intensity, high visibility violence, the paradigm cases being the killing of
Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympics and the 1988 bombing of
Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie.33 Consistent with this assumption, the actuarial
12 (2004) (estimating $25 billion to $35 billion); DIXON & STERN, supra note 28, at xviii, 1
(estimating a high of $32.5 billion with current payments of $19.6 billion); R. GLENN HUBBARD
& BRUCE DEAL, ANALYSIS GROUP, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN
TERRORISM RISK 10 (2004) (estimating $32.5 billion). The precise loss to the insurance industry
will not be known for many years as claims are made and disputes resolved. See generally infra
note 57 and accompanying text.
30. The direct economic loss has been calculated to be between $80 billion to $90 billion.
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CATASTROPHIC INSURANCE RISKS: STATUS OF EFFORTS TO
SECURITIZE NATURAL CATASTROPHE AND TERRORISM RISK 1 (2003) ($80 billion); see also
SHAAD, supra note 29, at 3 ($90 billion).
31. LENAINETAL., supra note 4, at 3 (estimating a loss of 5% of annual GDP from 2001 to
2003).
32. The attacks wiped out about 25% of the capital supporting the commercial multiperil
insurance sector, or about 11% of the US nonlife premiums. See PATRIZIA BAUR & RUDOLPH
ENZ, SWISS RE, SIGMA No. 5/2003, REINSURANCE-A SYSTEMIC RISK? 13 (Thomas Hess &
Auriella Zanetti eds., 2003) (estimating that 25% of global reinsurance capital was destroyed by
9/11 and $40 billion loss constituted about 11% of the US nonlife premiums); GARY EMBLETON
& KELLEY BERNAL, GEN RE FACULTATIVE MATTERS, TERRORISM-TO TRIA... AND BEYOND,
2 (2004) (25% of capital); RONALD E. FERGUSON ET AL., GENERAL COLOGNE RE, TOPICS No. 10,
THE IMPACTS OF THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11TH ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND UNDERWRITING 8
(2002) (providing separate estimates of 15%, 20%, and 22% to 34% of capital). Aside from
Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge earthquake, see infra note 449, the 1906 San Francisco
earthquake, measuring 7.7 to 7.9 on the Richter scale, is the only other comparable event. The
earthquake caused $180 million in losses, constituting 35% of the U.S. primary insurance
premiums at the time. BAUR & ENZ, supra, at 13. In terms of the amount of loss, only asbestos
liability, estimated to be at $117 billion to $127 billion, exceeds 9/11 losses. TILLINGHAST-
TOWERS PERRIN, SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 5 (2001);
see OXFORD METRICA, supra note 18, at 26 (estimating $41 billion paid thus far for asbestos
claims and environmental liability, with another $23 billion held in loss reserve, and another
$121 billion in future losses).
33. See SCHROEDER, supra note 29, at 4 ("conventional wisdom about terrorism prior to
September 11 th had been that terrorism was principally confined to small-scale events"). Even
the US intelligence community held this conventional wisdom:
It would be a mistake to redefine counterterrorism as a task of dealing with
"catastrophic," "grand," or "super" terrorism, when in fact these labels do not
represent most of the terrorism that the United States is likely to face or most
of the costs that terrorism imposes on U.S. interests.
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and pricing models did not consider terrorism as an extraordinary risk in the
vein of nuclear contamination, war loss, or even earthquake loss for which
either the risk is excluded or additional premiums are collected.34 Insurers
covered terrorism risk in most "all risk" policies." Nor did reinsurers carve
out the risk in their treaties.36 In effect, the risk was perceived to be so de
minimis that it was covered for "free.,
37
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 343 (quoting Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S.
Foreign Policy 23 (2001)).
34. Certain risks are considered so high that, without an additional premium, insurers
regularly exclude them, e.g., the war risk loss and nuclear hazard exclusions. Without an
additional premium, most policies exclude risks of loss due to war and nuclear, biological or
chemical contamination. See, e.g., Int'l Dairy Eng'g Co. of Asia v. Am. Home Assurance Co.,
352 F. Supp. 827, 828 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Zen Cont'l Co. v. Intercargo Ins. Co., 151 F. Supp. 2d
250, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, PUBLIC POLICY MONOGRAPH,
TERRORISM INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE AFTERMATH OF SEPTEMBER 11TH 6 (2002).
35. An "all risk" policy covers all contingencies except those specifically excluded. City
of Burlington v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 332 F.3d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 2003).
36. "Reinsurance is the shifting of part or all of the insurance" business written by a
primary insurer to a reinsurer. See GEORGE E. REJDA, PRINCIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND
INSURANCE 535 (Denise Clinton ed., 8th ed. 2003) (emphasis omitted). In its simplest form,
reinsurance is insurance to insurers "whereby a reinsurer agrees to indemnify a ceding insurer
based upon the cedant's own loss experience." Martin F. Grace et al., Regulating Onshore
Special Purpose Reinsurance Vehicles, 19 J. INS. REG. 551, 557 (2001). Many catastrophe
reinsurance programs are structured so that the cedant retains all losses up to an agreed
aggregate amount and the reinsurer agrees to pay the excess of loss. Id. Among other things,
reinsurance provides another layer of capital supporting the underwriting, and insurers seek
reinsurance to protect against catastrophic risk. Id. Most reinsurers are large, well-capitalized,
international companies that can assume and diversify large risks. The top ten reinsurers
constitute two-thirds of the global market, and European based reinsurers led by Munich Re and
Swiss Re command significant market share. Pat Murphy-O'Connor, Recent Trends in the
Catastrophic Risk Insurance and Reinsurance Market, in THE OECD CONFERENCE ON
CATASTROPHIC RISKS AND INSURANCE (Nov. 22, 2004) [hereinafter OECD CONFERENCE], at
www.oecd.org/document/34/0,2340,fr 2649_37411_33753570_1_1_1_37411,00.html (last
visited Mar. 14, 2005). In the case of 9/11, reinsurers will assume a large bulk of the ultimate
insurance liability. See infra note 65 and accompanying text; see also HUBBARD & DEAL, supra
note 29, at 18 (stating that European insurers and reinsurers will assume a bulk of the losses,
including Lloyd's of London ($2.377 billion), Swiss Re ($2.316 billion), Munich Re ($1.968
billion), and Allianz ($1.323 billion)).
37. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TERRORISM INSURANCE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002, 5 (2004); see also DAN L. CRIPPEN, CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, A CBO STUDY: FEDERAL REINSURANCE FOR DISASTERS 11 (2002) ("Prior to September
11, terrorism insurance was provided only implicitly; that is, most existing policies did not
explicitly include or exclude losses from terrorism."); Terrorism Insurance: Rising Uninsured
Exposure to Attacks Heightens Potential Economic Vulnerabilities: Hearing Before the House
Subcomm. On Capital Mkts., Ins. & Gov 't Sponsored Enters. & the Subcomm. On Oversight &
Investigations, Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 3 (2002) [hereinafter Rising Uninsured
Exposure Hearing] (statement of Richard J. Hillman, Dir., Fin. Mkts. & Cmty. Inv.) ("Insurance
companies considered the risk so low that they did not identify or price potential losses from
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This pricing model continued as terrorism was slowly brewing into a
major problem over the course of several decades.3 ' The 1990s ushered in
the era of catastrophic terrorism, with the phenomenon first taking root in
Western Europe.3 9 Arguably the first catastrophic terrorist act occurred
when the Irish Republican Army bombed London on April 21, 1992,
causing $671 million in insurance losses. The industry recognized then that
terrorism posed a "catastrophic risk."'4 In a prescient assessment, Swiss Re
wrote in 1993: "A single bomb attack can kill thousands of people, cause
several billion dollars of damage and paralyse entire branches of
industry .... [and] lay entire cities to waste."4 1 The industry recognized
then that assessment of terrorism required the consideration of "every
eventuality." 4 2 Thus, 9/11 did not beget a new awareness. Scholars and
policymakers had warned of such risks before and industry leaders were
aware of the potentially massive exposure to terrorism long before al Qaeda
acquired its infamy.43
In the years since 1992, the industry considered many eventualities.
Insurers specifically considered as "possible" an airplane crashing into a
building in a high density urban center but dismissed the risk as not
"probable." 44 Even to an industry whose business is to foresee the
unfortunate and the tragic, it was inconceivable that an airliner, let alone
terrorist activity separately from the general property and liability coverage provided to
businesses."); DAN MILLER, REPORT TO THE JOINT ECON. COMM. OF U.S. CONGRESS, ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM INSURANCE 3 (2002) (most policies "automatically covered" from
terrorism).
38. See tbl.1 for a list of the ten largest terrorism related losses. Since at least 1972, in the
wake of the Munich Olympics, the industry has been tracking major terrorism risks. CHRISTIAN
BRAUNER & GEDRGES GALEY, Swiss RE, TERRORISM RISKS IN PROPERTY INSURANCE AND
THEIR INSURABILITY AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 15 (2003).
39. In the 1990s, four of the top ten most costly terrorist attacks were against New York
and London, resulting in total losses of over $2.5 billion. See infra tbl. 1. Additionally, six of the
those top ten attacks were against U.S. or U.K. targets, resulting in losses of over $3.4 billion. Id.
40. See SwIss RE, TERRORISM AND INSURANCE 3 (1993).
4 1. Id. See infra tbl. 1.
42. Swiss RE, supra note 40, at 10, 27.
43. See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 34, at 7 ("extreme terrorist events have had
a certain amount of theoretical attention in academia"); THE U.S. COMM. ON NAT'L SEC., 21 ST
CENTURY NAT'L SEC. STUDY GROUP, NEW WORLD COMING: AMERICAN SECURITY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 4 (1999), available at http://www.fas.org/man/docs/nwc/nwc.htm (last visited Mar.
22, 2005) ("Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers."). In a bit of
homespun retrospective, Warren Buffett concluded that the insurance industry "violated the
Noah rule: Predicting rain doesn't count; building arks does." Letter from Warren Buffett,
Chairman, to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. 9 (Feb. 28, 2002).
44. MUNICH RE, 11 SEPTEMBER2001 11 (2001).
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two, would be used as guided missiles against an urban target.45 Before 9/11,
losses from terrorism were measured in hundreds of lives and hundreds of
millions of dollars. 46 It was a catastrophic loss, but not on the scale that
would threaten a whole economy or pose a systemic danger to the insurance
system.47 But the industry also knew that liability could extend into the
billions of dollars, and if it had critically analyzed the data, including the
ominous swell of more frequent and severe incidents during the 1990s, 48 the
inevitable conclusion would have been that catastrophic losses would
continue and that both frequency and severity could substantially increase
beyond the linear extrapolations of past data.49
Despite the mounting evidence, the industry discounted the exposure to
infrequent but potentially severe events.5 ° Each year's miss heightened the
45. See Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman, to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway,
Inc. 8 (Feb. 21, 2003) ("A disaster of that scope was highly improbable, of course, but it is up to
insurers to limit their risks in a manner that leaves their finances rock-solid if the 'impossible'
happens."); BRAUNER & GALEY, supra note 38, at 20 (stating that insurers did not anticipate an
airborne attack using several airliners).
46. See infra notes 447-448 and accompanying tables.
47. See supra note 15.
48. See infra tbl. 1. The 1990s saw a trend towards more dramatic terrorist plots. In 1993,
terrorists bombed the World Trade Center with the intention of collapsing the towers. In 1994,
terrorists hijacked an Air France plane in Algiers with the intention of crashing it into the Eiffel
Tower. In 1995, the Philippine government uncovered a plot to blow up 11 American airliners
over the Pacific Ocean. In 1998, terrorists simultaneously bombed the American embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania. In 2000, terrorists attacked the USS Cole, almost sinking the warship. See
PUB. BROAD. Sys., AL QAEDA'S GLOBAL CONTEXT, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/knew/etc/cron.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2005) (providing a timeline of al
Qaeda's rise in global terrorism). And in 1992, 1993, and 1996, terrorists bombed various
targets in the United Kingdom with combined insurance losses over $2.5 billion. See infra tbl. 1.
49. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Brauner and Galey state that:
Looking at the findings and priorities formulated in the 1980s and early
1990s, it becomes evident that the enormous loss potential of future terrorist
attacks had been recognised, and that large reinsurers and international direct
insurers had the best of intentions to make expected future terrorist attacks
manageable from an insurance point of view.
BRAUNER & GALEY, supra note 38, at 17. Indeed, the insurance industry's failure to recognize
catastrophic terrorism risk is similar to the failures of the U.S. intelligence industry as detailed
by the 9/11 commission. See Tr 9/11 CoMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 1, at 339-60 (noting
that intelligence suffered from failures in imagination, policy capabilities, and management).
50. See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 34, at 7 (stating that any terrorism risk was
"not subject to systematic, close attention from an insurance viewpoint before Sept. 11"); ALICE
SCHROEDER, MORGAN STANLEY, ASSESSING TERROR AND RELATED LEGISLATIVE RISKS, 6 (2002)
("Most important to recognize is that the 9/11 attack was not a fluke, nor was it entirely
unforeseen."); Swiss RE, SIGMA No. 1/20032, NATURAL CATASTROPHES AND REINSURANCE 5
(2002) ("There is a tendency to underestimate risks relating to natural hazards when a
catastrophic event has not occurred for a long time."); Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman, to
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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collective perception of inconceivability, reinforcing a cycle of denial based
on a false assumption. The attacks also showed that the potential exposure
could be equivalent to the "Big O - the type of mega-catastrophe that
could result in a systemic failure or incapacitation of the industry,
particularly if nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons were deployed
against a large urban target.52 In short, terrorism risk metastasized into a
paradigm shifting problem for the industry, national economy, and
government.
Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., supra note 43, at 8 ("industry made a fundamental
underwriting mistake by focusing on experience, rather than exposure, thereby assuming a huge
terrorism risk for which we received no premium"). But see Kent Smetters, Brookings-Wharton
Papers on Financial Services, Insuring Against Terrorism: The Policy Challenge 4 (2004) ("It is
especially unimaginable that any insurer of the World Trade Center itself would have never
considered the possibility of another attack."), available at http://irm.wharton.upenn.edu/WP-
Insuring-Smetters.pdf. Cf Georgette Chapman Poindexter, Impossible, Impracticable, or Just
Expensive? Allocation of Expense of Ancillary Risk in the CMBS Market, 36 J. MARSHALL L.
REv. 653, 662 (2003) (discussing how banks and lenders did not consider terrorism to be a
systemic risk to credit and therefore did not require specific terrorism coverage before 9/11).
51. See, e.g., ROGER D. BORCHERDT ET AL., USGS, EARTHQUAKE GROUND-SHAKING AND
ITS POTENTIAL EFFECTS IN THE SAN FRANSCISCO BAY REGION FOR A REPEAT OF THE GREAT 1906
EARTHQUAKE, available at http://nsmp.wr.usgs.gov/Presentations/earthquakeground
_shaking.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2005) ("A repeat of the Great 1906 San Francisco
Earthquake could cause 8,000 deaths and 225 billion dollars in property losses."); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30, at 8-9 (estimates of a mega-catastrophic hurricane in
Florida or earthquake in California are up to $110 billion in insurance losses with property
losses as high as $225 billion). In addition to Florida and California, the New Madrid fault
running along the central Mississippi Valley has historically been the site of the most severe
earthquakes in North America. Id. at 9 & n. 18.
52. Both scholars and sophisticated insurers like Warren Buffett have warned of the
possibility of a mega-catastrophe in the order of $1 trillion, which is the approximate total
capitalization of the entire global insurance market. Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman, to
Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., supra note 43, at 8. See DANIEL ADRIS ET AL., SWISS
RE, NUCLEAR RISKS IN PROPERTY INSURANCE AND LIMITATIONS OF INSURABILITY (Technical
Communications, Chief Underwriting Office ed., 2003) (estimating that a "close-to-worst case"
scenario involving nuclear weapons could result in a trillion dollar loss); JEFFREY R. BROWN ET
AL., THE WHARTON FIN. INSTS. CTR., AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
FEDERAL TERRORISM REINSURANCE 9 (2004) ("the detonation of a nuclear device in a major
urban center such as New York could cause significantly higher losses, possibly running into
trillions of dollars"). Cf generally POSNER, supra note 15 (proposing that government enact
economically efficient policies to prevent a variety of manmade and natural mega-catastrophes).
Obviously, in the event of a nuclear detonation, no economic or government mechanism in
place could absorb such a shock, and humankind would enter an era riskier than any seen since
the dark days of World War II.
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B. Post-9/ 1 Market Distortions
While Ground Zero smoldered, the public and politicians asked if the
industry would honor claims or would try to evade coverage under the war
loss exclusion. 3 The nation was attacked, massive losses were suffered, and
the public needed relief. An industry-wide denial of claims, even if
colorable,54 would have resulted in a backlash that ultimately would have
extracted legal, political, and reputational costs far greater than the
insurances losses.5 Insurers quickly announced that they would not invoke
the war loss exclusion, 56 with the caveat that they would be free to dispute
ordinary coverage issues. 7 In the same breath, however, they indicated that
terrorism risk would be excluded in the future.58
53. See supra note 34.
54. The casualty count of 9/11 is akin to levels seen in traditional wars rather than a single
act of terrorism. There has been discussion of whether the conflict with Islamic terrorist groups
like al Qaeda is a "war." See, e.g., Robert F. Turner, The War on Terrorism and the Modern
Relevance of the Congressional Power to "Declare War", 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 519
(2002); Doyle McManus & James Gerstenzang, America Attacked: The Political Response, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, at Al. Indeed, 9/11 is often compared to the Japanese surprise attack on
December 7, 1941, but Pearl Harbor involved significant loss of military personnel and property
associated with an act of war from a foreign sovereign whereas 9/11 involved mostly private
losses inflicted by a terrorist organization. See Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insuring
Against Terrorism-and Crime, 102 MICH. L. REv. 268, 275 & n.25 (2003).
55. See, e.g., James G. Rizzo, The Impact of 9/11 on the Insurance Industry,
http://www.mwe.com/info/pubs/rizzoins.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2005) (reprinted from
Volume 46, Number 1, Boston Bar Journal) ("Any attempt to evade coverage obligations by
either primary insurers or reinsurers based on such legal maneuvering would not only be
unsupported and unpatriotic - it would tear at the faith of the American people in the insurance
industry.") (quoting Letter from the House Committee on Financial Services, to National
Association of Insurance Commissioners 1 (Sept. 17, 2001)).
56. See, e.g., After the Attack: "Act of War" Exclusion Doesn't Apply to Attacks, Insurers
Say, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2001, at C3; Tom Hamburger & Christopher Oster, Insurance
Industry Backs US. Terrorism Fund, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2001, at A3. Indeed, the industry
associated a certain degree of patriotism with its coverage decision. See, e.g., BRAUNER &
GALEY, supra note 38, at 15 (stating that excluding coverage "could be interpreted as terrorists'
victory over society and hence of the free democratic system"); Richard Allyn & Heather
McNeff, The Fall and Rise of Terrorism Insurance Coverage Since September 11, 2001, 29 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 821, 828 n.41 (2003) (noting the testimony of Ronald E. Ferguson,
Chairman, General Re, that he was "proud of the way [the insurance industry] stepped up to the
losses of September 1 lth without complaint"). Whether this is genuine patriotism or the best
possible spin on an impossible political situation is neither here nor there, given the end result.
57. See, e.g., World Trade Ctr. Props., LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 154, 158
(2d Cir. 2003) (involving litigation concerning whether two attacks on the World Trade Center
towers were one or two occurrences for which insurance provides $3.5 billion "per occurrence").
58. See, e.g., BRAUNER & GALEY, supra note 38, at 24 (stating that insurers proposed new
exclusions, sought significantly more premium for significantly less risk, and generally sought
to limit liability exposure); AURIELA ZANETTI ET AL., supra note 2, at 18 ("In view of such
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Historically, the industry reacts to an event shock by withdrawing from
the market. The last such shocks were Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the
Northridge earthquake in 1994, which precipitated a withdrawal from the
market by reinsurers. This in turn led to dramatic price increases in the short
term,59 but as the industry recapitalized the market eventually went into a
soft price cycle for much of the 1990s.6" While there are microeconomic
and corporate finance theories that explain why insurers withdraw from
markets after event shock,61 in the case of 9/11 the reason is fairly obvious.
Secretary Paul O'Neill best summarized the situation: "Because insurance
companies do not know the upper bound of terrorism risk exposure, they
will protect themselves by charging enormous premiums, dramatically
curtailing coverage or-as we have already seen with terrorism risk
exclusions-simply refusing to offer the coverage." 62 Given that the
industry relies on accurate information to forecast losses, insurers are averse
to informational ambiguities.
After an industry shock, the first to exit are reinsurers. Reinsurance
provides additional capital to insurers and thus increases underwriting
difficulties, a quick answer-and an understandable instant response by insurers to the shock of
11 September-is to exclude terrorism from insurance policies altogether.").
59. See COMMERICAL MORTGAGE SEC. ASS'N, TERRORISM INSURANCE ROUNDTABLE 2002,
at 39, 42 (2002) (quoting Bernard Brown, President, Insurance Advisors LLC, "The history of
the insurance industry is that if they perceive a risk to be very dangerous then they're going to
run away from it."); CRIPPEN, supra note 37, at 3 ("[R]einsurance rates rose 75% between
January 1992 and July 1994."); Anne Gron & Alan 0. Sykes, Terrorism and Insurance Markets:
A Role for the Government as Insurer?, 36 IND. L. REV. 447, 451 (2003) (stating that reinsurers
withdrew from the market).
60. Like other industries, insurance follows the general law of supply and demand. The
amount of underwriting is a function of capital held. If there is excess capital, insurers will seek
to underwrite more business. This leads to price competition, and inadequate returns on capital
as an over supply of capital is vying for limited business opportunities, leading to a "soft" price
cycle. Cf Shuford, supra note 15, at 47 (suggesting that inadequate returns on capital cause
insurance cycles).
61. See Gron & Sykes, supra note 59, at 451-55 (explaining the various technical finance
and insurance theories).
62. Terrorism Risk Insurance, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., &
Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Paul H. O'Neill, Sec'y
of the Treasury); see also infra notes 270, 271 (explaining that insurers have a short-term
aversion to information ambiguity). Anne Gron concurs with Secretary O'Neill's assessment:
And what happens is that when the new information comes and when you
have less capital after the event, you reevaluate your risk portfolio. And a lot
of insurers will realize that they have more risk than they would have
preferred, given the level of capital, given the new information about the risk.
THE CATO INST., POLICY FORUM, INSURING AGAINST TERROR: Is THERE A ROLE FOR
GOVERNMENT REINSURANCE? 14 (2002) (quoting Anne Gron).
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capacity.63 Because reinsurers are unregulated, they can enter and exit
markets at will.' In the case of 9/11, reinsurers bore the brunt of the losses,
about 70%.65 As expected, when a majority of the reinsurance treaties came
up for renewal in January 2002, they were not renewed as to terrorism
coverage.66
Without reinsurance, insurers could not limit the exposure to severe
liability and had no choice but to exclude coverage.67 Their exit, however,
63. The amount insurers can underwrite is regulated in accordance with capital ratios set
by the states. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2c01 to § 40-2c28 (2003). Primary insurers can,
however, underwrite more if they can obtain reinsurance, which cedes some of the premium to
reinsurers in consideration for the assumption of a layer of risk. See BAUR & ENz, supra note 32,
at 11 (noting that, in 2001, less than 14% of premiums in nonlife policies were ceded to
reinsurers).
64. Rising Uninsured Exposure Hearing, supra note 37, at 3-4 (stating the reinsurance
market is not regulated because it involves transactions between sophisticated commercial
parties).
65. BRAUNER & GALEY, supra note 38, at 15. See MILLER, supra note 37, at 4 (noting that
about 25% of the global reinsurance capital was wiped out in assuming a burden of 60% to 80%
of the insurance losses); GEN RE INTERMEDIARIES, CATASTROPHE MARKET UPDATE 4 (Fall 2003)
(estimating World Trade Center losses of $40 billion of which the reinsurance share is $27
billion). Reinsurers are typically large, international institutions that are well capitalized. See id.
(stating that, in 2001, over 60% of the cessions went to eighteen large reinsurance groups). In
the case of 9/11, European and Bermuda based reinsurers took the brunt of the losses: Munich
Re ($1,959 million), Swiss Re ($1,777 million), Allianz ($1,335 million), ACE ($559 million).
OXFORD METRICA, supra note 18, at 22; see also HUBBARD & DEAL, supra note 29, at 18
(providing similar loss figures). Cf Howard Kunreuther & Erwann Michael-Kerjan, Insurability
of (Mega-) Terrorism Risk: Challenges and Perspectives, in OECD CONFERENCE, supra note 36,
at 5 (noting that 9/11 losses covered by 150 insurers and reinsurers, with reinsurers being
responsible for about 67% of the losses).
66. See Rising Uninsured Exposure Hearing, supra note 37, at 2 ("This withdrawal is
happening fastest among reinsurers."). Unlike primary insurance policies which are renewed
throughout the year, reinsurance treaties are typically renewed on a January-July insurance
cycle. As much as 70% of reinsurance treaties came up for renewal during the January 2002
reinsurance cycle, most of which were not renewed. Id. at 4 & n.2. See MILLER, supra note 37,
at 4 (stating that reinsurance treaties were not renewed in January 2002); Congress Needs to Act
Fast to Avert Insurance Crisis, NEWSDAY, Dec. 5, 2001, at A40 ("About 70 percent of
reinsurance contracts expire at [month's end], and reinsurers are threatening not to renew
them.").
67. See COMMERICAL MORTGAGE SEC. ASS'N, supra note 59, at 42 ("[T]he reinsurers are
driving the availability of primary coverage.") (quoting Bernard Brown); MILLER, supra note 37,
at 4 ("[T]he primary insurers bad little choice but to follow."). This is the explanation of the
market dynamics and is not to suggest that primary insurers wanted to cover the risk but could
not for lack of reinsurance. See MILLER, supra note 37, at 1 ("[I]nsurance companies are
routinely excluding or limiting coverage for terrorist acts from the policies they issue.");
Barbara De Lollis, Insurers Asking States to Let Them Opt Out of Terrorism Coverage,
GANNETr NEWS SERV., Dec. 5, 2001, available at 2001 WL 5114767.
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was slower due to regulatory constraints.6" Insurers had to file their new
exclusions with individual state regulators.69 The new exclusion broadly
defines terrorism as the use of force that has the effect or intent to coerce a
government or civilian population; and terrorism coverage is limited to
losses that are $25 million or less with exclusions for losses exceeding this
amount.7 ° The exclusion places terrorism risk squarely on the shoulders of
policyholders and their financiers.7"
In addition to reduced capacity, 9/11 accelerated a price hardening
cycle.7 2 Evidence suggests that post-9/1 1 prices increased in the range of
10% to 50%." These increases were "just shy of a 12-year peak,"7 4 and
some insurers cherry picked underwriting risks at greatly increased prices.75
68. Rising Uninsured Exposure Hearing, supra note 37, at 2. Primary insurers are
regulated by the individual states. See infra Part V.B.
69. Every state approved the new terrorism exclusion language, except for California,
Florida, Georgia, New York, and Texas, which collectively accounted for about 35% of the
commercial market. See Jeffrey E. Thomas, Exclusion of Terrorist-Related Harms from
Insurance Coverage: Do the Costs Justify the Benefits?, 36 IND. L. REv. 397 (2003) (discussing
the new terrorism exclusion); see generally Jane Kendall, The Incalculable Risk: How the
World Trade Center Disaster Accelerated the Evolution of Insurance Terrorism Exclusions, 36
U. RICH. L. REv. 569 (2002).
70. See AM. AcAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 34, at 14-15 (quoting the new war and
terrorism risk exclusions filed by ISO on behalf of the insurance industry).
71. The designations "insureds," "policyholders," and "businesses" are used
synonymously throughout this article as purchasers or potential purchasers of commercial
property and casualty insurance. This group is most at risk in terms of absolute value of
potential losses.
72. See MILLER, supra note 37, at 5 ("[T]errorism insurance is still very expensive, terms
are restrictive and coverage limits are frequently too low, when it is available at all.").
Anecdotal evidence suggested high premiums and unavailability of coverage. See id. at 6-7;
Rising Uninsured Exposure Hearing, supra note 37, at 10-13. The commercial insurance
business is cyclical. See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 29, at 4 ("P/C insurance is often
considered an inherently cyclical industry... ."); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30,
at 10 (charting the softening of the reinsurance market after the recapitalization of the industry
after Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge earthquake). Even before 9/11 commercial
insurance prices had been hardening after nearly a decade of soft cyclical prices. See AM. ACAD.
OF ACTUARIES, supra note 34, at 2 ("Prior to Sept. 11, the P/C insurance market was in the
price-firming phase of its market cycle. After Sept. 11, the P/C market is exhibiting accelerated
price firming and has started to incorporate some coverage limitations."); Rising Uninsured
Exposure Hearing, supra note 37, at 2 n.1 ("Prices were already increasing for commercial
coverage prior to September 1lth."); MILLER, supra note 37, at 10 (noting price hardening
before 9/11 and that "premiums for most commercial insurance policies increased 10 to 30
percent in the first quarter of 2002").
73. See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 29, at 1.
74. Weathering Well-Catastrophe Insurance, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 21, 2004, at 62.
75. See Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman, to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway,
Inc., supra note 43, at 9 (stating that Berkshire Hathaway's General Re would underwrite
terrorism risk, but only selectively); Gron & Sykes, supra note 59, at 448 (noting that "a little
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Although certain high-risk cities and trophy properties carried the greatest
risk and saw the largest premium hikes, increases were seen across the
board.
Reduced capacity and increased prices led to an inability to transfer risk.
Unless required by financial covenants in debentures, few policyholders
bought terrorism coverage. The new pricing of terrorism coverage and cost-
benefit perceptions of policyholders led to adverse selection. 76 Those
perceived to be most at risk (e.g., policyholders and financiers of trophy
properties) were the most likely to purchase terrorism coverage, if such
coverage was available, while lower risk policyholders chose to forego it."
The greatest risk of terrorism was transferred, albeit selectively, to the
industry, which could not sufficiently diversify this risk due to the low "take
up" by lower risk insureds who may have been priced out of the market.
Adverse selection and price distortions concentrated risk.7 8 This is not to
suggest that before 9/11 the risk was widely spread via insurance.7 9 Even
the World Trade Center-an iconic symbol of American economic power-
was underinsured from the perspective of total loss.8" A large portion of
more than six months after" 9/11, some insurers were willing to insure the airliners with an
appropriate premium hike); Orlans, supra note 29, at 100 & n.60 (indicating that only six
insurers were willing to offer insurance at an estimated rate of $0.20 for every $100 of
replacement value, those six insurers being AIG, Lloyd's of London, Berkshire Hathaway, the
Chubb Corp., Travelers Insurance, and Liberty Mutual).
76. See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 29, at 5 ("A continuous build-up of
terrorism exposure of those that think they are high-risk on an insurer's portfolio could become
problematic. This type of adverse selection may also have affected the pricing.").
77. See Rising Uninsured Exposure Hearing, supra note 37, at 3. The highest risk incurred
the greatest price increases while coverage was significantly reduced.
78. See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 34, at 4 ("higher rates with less coverage
seem likely to be more pronounced for larger rather than for smaller risks and for major city
risks").
79. For "every dollar of commercial-structure replacement value," insurers maintained
capital of approximately "two-tenths of a penny of premium." SCHROEDER, supra note 50, at 4.
Insurers collected premiums approximately the equivalent amount of capital. Id. As of 2000, the
industry had collected $19.8 billion of premium for US commercial multiperil coverage, as
compared to the "$5.5 trillion replacement value of all US commercial structures." Id Including
real estate, the total asset value is $12.2 trillion, which is supported by $8.2 trillion in debt and
$4 trillion in equity (approximately). Id. At the end of 2001, the aggregate U.S. property and
casualty insurer capital was about $282 billion. Id. In addition to the real structure, Morgan
Stanley estimates "$5.1 trillion in inventory, equipment and software." Id.
80. The World Trade Centers were insured for $3.55 billion per occurrence. See STEVEN
BRILL, AFTER: How AMERICA CONFRONTED THE SEPTEMBER 12 ERA 156, 389 (2003)
(replacement value estimated at $5 to $6 billion); DIxON & STERN, supra note 28, at 103
(stating the replacement value estimated at $4.5 billion, and contents at $5.2 billion). Cf. Mark
Hamblett, Industry Lawyers Argue WTC Was Underinsured, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 16, 2004, at 1
(noting that lawyers for insurers argued the World Trade Center was underinsured).
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fortuitous risk, including terrorism risk, was always shouldered by
policyholders and their financiers."
That policyholders bear some risk through deductibles, retentions and
policy limits is an essential part of risk management. Risk management
techniques are categorized into "avoidance, reduction, control, transfer and
retention,""2 all of which require significant policyholder participation. The
problem was not that 9/11 left owners and financiers retaining their risk.83 It
was that the insurance mechanism was unavailable when they sought to
transfer some of the risk in the ordinary course of corporate risk
management. There was either no coverage or exorbitant prices.84 Because
there was a temporary dislocation of supply and demand, the economy
began to suffer. In addition to the direct losses caused by the attacks and the
immediate consequences on the airline, hotel and tourism industries, high
premiums had a trickle down effect on the rest of the economy. Increases in
financing costs led to higher cost of goods and services, resulting in higher
prices and reduced profits. 5 The real estate and financing industries were
hit the hardest. The lack of coverage and higher premiums increased the
cost of capital and restricted capital flow to the real estate and construction
sectors.86 Commercial mortgage backed securities ("CMBS") saw a decline
81. See SCHROEDER, supra note 50, at 3. Not surprisingly, 67% to 75% of retail
establishments in Lower Manhattan carried insurance that covered some of the losses from 9/11.
DIXON & STERN, supra note 28, at 107. When the Morgan Stanley data is viewed in comparison,
the data suggests that, even before 9/11, there was some degree of adverse selection involved as
businesses in high risk urban areas tended to get insurance while other businesses may not.
82. See Christopher D. Stone, Beyond Rio: "Insuring" Against Global Warming, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 445, 474-75 (1992).
83. Policyholders and owners always retain a significant portion of the risk in catastrophes.
Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge earthquake inflicted about $34 billion and $43 billion of
losses, respectively, but insurance only covered a portion of the losses. See CRIPPEN, supra note
37, at 10 (providing figures on economic losses); infra tbl.1 and note 449 (providing estimates
of insurance losses). September 11 th resulted in a similar retention of some of the losses by
policyholders and owners. See supra note 29.
84. See THE CATO INST., supra note 62, at 23 (containing Debra Ballen, American
Insurance Association, comments that two-thirds of major corporations have no terrorism
coverage and that "eighty percent believe their coverage is inadequate" based on data from Risk
and Insurance Management Society).
85. See Hearing, supra note 62 ("[I]ncreased premiums and/or increased risk exposure for
businesses . . . will be passed on to consumers in the form of higher product prices,
transportation costs, energy costs and reduced production.").
86. See Rising Uninsured Exposure Hearing, supra note 37, at 2 ("[S]ome sectors of the
economy-notably real estate and commercial lending-are beginning to experience difficulties
because some properties and businesses are unable to find sufficient terrorism coverage, at any
price."); MILLER, supra note 37, at 1 ("As a result, a significant barrier to economic activity has
been created, as businesses are forced to bear higher costs of insurance or are unable to conduct
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in overall credit rating and prices,87 and borrowers faced the possibility of
default and loan recalls due to covenants requiring insurance coverage."
Lenders refused to finance billions of dollars of construction projects
without terrorism coverage, resulting in significant job losses in the
construction and real estate industries in an economy that was already
sliding into a recession. 9
In short, 9/11 caused substantial short-term economic damage on a
national level. The insurance market was perceived to be "unstable" in the
short-term, 9 causing price and capacity dislocation, adverse selection of
risk, concentrated risk, economic slowdown, and significant job losses. In
the midst of this perceived temporary economic turbulence, the government
enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 ("TRIA").91
C. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002
On November 26, 2002, TRIA was signed into law. 92 TRIA is a
temporary market stabilization measure with a sunset date of December 31,
business due to financing requirements to carry terrorism insurance."). Approximately $15 to
$17 billion worth of commercial real estate loans, "representing about 10% of the CMBS
market," were suspended or cancelled due to terrorism risk and the inability of businesses to
transfer the risk. See id. at 14 & n.70 ($17 billion); THE CATO INST., supra note 62, at 24 (citing
$15 billion in seventeen states); President George W. Bush, Address on the Signing of the
Terrorism Insurance Act (Nov. 26, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2002/11/20021126-1.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2005) (citing $15 billion).
87. See DANIEL B. RUBOCK, CMBS WORLD, MOODY'S UPDATE ON TERRORISM
INSURANCE, 48 (2003) (downgrading eleven deals); AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 34,
at 6 (lenders reluctant "to finance projects of $100 million or more" and to invest in single asset
CMBS bonds); Poindexter, supra note 50, at 660-61 (noting that rating agencies downgraded
billions of dollars of single asset CMBS and that lenders threatened to "force place" expensive
coverage on borrowers). CMBS are commercial real estate loans that have been securitized into
bonds collateralized by the income streams from the mortgage. See infra Part IV.A.
88. See Rising Uninsured Exposure Hearing, supra note 37, at 11. But see Orlans, supra
note 29, at 101 ("Lenders have generally avoided placing loans into default for insufficient
terrorism insurance.").
89. See EMBLETON & BERNAL, supra note 32, at 2 (stating lenders held up approximately
$17 billion of construction projects for lack of terrorism coverage); see also Rising Uninsured
Exposure Hearing, supra note 37, at 9 ("Some examples of large projects canceling or
experiencing delays have surfaced, with the lack of terrorism coverage being cited as a principal
contributing factor."); Orlans, supra note 29, at 94 (noting that more than $11.7 billion of real
estate projects were delayed or cancelled).
90. AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 29, at 4.
91. See Bush, supra note 86 ("[T]he Terrorism Risk Insurance Act will permit many
construction projects to move forward and to help this economy grow.").
92. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 101(a)-(b), 116 Stat.
2322, 2322-23 (2002) [hereinafter TRIA]. TRIA is loosely based on Pool Re, the British
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2005. 93 It implements a federal reinsurance program. Coverage begins when
the Secretary of Treasury certifies a loss caused by an "act of terrorism,"
defined as "an act that is dangerous to human life, property, or
infrastructure [committed] . . . to coerce the civilian population of the
United States or to influence the policy or affect the conduct of the United
States Government by coercion.,
94
TRIA is mandatory for insurers but optional for policyholders. Insurers
must offer terrorism coverage that "does not differ materially from the
terms, amounts, and other coverage limitations applicable to losses arising
from events other than acts of terrorism." 95 This nullifies the new terrorism
risk exclusions that were approved by most states after 9/11.96 In exchange,
the government provides a cost sharing program. In the event of a certified
act of terrorism, insurers retain a loss deductible of 7%, 10%, and 15% of
their direct earned premiums in 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively.97 Above
this deductible, the government bears 90% of the loss up to a maximum loss
of $100 billion per year while insurers bear the remaining 10% and any
excess losses above the $100 billion per year cap. 98 By way of example, if
scheme to provide reinsurance coverage for terrorism risk. Levmore & Logue, supra note 54, at
301. See generally William B. Bice, British Government Reinsurance and Acts of Terrorism:
The Problems of Pool Re, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. 441 (1994) (discussing Pool Re). TRIA was
the product of extensive negotiations among the various interest groups, which accounted for
the fact that it was signed into law over a year after 9/11. See Mark Boran, To Insure or Not to
Insure, That is the Question: Congress' Attempt to Bolster the Insurance Industry After the
Attacks on September 11, 2001, 17 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT., 523, 561-82 (2003)
(describing the TRIA negotiation process).
93. TRIA § 108(a). TRIA was set to expire on December 31, 2004 unless the Secretary of
Treasury extended the "make available" provision to 2005 by September 1, 2004. Id. §
103(c)(2). Subsequently, the Treasury Department extended TRIA for 2005. Treasury
Department Press Release (June 24, 2004). Lobbying by the industry may have influenced this
decision. See, e.g., Letter from Coalition to Insure Against Terrorism to President George W.
Bush (Apr. 21, 2004) (urging extension of the "make available" provision).
94. Id. § 102(1). The statututory definition of "terrorism" excludes acts of domestic
terrorism, acts of war, acts not on American soil (with a few exceptions), and acts that do not
exceed $5 million of damage in the aggregate. Id. Also, it applies to commercial property and
casualty insurance, but does not apply to other insurance lines, such as life and health, personal
lines, federal crop, private mortgage, financial guaranty, medical malpractice, flood, and
reinsurance and retrocession. Id. § 102(12).
95. Id. § 103(c)(1)(B).
96. See supra note 69.
97. TRIA § 102(7). The deductible levels are high for most large commercial insurers. A
recent survey estimates that the 2004 deductibles for AIG, Travelers, ACE, Chubb and
Berkshire Hathaway would be $2.7 billion: "$928 million, $743 million, $600 million and $200
million, respectively." KUNREUTHER & MICHAEL-KERJAN, supra note 29, at 16 n.23.
98. TRIA § 103(e). The statute requires a mandatory government recoupment of the
federal share of the losses if the aggregate deductible and 10% share is less than the "insurance
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TRIA had been in place on 9/11 and insurance losses are finally determined
to be $35 billion, the government would have paid anywhere from about $4
billion to $21 billion of the $35 billion loss, depending on the loss
deductible percentage applicable for that year. 99 In the event of another
attack on the scale of 9/11 or greater, TRIA would provide a substantial
government subsidy to the insurance industry at the expense of taxpayers.00
By capping the liability of extreme catastrophe, the federal government acts
as the reinsurer to insurers and policyholders. This is a form of federal
subsidy in that the government receives no compensation for assuming this
extreme risk, which would have otherwise been privately apportioned
between insurer and policyholder in an economically rational manner."'
There is a risk transfer from the industry to the government wherein the
former can now earn a profitable premium-profitable because it can be
actuarially assessed without consideration of extreme risk.
The government enacted TRIA for two purposes: (1) to address "market
disruptions and ensure the continued widespread availability and
affordability" of insurance and (2) to "allow for a transitional period for the
private markets to stabilize, resume pricing of such insurance, and build
capacity to absorb any future losses."' 2 The mandatory offer feature of
TRIA is presumed to have partially achieved the first objective. Terrorism
risk generally has been available to businesses, including owners of trophy
marketplace aggregate retention amount," set at $10 billion, $12.5 billion, and $15 billion in
years 2003, 2004, and 2005. Id. § 103(e)(6). The government would then recoup the difference
between these amounts through a policyholder surcharge of not more than 3% of the policy
premium per year. Id. § 103(7)-(8); see also Jeffrey Manns, Insuring Against Terror?, 112
YALE L.J. 2509, 2534 (2003).
99. BRAUNER & GALEY, supra note 38, at 31. This assumes direct earned premiums of
$170 billion. Id. The calculation works as follows: the deductible rates of 7%, 10%, and 15%
premium income in program years one, two, and three would result in deductibles of about $12
billion, $17 billion, and $26 billion; the insurers would retain 10% in excess of the premium
deductible, or $2.3 billion, $1.8 billion, or $0.9 billion, depending on the program year; the
insurance industry would have assumed $14.3 billion, $18.8 billion, or $26.9 billion of losses,
depending on the program year; the government's share would then be $20.7 billion, $16.2
billion, or $8.1 billion, depending on the program year in which the attack occurred.
100. To put the $8 billion to $21 billion subsidy in context, the September 1 1th Victim
Compensation Fund has paid out over $5 billion in compensation to 9/11 victims. See infra note
235.
101. If the insurer does not assume the catastrophe risk, it is questionable whether
policyholders would purchase coverage in the first place. Hubbard and Deal argue that "TRIA is
not a subsidy transfer to primary insurers and no payments are duplicated under the program."
HUBBARD & DEAL, supra note 29, at 22. While this is technically true, they gloss over the larger
point that there is now free federal reinsurance.
102. TRIA § 101(b).
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properties, and credit ratings of CMBS bonds have improved. 103 The
government found that there is "widespread availability of terrorism
insurance.1 °4 But questions concerning the cause and effect remain open to
debate. Evidence suggests that premium prices were coming down from the
initial price spikes during the fourteen month period between 9/11 and the
enactment of TRIA. °5 Lenders were beginning to adjust to the reality that
terrorism insurance was limited, and according to the Federal Reserve, as of
July 2002, data from the CMBS market "'suggests that concerns about
terrorism insurance have not been widespread."' 06 These effects are
consistent with the experiences of Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge
earthquake, which saw a similar pattern of mass withdraw after an event
103. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TERRORISM INSURANCE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002 4 (2004). Effective July 7, 2004, the GAO changed
its legal name from the Government Accounting Office to the Government Accountability
Office. GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-271, 118 Stat. 811 (2004).
104. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 103, at 5; see also Smetters, supra note 50,
at 1 ("Overall, premiums are viewed as reasonable.").
105. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 52, at 10 (noting how the market was stabilizing into a
new equilibrium even before TRIA was enacted); THE CATO INST., supra note 62, at 30
(containing the comments of Scott Harrington, University of South Carolina, that "prices are
high, but the brokerage community estimates that the prices have dropped substantially since
the beginning of this year [2002]"); Lisa S. Howard, Capacity Issues Creep Into Special Terror
Market, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, May 6, 2002, at 20 ("[T]he market has stabilized, more capacity
has become available, and prices have dropped ...."); Smetters, supra note 50, at 13 (stating
that, "[b]y September 2002, premiums dropped as much as 75 percent per unit of coverage,"
and limits as high as $1 billion were once again available). Cf REPUBLICAN POL'Y COMM., U.S.
SENATE, FEDERAL TERRORISM REINSURANCE: A SOLUTION OR A PROBLEM?, 6 (2004) (noting
that terrorism risk price averaged about 8% to 10% of the total all risk premium).
106. Smetters, supra note 50, at 27-28; see also CRIPPEN, supra note 37, at 30 (noting that
CMBS data "do[es] not suggest a major disruption in the supply of commercial mortgage
money at this time [September 2002]" and that "investors are not demanding much of a
premium for bearing terrorism risk, in part because CMBSs are geographically diversified").
"[L]enders began to adapt to more limited access to terrorism insurance by waiving coverage
covenants in exchange for higher loan rates." Manns, supra note 98, at 2524; see also CRIPPEN,
supra note 37, at 29 (noting little impact of the lack of terrorism coverage on the real estate
lending industry and attributing any decline in commercial construction to the recession started
in March 2001). There is evidence that terrorism risk did not hurt the CMBS market as much as
some believed. See supra note 87. In July 2002, the Federal Reserve noted in its Monetary
Policy Report to Congress: "Investment appetite for CMBS has apparently been strong, as yield
spreads have narrowed this year ...the low level of risk spreads for CMBS suggests that
concerns about terrorism insurance have not been widespread in the market for commercial
mortgages." REPUBLICAN POL'Y COMM., supra note 105, at 10 (quoting THE FED. RESERVE BD.
OF GOVERNORS, MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS § 2 (2002)).
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shock followed by a gradual return to market stability after the industry
recapitalized and reassessed the risk." 7
By the end of 2003, premium rates were stabilized to single digit
increases across all firm sizes,' ° and terrorism premiums averaged 4.4% of
total property premiums.0 9 If the cause of the price stabilization is debatable,
its effect is less so. Although TRIA may have increased capacity, the "take
up" rate has been low even with a federal backstop. About 10% to 30% of
policyholders bought terrorism coverage."' The low take up is consistent
with other government run insurance programs."' While the take up among
larger firms and policyholders in high risk areas have been higher, smaller
firms have not followed."2 Several factors may explain this. In spite of the
107. BROWN ET AL., supra note 52, at 34; CRIPPEN, supra note 37, at 14-15. Although
premiums rose immediately after Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge earthquake, significant
new equity capital flowed into the industry and reinsurance prices eventually declined. BROWN
ET AL., supra note 52, at 8; see also Grace et al., supra note 36, at 566 ("Yet, historical
experience suggests that the flow of capital to replenish funds expended to cover catastrophe
losses is somewhat balky and can lead to short-term dislocations in insurance and reinsurance
markets."). In view of this phenomenon, the government that predicted that "in a few years, the
industry is likely to recover fully." CRIPPEN, supra note 37, at 1.
108. AM. AcAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 29, at 4 (noting that small, medium, and large
accounts increased by 5%, 6%, and 4%, respectively).
109. HUBBARD & DEAL, supra note 29, at 45.
110. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 103, at 4 (estimating 10% to 30%). See
DIXON & STERN, supra note 28, at 140 n.2 (stating that Marsh & McLennan found that the take
up rates in 2003 were 25% to 30% for firms with a total insured value between $5 to $500
million, 40% with value between $500 million to $1 billion, and 27% with value over $1
billion); EMBLETON & BERNAL, supra note 32, at 5 (estimating 10% to 25% a year after the
passage of TRIA); GEN RE INTERMEDIARIES, CATASTROPHE MARKET UPDATE, 5 (2003) (noting
market capacity is "limited with pricing levels that can range above 30% rate on line");
REPUBLICAN POL'Y COMM., supra note 105, at 6-7 (citing Treasury Department figures at 25%
to 30%)
111. HUBBARD & DEAL, supra note 29, at 52 (noting that the California Earthquake
Authority has a take up of 14% to 17%, and that the National Flood Insurance Program has a
participation of 41%).
112. See infra note 447. The take up rates are substantially higher in "Tier One" cities of
New York, Washington, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES,
supra note 29, at 14. For example, in New York, the take up rate is 50% for properties over $50
million, 40% to 50% for $15 to $50 million, and 15% for less than $15 million. Id. The
evidence also suggests that smaller firms bought less terrorism coverage than larger firms.
Compare id. at 13-14 (estimating a take up rate of 10% of small businesses and 20% of midsize
companies with a national average of 15%), and BROWN ET AL., supra note 52, at 34 (estimating
a take up rate of 19% of small customers, 22% of medium size firms, and 29% of large firms as
of March 2003 according to the Council of Insurance Agents and Brokers), with HUBBARD &
DEAL, supra note 29, at 35 ("Survey data suggests that roughly 44% of larger property
insurance policyholders elect (or 'take up') terrorism coverage ...."). For small businesses with
de minimis potential for catastrophic exposure, insurers apparently have gone back to the pre-
9/11 practice of including the risk as a part of the package, suggesting that insurers have become
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perception that terrorism can strike at random, few attacks of catastrophic
severity occurred outside of prominent cities such as London, New York,
and Washington, and high economic value targets such as commercial
airliners, London's financial district and the World Trade Center. It is easy
to see how a business on Main Street could opt for no coverage when
premium costs cut into profit in an already weakened economy. Unlike
large firms, smaller firms may not have the same bargaining power to
negotiate premium discounts, and the marginal costs may be significantly
greater. The cost-benefit analysis may not have been a single determinant
process either. Prices could have been too expensive in relation to the
actuarial risk (the probability and severity of attack based on the available
information.)113 Or prices could have been too expensive based on an
assumption of ex post relief (the probability of loss reduced by the
expectation of ex post subsidy). The optional purchase feature of TRIA
resulted in low participation and adverse selection. The "take up" rate has
been low, particularly among smaller firms, because policyholders
considered terrorism coverage a bad purchase given the prices and the
perceived risks."4
Lastly, if there is some question as to whether TRIA achieved the first
objective of market stabilization, there is none as to the second objective of
promoting a long-term solution. The government found "little development
or movement among insurers or reinsurers toward developing a private-
sector mechanism that could provide capacity, without government
involvement, to absorb losses from terrorist events.""' ' The industry's effort
to find a long-term solution appears to have consisted of lobbying for an
extension of TRIA or "a long-term, public-private partnership" in the form
of federal cost sharing program." 6
more sophisticated about assessing terrorism risk since the panic stricken days of 9/11. DIXON &
STERN, supra note 28, at 140 n.2.
113. See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 29, at 5 ("One reason for the low take-up
rate for terrorism coverage may be that the price of coverage is too high for the amount of
perceived risk being transferred."); GEN RE INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 65, at 2 ("Small to
mid-market companies have not expressed much interest in purchasing stand-alone terrorism
products as these clients conclude that the protection is too costly relative to what they perceive
to be a low likelihood of loss.").
114. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 103, at 4; see GEN RE INTERMEDIARIES,
supra note 110, at 5 (noting market capacity is "limited with pricing levels that can range above
30% rate on line").
115. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 103, at 28.
116. AM. INS. ASS'N ADVOCATE, supra note 25, at 3; see also HUBBARD & DEAL, supra
note 29, at 55 ("Government partnership in risk bearing may be warranted when the private
sector is unable to effectively underwrite and price catastrophic risks that are difficult to predict,
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D. Long-Term Economic Uncertainty
If we assume that another catastrophic attack is not a matter of if but
rather when, where, how and how much, then the prospects are troubling." 7
The economic question is: Who should bear the cost? The cost of future
catastrophic terrorism has been estimated to be in the range of $50 billion to
$100 billion, with outlier estimates as high as $1 trillion."' Sound risk
management principles dictate that policyholders must always internalize
some of these costs to mitigate moral hazards." 9 Cost internalization also
reflects the reality that total loss coverage is not always an efficient use of
capital, and cheaper premiums can be negotiated with higher deductibles or
lower policy limits. In the case of 9/11, the industry and policyholders
jointly shouldered a substantial portion of the losses, and the government
subsidized a significant portion of the latter's uninsured loss. '20 Without
insurance, the economic disruptions would have been far more severe.'2 ' "If
insurance is not widely held in areas affected by future terrorist attacks, the
demand for benefits from government programs, charities, and the tort
system would be much greater after such attacks."'22
If another attack occurs in the near future and the industry again faces
massive losses without adequate buildup of reserves, the market will lose
confidence in the industry. An investment in insurance-whether the
investment is made by an insurer on an underwritten policy, a reinsurer on a
reinsurance treaty, or a market investor in stocks or bonds of (re)insurers-
will be deemed speculative. The domino effect is easy to foresee: (1) the
industry will not be able to recapitalize so quickly as the opportunity for
potentially realized by large numbers of insured entities simultaneously, and difficult to
spread."); infra note 225.
117. On May 19, 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney commented on NBC's Meet the Press:
"In my opinion, the prospects of a future attack against the United States are almost certain."
Roger Simon et al., One Year After 9/ 1-A Nation Changed- Introduction, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Nov. 11, 2002, at 4. The next day, on May 20, FBI Direct Robert Mueller told a
meeting of the National Association of District Attorneys: "There will be another terrorist attack.
We will not be able to stop it. It's something we all live with." Id.
118. See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 29, at 17 ("cost to commercial lines of a
future extreme terrorist attack ranges from $50 billion to $100 billion"); see also supra note 52.
119. A moral hazard is created when one party can transfer risk to another without an
appropriate counterbalancing compensation structure, thereby incentivizing the negative
consequences of that risk taking.
120. See DIXON & STERN, supra note 28, at xviii fig.S.1, 1-2 (stating that the government
has paid $15.8 billion of $38.1 billion in 9/11 compensation, not including the $20 billion
promised to New York City and the $5 billion in federal aid to the airlines).
121. Id. at 126.
122. Id.
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gain will be offset by the reality that the industry will have been burned
twice without adequate returns; (2) there will be a capital flight away from
insurers as the markets assess the impact of another catastrophic attack; (3)
without access to capital, the industry will refuse to cover terrorism risk; (4)
capacity will be reduced and premiums will be prohibitively expensive; (5)
businesses and their financiers will bear more risk; (6) increased risk will
raise the cost of capital and expenses, and projects will be cancelled or
delayed as funding dissipates; (7) these costs will trickle down to the rest of
economy in the form of higher prices, lower profits, layoffs, and slower
spending; and (8) the inevitable result will be a damaged economy. This
procession of events is the inevitable butterfly effect of a market system
based on self-interest. Under these circumstances, the only available options
will be to do nothing and allow time for the market to recover or to provide
an ex post bailout from public funds if the threat seems systemic.
Of course, the above scenario assumes that the industry would have
assumed a substantial portion of the risk as it did before 9/11. In this regard,
we must distinguish between short-term and long-term consequences of
catastrophic terrorism. As seen, exogenous shocks create short-term
"psychological" distortions in the industry as perceptions of the risk are
changed by new information. 123 The old supply and demand curves no
longer hold. Eventually, however, market forces work themselves into a
new equilibrium. The dire warnings of the industry that terrorism coverage
will dissipate upon the expiration of TRIA is attributable more to lobbying
strategy than market reality. 24 Since 9/11, the industry recapitalized its
losses and now holds more capital than it did before 9/1 125 In the months
after 9/11, insurance stock prices increased as investors sought to capitalize
on anticipated hardening prices and higher returns on capital. 126 In the
123. See Shuford, supra note 15, at 49 ("Shocks actually have been more psychological
than financial due to the benefits of diversification."); supra Part II.B.
124. See infra note 259.
125. From September to July 2002, "66 firms had raised $28 billion and another 47 deals
worth $47 billion were" in the pipeline. HUBBARD & DEAL, supra note 29, at 37. At the end of
2000, the U.S. property and casualty sector held $290 billion in surplus, and at the end of the
first quarter 2004 it held capital of $361 billion. Id. at 30. Moreover, the capital of US reinsurers
more than doubled since 9/11. Id. at 39 fig.17.
126.Immediately after 9/11, insurance stock prices dropped sharply because of the
anticipated losses and speculation about insolvency. The price, however, bounced back and
subsequently outperformed broader indices in the immediate months following 9/11 as investors
realized that 9/11 would result in increased premiums and higher returns on the reduced equity
capital. This phenomenon can be confirmed by checking the stock prices of AIG (NYSE Ticker:
AIG), Chubb (NYSE Ticker: CB), Hartford Financial (NYSE Ticker: HIG), and Berkshire
Hathaway (NYSE Ticker: BRKa). See, e.g., http://finance.yahoo.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2005);
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several years following 9/11, industry return on equity has exceeded that of
all US industry composite. 127 The implication of this recapitalization,
complete financial recovery, and opportunistic gain is that even without
TRIA insurers would have been forced to underwrite more coverage, lest
the new capital held by (re)insurers not generate sufficient returns to
shareholders. As the pressure to deploy the new capital builds, the market
forces of price, supply and demand take over, and a gradual decrease in
premium pricing is inevitable as the bargaining power between supplier and
purchaser shifts. Extrapolations of data suggests that terrorism insurance
premiums are roughly $3.6 billion, or about 12% of 9/11 loss. 28 Four years
have already passed without a major act of terrorism on American soil, and
in another four years the industry will have fully recaptured its 9/11 losses
(without consideration of investment yield and time value of money). From
this perspective, it is difficult to see how the industry would wholly shun
potentially profitable premiums.
This is not to suggest that catastrophic terrorism should be treated as an
ordinary risk. September 1 1th shattered the old paradigm. The question
remains whether the current structure of the insurance industry efficiently
disperses this risk.
Presently, the sources of compensation are insurance, government, and
tort law. 129 Tort litigation is the most costly mechanism to distribute
compensation.130 Because it is ponderous and adversarial, it is not the best
see also OXFORD METRICA, supra note 18, at 23-24 & tbl.6 (finding that, in the one year after
9/11, the stocks of the top twenty-five global insurance companies fell 0.73% as compared to a
loss of 16.8% for the S&P 500 Composite and a loss of 16.9% for the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx);
SCHROEDER, supra note 29, at 2 (noting that property and casualty insurance stocks were up
11.1% since September 10, 2001).
127. HUBBARD & DEAL, supra note 29, at 36.
128. Id. at 35.
129. To a lesser extent, charity also is a source of compensation. DIXON & STERN, supra
note 28, at xviii ($2.7 billion or 7% of 9/11 disbursements). In times of great, identifiable
human tragedy, whether localized or broad, charity can provide substantial relief as was
demonstrated in both the 9/11 attacks and the South Asia tsunami of December 2004. See Alan
Cooperman & Jacqueline Salmon, Charities Report Record Donations, WASH. POST.COM, Jan.
8, 2005, at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6081385 (last visited Jan. 8, 2005) (noting that US
charities raised $337 million and that it "could soon dwarf the $350 million in aid committed by
the U.S. government").
130. The cost ratio for the tort system, defined as costs over total payment, was 54%,
meaning that costs consume more than payouts to tort victims. RUDOLF ENZ & THOMAS
HOLZHEU, Swiss RE, SIGMA No. 6/2004, THE ECONOMICS OF LIABILITY LOSSES - INSURING A
MOVING TARGET 5 (Kurt Karl & Aurelia Zanetti eds., 2004). This compares unfavorably to life
and health insurance (23%), HMO/Blue Cross Blue Shield (20%), workers compensation (17%),
and Social Security (3%). Id. at 5 fig. 1. Interestingly, tort claims have not accounted for any of
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scheme to provide relief following a national disaster. The cost involved in
delivering compensation indicates that one of the primary beneficiaries of
the tort system is the legal profession.' 31 Some would agree, including the
author, that government subsidies should not be the long-term solution.'32
This leaves insurance. Without TRIA, however, it is doubtful that insurance
can substantially cover future catastrophic terrorism losses. 133 The problem
is not the prospect of another massive blow to the industry's capital. 34 It is
the prospect of a lack of capital flow. September 11 th showed that the
industry can readily absorb a loss of $30 billion without a threat to
solvency,1 35 and financial analysis of the industry has shown that it can
absorb as much as a $100 billion lOSS.1 36 But the economic fallout from
another catastrophic attack will be severe if the risks remain concentrated
and so the prospects of broad compensation is diminished. 1
37
the compensation for 9/11 losses thus far. DIXON & STERN, supra note 28, at 133 tbl.8.1. The
September 11 th Victim's Compensation Fund preempted tort claims. See infra note 235.
131. See supra note 130. I make no suggestions of whether the legal professional is
primarily responsible for the high cost ratio or whether the problem is more intrinsic to the
structure of the legal system.
132. See infra Part III.C.
133. See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 29, at 17 ("[T]he insurance industry is not
in the position of being able to play its usual risk management role in the economy."); MILLER,
supra note 37, at 13 ("Although the insurance industry had the resources necessary to cover the
costs of the claims from the 9/11 attacks, another attack of similar magnitude could seriously
destabilize the entire industry."); Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman, to Shareholders of
Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., supra note 45, at 8 (speculating that 9/11 would have threatened the
existence of General Re if it was not owned by Berkshire Hathaway).
134. As of 2001, the U.S. property and casualty sector was supported by about $290 million
surplus of capital. CRIPPEN, supra note 37, at 5 tbl.1.
135. The 9/11 attacks triggered the liquidation or bankruptcy of only a few troubled
insurers. See Bill Bergstrom, Insurance Co. in 9-11 Claims to Liquidate, A.P., July 1, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 58609197 (discussing Legion Insurance Co., which owed $140 million of
insurance claims to American Airlines as its part of the 9/11 insurance claims); Shingo Ito,
Japanese Insurers Warn of Big Costs from US Terror Attacks, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Nov.
27, 2001, available at 2001 WL 25072331 (stating that Taisei Fire & Marine Insurance Co. Ltd,
a Japanese insurer, filed for bankruptcy after Y 74.4 billion in losses related to 9/11).
136. There will be some hardships associated with such a loss but not a systemic failure.
See Insurance and Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance,
and Government Sponsored Activities (Oct. 24, 2001) [hereinafter Insurance and Terrorism
Hearing], available at 2001 WL 26187518 (statement of J. David Cummins, Harry J. Loman
Professor of Insurance and Risk Management, The Wharton School, University of Pennslyvania:
"A study I recently conducted indicates that the insurance industry could survive an event of
that magnitude [$100 billion loss] but that markets would be disrupted by numerous insurer
insolvencies as well as market price and availability problems.").
137. The real problem of terrorism risk "stems from the threat to the economy rather than
from the insurance industry." CRIPPEN, supra note 37, at 1.
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The nature of the insurance business requires a long institutional memory.
The lessons of 9/11 will not fade from actuarial databanks, and 9/11 will be
the frame of reference by which terrorism risk is priced and assessed.
Without TRIA, premiums will probably rise with reduced coverage, the net
result being that the market may find a new equilibrium similar to the
conditions found after 9/11, though not as extreme and tempered by a more
rational assessment of the -risks: 138 i.e., capacity remains reduced due to
market exit and coverage limitations imposed by some (re)insurers;
premium prices vary depending on the unique risks associated with each
policy; the overall take up rate is low, particularly among smaller firms;
1 39
the risks are still concentrated at the policyholder level; the risk is not
evenly distributed, but instead adversely selected; and smaller firms, most
susceptible to a catastrophic event, are more likely to forego insurance.
There will also be more concentrated insurance risk as many insurers will
choose not to cede premiums to reinsurers because the take up rate and
policy limits lowered their aggregate exposure and reinsurance prices may
be too high. These effects will magnify future economic disruptions from
another terrorism related catastrophe.
E. Problems of Insuring Terrorism Risk
September 11 th presented an information shock on two levels. First, the
industry learned that diversification of business lines does not necessarily
reduce the risk. The attacks affected twenty-three different product lines,
e.g., property and casualty, life and health, liability, aviation, business
interruption, workers compensation, etc."' Second, and more profoundly,
the severity of the loss exceeded any expectations or linear extrapolations
from previous data, and losses from catastrophic terrorism could exceed
those of extreme natural catastrophes.141 Without a mechanism to assess the
risks and reserve against anticipated losses, terrorism risk could become a
138. In TRIA's absence, the intermediate strategic decision of some insurers may be to
restrict capacity in certain high risk geographic areas, making coverage more difficult to obtain
for some. HUBBARD & DEAL, supra note 29, at 69.
139. See Kunreuther & Michael-Kerjan, supra note 65, at 15 (citing the take up rate at 43%
as of 3rd Q04 based on a Marsh Inc. survey); supra note 110 and accompanying text. The main
affected lines were business interruption, property, liability, and workers compensation.
HUBBARD & DEAL, supra note 29, at 17.
140. FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 32, at 7.
141. See BRAUNER & GALEY, supra note 38, at 20 ("Even if we had extrapolated our
statistical experience from previous years along more than just a linear path into the future, we
would not have arrived at an event with such implications.").
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black hole of liability. These considerations pose the question of whether
the risk is quantified in an actuarial sense and so can be priced. Because the
keystone concept in insurance is the law of large numbers, 142 insurance
works best when frequency is high and severity is relatively low, e.g., auto
and home insurance. 14 3 When frequency is low and severity is high, as is the
case in both manmade and natural catastrophes, assessibility of risk is
problematic and insurability is tested at the extremities.
Insurance has been defined as the "'mutual cover of a fortuitous,
assessable need of a large number of similarly exposed businesses.' 1 4 4 A
risk must satisfy four key criteria: randomness, mutuality, assessibility and
economic feasibility. 145
Randomness considers whether the loss event is unpredictable and
beyond the control of the policyholder. 146 Contrary to intuition, a high
degree of predictability means that a risk pool is economically infeasible as
no insurer would provide coverage knowing that a certain event would
likely occur. 147 Terrorism is not a fortuitous event in the sense of an accident.
It is an intentional act that is planned to appear random. That an occurrence
is intentionally initiated, perhaps even criminally, does not preclude
coverage. An event is considered fortuitous if it is unpredictable. 48 Because
142. The law of large numbers, or the Central Limit Theoreom, states that the mathematical
distribution in a finite set of data will approach the normal distribution as the sample size
increases. REJDA, supra note 36, at 34. The application in insurance is that the actual loss
experience will better correspond with actuarial loss predictions as the number of policyholders
increase. Id. at 3-4.
143. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 52, at 6 ("Insurance works best for smaller, more
frequent events, where it is possible to gather sufficient statistical data to support actuarial
pricing estimates and provide for risk diversification."); see also AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES,
supra note 29, at 13 (insurance works best when adequate actuarial data exists; insurers can
"earn an adequate return on capital invested; [r]isks are spread across homogenous
classifications;" and adverse selection is minimal); Ross J. Davidson, Jr., Working Toward a
Comprehensive National Strategy for Funding Catastrophe Exposures, 17 J. INS. REG. 134, 145
(1998) ("However, reinsurers usually are more comfortable in dealing with lower level more
frequent and predictable catastrophes.").
144. BRAUNER & GALEY, supra note 38, at 19 (quoting Alfred Manes).
145. ZANETTI ET AL., supra note 2, at 18; see also REJDA, supra note 36, at 20-22 (stating
that insurability depends on a large number of policyholders, accidental loss, measurability of
loss, calculability of risk and loss, and economic feasibility of premiums); see generally BUAER
& ENZ, supra note 32, at 14 (citing BARUCH BERLINER, LIMITS OF INSURABILITY OF RISKS 16
(Englewood Cliffs 1982)) (stating the criteria for insurable risks).
146. ZANETTI ET AL., supra note 2, at 18.
147. "The non-predictability, or randomness, of natural hazards is a fundamental
prerequisite of insurability for these risk types." Swiss RE, supra note 50, at 15.
148. BRAUNER & GALEY, supra note 38, at 19.
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the policyholder cannot influence the event or predict it, 149 terrorism does
not pose a significant moral hazard and so can be considered fortuitous for
the purpose of insurability. 5 0
Mutuality considers whether numerous persons who are exposed to the
same hazard can form a risk pool whereby the risk is shared and
diversified. '51 Terrorism risk is not smoothly distributed. Terrorism
disproportionately strikes marquee targets and cities.'52 Certain landmark
structures, for example the Sears Tower or Rockefeller Plaza, are subject to
greater risk than an otherwise nondescript office tower in Phoenix. Yet
major attacks have been launched against relatively ordinary targets. 53
Terrorism is different from other criminal acts in that it is done for a
political or religious motive, and terror is achieved through the
unpredictability of shocking violence. We should not be surprised to see
strikes against Main Street targets. 15' These targets are more vulnerable
now, 55 and so they are subject to increased probability of attack (though the
severity may be lower). This uneven distribution of risk does not pose a
problem of mutuality, however. It is a matter of pricing, and not insurability.
For example, smokers and nonsmokers can equally get health insurance,
though the pricing will be unequal. While certain assets and geographic
areas are more susceptible to terrorism, and the price must reflect the
greater risks, any valuable asset is subject to attack. 156 Thus, there is
sufficient mutuality.
149. This does not mean that policyholders cannot control the risk through mitigation or
avoidance. See infra note 274.
150. BRAUNER & GALEY, supra note 38, at 19.
151. ZANETTI ET AL., supra note 2, at 18.
152. The World Trade Centers were attacked twice within eight years. Five of the top ten
catastrophic attacks have occurred in New York (two) and London (three). See infra note 447 &
accompanying table.
153. See id. Past targets include the Alfred Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and
the NatWest Towers in London, and cities like Oklahoma City and Manchester, U.K., have been
bombed in the past. See id.
154. Consider that in the United States there are 177 buildings over 50 stories, with New
York, Chicago and Los Angeles accounting for 116 of those buildings. MILLER, supra note 37,
at 12 tbl.2; see also infra note 448 & accompanying table.
155. Vulnerability is a relative concept. As security measures around previously high risk
assets increase, the rational strategic choice of terrorist would be to look for other targets of
opportunity. There is a certain amount of "dynamic uncertainty" involved in this process. See
infra note 179 and accompanying text.
156. Hubbard and Deal show that terrorism premiums vary depending on the business
sector with energy and construction being the highest and lowest, respectively. HUBBARD &
DEAL, supra note 29, at 48 fig.23.
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Assessibility considers whether the risk, both frequency and severity, can
be quantified, and this factor is perceived by many to be the most
significant problem, "perhaps insurmountable" according to some. 157 The
pricing of premium presupposes the sufficient quantification of risk. 151
Insurers could approach terrorism like natural catastrophes,'59 the risks of
which are assessed "over a long time span." 160 Natural catastrophes too
present a problem of forecasting frequency and severity. While certain
catastrophic events are subject to reasonably accurate actuarial modeling,
the recent tragedy of the South Asia tsunami of December 26, 2004,
reminds us that natural catastrophe risks are never fully managed or
assessed.'6' Because the victim nations were economically underdeveloped,
the property and insurance losses were relatively small compared to the
scale of the catastrophe; 6 2 but had a comparable catastrophe hit a highly
developed area like Tokyo or Honolulu, the economic losses could have
dwarfed those of 9/11. The greatest risk of exogenous shock to the industry
is from a natural mega-catastrophe. '63 This fact puts into perspective
catastrophic terrorism risk as no one would suggest that the insurance
industry exit coverages in heavily industrial or populated centers, though
there may be a remote potential for a natural mega-catastrophe. The matter
is a question of risk management, a task that is within the expertise of the
insurance and financial markets.
157. It has been suggested that the "biggest-perhaps insurmountable-problem with
terrorism risk is that very limited historical data are available on terrorist attacks, and because
terrorism threat is dynamic, even the available historical data are less relevant in predicting
future incidents in the case of terrorism than natural catastrophes." Id. at 56; see also ZANETTI
ET AL., supra note 2, at 18.
158. ZANETTI ET AL., supra note 2, at 18 (noting premium pricing methods must be
feasible).
159. Id. at 16; see also GEN RE INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 110, at 6.
160. Swiss RE, supra note 50, at 15. For example, earthquakes cannot be predicted, though
over a long period of time the frequency can be extrapolated to some degree. Id. at 17.
161. See infra Appendix & note 450.
162. CHRISTIAN BRAUNER, Swiss RE, TSUNAMI IN SOUTH ASIA: BUILDING FINANCIAL
PROTECTION 7 (2005) ("[D]ue to the very low insurance density, the insured losses will be
relatively low compared to the overall scale of the losses suffered."); see also Jim Boulden,
Tsunami Not an Insurance Disaster, CNN, Jan. 3, 2005, available at http://edition.cnn.com/
2005/WORLD/asiapcf/01/03/asia.quake.insurance/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2005) (citing Munich
Re as estimating the economic loss at around $10 billion, of which insurance losses would
presumably be a small fraction).
163. Shuford, supra note 15, at 39. Indeed, sophisticated insurers recognize the potential
exposure to mega-catastrophes hitting large population centers and the opportunities for the
insurance industry to both profit from these risks and provide a service to society. See MUNICH
RE, MEGACITIES-MEGARISKS: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES FOR INSURANCE AND RISK
MANAGEMENT 4-5 (2004); infra note 313.
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Terrorism is similar to natural catastrophes in that it is random and
involves low frequency, potentially high severity."6 The key difference is
that long-term historical data exists for some kinds of repeating natural
catastrophes, and their catastrophic patterns are generally localized to
specific geographic areas, e.g., hurricanes in Florida and earthquakes in
California.'65 In contrast, the industry has just started to process the raw data
on terrorism, 166 and to develop models of terrorism assessment. Despite this
difference, natural catastrophes and terrorism share a key trait: frequencies
and severities are quite similar. 167 It is worth noting that virtually all terrorist
acts in the past have been low severity events. September 11 th was an
outlier, and the possibility of such events recurring in the future, while
tangible, has become more remote with the awareness it brought and the
countermeasures begotten. 168 Only a few spectacular acts will cause
widespread losses. In this regard, terrorism is very much akin to natural
catastrophes in frequency and severity. In the context of the twentieth
century, 9/11 was a 1/100 year event. Natural catastrophes on par with 9/11
are equally rare, 169 and in some cases equally inassessible as evinced by the
recent South Asia tsunami.17 Yet no one has suggested that the insurance
industry should not cover natural catastrophes or that they are
uninsurable. 71 The self-serving protestation by the industry and its lobbyists
164. Like the "Big One" awaiting California, "the scale of the intended harm has so far
been 'only' a fraction of the technical and logistical damage that could have been caused."
BRAUNER & GALEY, supra note 38, at 11. Swiss Re characterizes attacks thus far as using "the
most simple methods possible," and large magnitude attacks are possible, including the use of
radioactive waste. Id.
165. See THE CATO INST., supra note 62, at 22 (quoting Debra Ballen, American Insurance
Association, in distinguishing natural and terrorism catastrophes on the basis that there are "no
meaningful historical patterns").
166. Even before 9/11, the insurance industry had large volume of data on both the
frequency and severity of attacks. See, e.g., infra notes 447-448 and accompanying tables.
167. See infra notes 447, 449 & accompanying tables.
168. See infra note 274.
169. In recent history, only Hurricane Andrew (a Category 5 hurricane) and the Northridge
earthquake (a 6.7 Richter scale earthquake) were comparable to 9/11 in terms of insurance
losses. See CRIPPEN, supra note 37, at 9. In the past century, only three Category 5 hurricanes
and four earthquakes exceeding 8.0 on the Richter scale have been recorded in the United States,
and only some of these events struck developed areas. Id. at 2; see also http://
www.nationalatlas.gov/articles/climate/a-hurrican.html#five (last visited Mar. 3, 2005)
(explaining the Saffir-Simpson scale for hurricanes and the Richter scale for earthquakes).
170. From the perspective of the industry, it was only a matter of chance that the tsunami
did not hit a heavily insured area.
171. Indeed, some leading reinsurers believe that the terrorism risk is assessable. See, e.g.,
.BRAUNER & GALEY, supra note 38, at 20. In spite of the difficulties, some insurers underwrote
terrorism risk after 9/11 and without the benefit of TRIA. See, e.g., Stefen Theil, The Last Word:
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-that terrorism risk is so fundamentally different and thus uninsurable-
rings hollow.172 "Terrorism coverage may be quantitatively different, but it
is not qualitatively different."'
7 3
Information is vital to the business of insurance. Enhanced information
leads to more efficient pricing. Without it, premiums must incorporate a
substantial markup to ensure proper reserving for losses. The informational
challenges are being addressed now, and the approach has been distinctly
interdisciplinary. The industry needs to collect, analyze and schematize data
into a working model of frequency and severity, methods of terrorism,
weaknesses in the national security system, geographic location, political
risk, and international developments as well as individual risks and
vulnerability of policyholders.'74
The study of terrorism and collection of data have become top priorities
of government, thinktanks, and sophisticated members of the industry.'75
Calculus for Catastrophe, Gordon Woo, NEWSWEEK INT'L, July 12, 2004, at 60 (stating that the
International Olympic Committee purchased $170 million worth of cover for terrorism risk, the
first time in the history of the Olympic Games).
172. Hubbard and Deal noted that:
At the simplest level, terrorism risk is not a risk the industry
fundamentally believes it can model, price, and sell profitably while limiting
its insolvency risks to an acceptable level. In short, TRIA is not perceived to
be crowding out an opportunity the private market is able and willing to
cover.
HUBBARD & DEAL, supra note 29, at 63; see also AM. INS. ASS'N ADVOCATE, supra note 25, at
2 ("Like war, catastrophic terrorism has unique actuarial properties that defy traditional
underwriting and rating principles, thus making it uninsurable."); supra note 157.
173. THE CATO INST., supra note 62, at 34 (comment of Scott Harrington, University of
South Carolina).
174. Natural catastrophes are analyzed based on four criteria: (1) hazard (geographic
location, frequency and severity), (2) vulnerability (the function of damages to severity), (3)
value distribution (concentrations of insured risk), and (4) insurance conditions (proportion of
loss insured). Swiss RE, supra note 50, 16-28.
175. See JOHN A. MAJOR, GuY CARPENTER, ADVANCED TECHNIQUES FOR MODELING
TERRORISM RISK (2002), available at http://www.guycarp.com/portal/extranet/pdf/
major terrorism.pdfvid=l (last visited Mar. 18, 2005); MIPT, TERRORISM KNOWLEDGE BASE:
A COMPREHENSIVE DATABANK OF GLOBAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS, at
http://www.tkb.org/home.jsp (last visited Mar. 3, 2005) (containing a database on global
terrorism maintained by MITP); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, at
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt (containing the U.S. Department of State's Patterns of Global
Terrorism database) (last visited Mar. 3, 2005); DR. GORDON Woo, RISK MGMT. SOLUTIONS,
UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM RISK available at http://www.rms.com/Publications/
UnderstandTerRisk Woo RiskReport04.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2005); see also BROWN ET AL.,
supra note 52, at 8 (stating that several insurance service firms have begun the study of
terrorism modeling). The government should partake in the collection and dissemination of
information on terrorism so that the market can better assess the risk. See Insurance and
Terrorism Hearing, supra note 136, at 4 (statement of J. David Cummins, Harry J. Loman
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(Re)insurers are developing risk factor models and methodologies to better
assess terrorism risk, 176 and "great strides" have been made already in
developing terrorism models and actuarial methods.17' Human motivations
and planning of attacks, which are intended to be unpredictable, are difficult
to model with actuarial rigor, 78 and the decisional element of terrorism
creates "dynamic uncertainty. '79 While the challenge is daunting, it is not
insurmountable. 8 Patterns of terrorism already are evident in the data.
Consider, for example, the commonly asserted claim that terrorism risk is
different from natural catastrophes because it can strike anywhere as
Professor of Insurance and Risk Management, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania:
"The government should also explore serving as a facilitator of securitization by providing data
that could be used by private firms in developing better loss indices to serve as the basis for the
trading and settlement of CAT risk securities, on both natural and man-made (e.g., terrorism)
catastrophes."). Some can argue that government's access to superior information on terrorism
is a reason why government can better price terrorism risk. But it seems rather unlikely that
government military or intelligence agencies would share highly classified information with
whatever bureaucracy that would be in charge of running the government's insurance program.
176. Several models have been developed by insurance services firms. Applied Insurance
Research uses the Delphi Method, which factors in the opinions of terrorism experts. GEN RE
INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 110, at 6. Eqecat is a probabilistic model that combines Delphi
Method and game theory. Id. Risk Management Solution's model relies more heavily on game
theory. Id. Cf EMBLETON & BERNAL, supra note 32, at 5 (noting "that it is difficult ... to
predict with any actuarial credibility the probability of loss at any given location"). The
insurance industry has "refined" terrorism modeling since 9/11, and now incorporates
engineering sciences, statistical analysis, political analysis, and judgment. AM. ACAD. OF
ACTUARIES, supra note 29, at 7-9. Reinsurers like Swiss Re have begun to develop their own
theories of terrorism modeling. BRAUNER & GALEY, supra note 38, at 8 ("Assessments are
facilitated using a risk factor model developed by Swiss Re, which groups together the many
different effects into three main factors: the terrorists' intentions, the terrorists' potential, the
vulnerability of the society under attack.") (alteration in original omitted). As expected, there
are skeptics. See GEN RE INTERMEDIARIES, supra note 110, at 6 (stating that effectiveness of
modeling terrorism has been criticized as "wildly exaggerated" and modeling is a "blunt
instrument that could nevertheless lull insurers into a false sense of security") (quoting Standard
& Poor's).
177. HUBBARD & DEAL, supra note 29, at 57. The recognition that significant advances
have already been made in methodologies to assess terrorism risk undercut one of Hubbard and
Deal's central premises that "terrorism risk is not a risk the industry fundamentally believes it
can model," thus requiring government intervention in the form of extending TRIA. Id. at 63.
178. See SCHROEDER, supra note 29, at 3-4; see also BRAUNER & GALEY, supra note 38, at
13 ("Even so, terrorism is by no means random, but follows its own, albeit twisted logic. Being
able to understand this logic is the first step towards managing terrorism risks better, even if
they cannot be eradicated entirely.").
179. KUNREUTHER & MICHAEL-KERJAN, supra note 29, at 7; see also CRIPPEN, supra note
37, at 2 ("Moreover, the underlying probabilities of catastrophic events can change as a result of
variations in climate, geology, and the global political environment.").
180. But see supra note 157.
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opposed to the geographic limitation of some natural catastrophes. 8' While
this may be true, it is an unpersuasive argument in terms of the economic
consequences of terrorism. Even the most cursory review of the unrefined
data shows that 8 of the top 10 costliest catastrophes struck London, New
York, and the airline industry.8 2
Terrorism and counterterrorism can be understood in part from a game
theory perspective.'83 The penultimate goal of terrorists is to strike fear or
shock, and such dread is achieved by substantial loss of lives, high visibility
symbolism, exceedingly cruel or shocking acts, substantial property or
economic damage, or a combination thereof.'84 Terrorism seeks maximum
impact with limited available weaponry.'85 From the economic perspective
of the insurance business, the chief concern is loss of high value economic
assets. 8 6 Just like natural catastrophes, which are limited to large swaths of
geographic areas like Florida and California, high value economic targets
tend to be concentrated in geographic areas, whether they be cities,
industrial zones, certain industries, or specific assets. An attack in
downtown Topeka, while possibly devastating, will have a markedly
different impact on the economy than an attack of the same scale in
Midtown Manhattan; and the same applies for an attack on an Amtrak train
181. See, e.g., THE CATO INST., supra note 62, at 21 ("[T]errorism is not an accidental risk,
it is not a quantifiable risk . . . it is not predictable.") (comment of Debra Ballen, American
Insurance Association); see also EMBLETON & BERNAL, supra note 32, at 2 ("Terrorists have an
almost infinite variety of potential targets and weapons, and have the flexibility to choose the
time and place of the act.").
182. See infra note 447 and accompanying table. If the U.K. is considered one geographic
zone for insurance purposes, similar to the way Florida is for hurricane risk, then nine of the top
ten catastrophes would fit this specified insurance parameter.
183. Game theory is a discipline of mathematics that seeks to model human decisionmaking.
See generally AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE
COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE (1991) (providing a
nontechnical treatment of the subject); R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND
DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY (7th prtg. 1957) (providing a technical
treatment of the subject).
184. See, e.g., infra note 448 and accompanying table (giving examples of these kinds of
attacks, such as the killing of hundreds of school children in Beslan, Russia; the bombing of the
U.S. Embassies in Africa; and the 9/11 attacks in New York). The ultimate goal of terrorists is
to initiate political changes or further a religious agenda.
185. Of course, this assumes that terrorist do not acquire nuclear, biological or chemical
(NBC) weapons, often categorized as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). See supra note 34.
186. See, e.g., DIXON & STERN, supra note 28, at 103 (noting that the damage to just the
communication and power infrastructure, owned mostly by Con Edison and Verizon, in the
World Trade Center was $2.3 billion). The combined "property damage to businesses in Lower
Manhattan total[ed] nearly $16 billion." Id.
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as opposed to an American Airline 747 jet. 8 7 The tragedy of 9/11 has many
dimensions of course, but one striking aspect is that high value economic
targets such as New York and the World Trade Center were considered
"soft" targets prior to 9/11. 188 With the realization that terrorists have
targeted high value economic assets, security around those assets has
increased significantly. Many of these properties are no longer "soft"
targets.'89 Major cities, ports of entry, and economic assets like factories,
dams, and skyscrapers have increased their security. 19 These assets are less
risky now. In response to these changes, terrorists have recently shifted their
strategy toward other soft target opportunities, a process that confirms the
dynamic uncertainty of containing terrorism. Recent soft target attacks have
included the bombings in Bali, Indonesia, and the Madrid train system, and
the killing of school children in Beslan, Russia. 9 ' These attacks combine
random killings and shocking inhumanity. Albeit horrific, they do not pose
a catastrophic economic problem. To the extent that soft targets are attacked,
insurance as a risk management technique can adequately handle the
economics of human loss.'92
There will never be a day in which terrorism risk can be calculated to an
actuarial certainty like auto or life insurance. Significant uncertainty will
always surround terrorism risk. But it is a mistake to believe that
uncertainty equates to inassessibility. An analogy can be drawn from the
corporate finance context. '3 Consider how venture capitalists invest in
highly risky, illiquid startups. Although financial modeling may provide
some indication of risk versus return, it is ultimately an exercise that
provides only incremental information on the nature of the risk. Much of the
187. The Madrid train bombing resulted in insurance losses of about E35 million. See infra
note 256.
188. On February 7, 2001, Central Intelligence Agency Director, George Tenet, warned:
"As we have increased security around government military facilities, terrorists are seeking out
,softer' targets that provide opportunities for mass casualties." KUNREUTHER & MICHAEL-
KERJAN, supra note 29, at 8.
189. See infra note 274.
190. See, e.g., Paul Magnusson et al., Welcome to Security Nation, Bus. WK., June 14,
2004, at 32 (discussing government spending to secure economic assets, cities, and ports of
entry); infra note 274 (noting that the private sector has increased spending on security related
matters).
191. See infra note 448 and accompanying table. By citing these instances of terrorism, I do
not suggest that the terrorists involved in each attack are coordinating their actions. Rather, the
global terrorism phenomenon is morphing as security is heightened in major Western cities,
ports of entry, and high value economic assets.
192. See supra note 188.
193. The business of insurance is guided by the same fundamental principle governing
investments: diversification of risk and the law of large numbers.
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assessment turns on qualitative factors, such as strategic analysis and
assessments of management capabilities, that cannot be synthesized down
to a simple number. There is great uncertainty involved in a private equity
investment, and a failed investment can result in spectacular losses. 19 4 An
investment in venture capital involves great risk, but the undertaking of that
risk is compensated by an expectation of significantly higher returns and the
risk is mitigated by holding a portfolio of investments that provides some
measure of diversification.'95 Practices in corporate finance show that for
any given unknown there is a risk premium. Similar to the venture capital
industry, the insurance industry previously has taken big risks with
imperfect data. 196 Natural catastrophes potentially inflicting incalculable
losses loom in various parts of the world.'97 In addressing the insurability of
mega-catastrophes like the South Asia tsunami, Swiss Re took the following
position:
Even tsunamis or yet more extreme events such as meteorite
impacts are insurable, subject to certain reservations. They cannot
yet be modeled in such detail as other natural hazards, for instance
earthquakes or tropical cyclones, but it is possible to quantify the
risks with sufficient accuracy to design expedient insurance cover,
and to spread the risk worldwide via the established reinsurance
system. 1
98
If the devastation from a meteorite strike is insurable, 199 what elevates
earthly terrorism to that rarified level of uninsurability? Insurance is
194. Consider the hundreds of failed companies and the billions of dollars lost in venture
capital investments during the technology bubble of the late 1990s, Kosmo.com being the poster
child of spectacular venture capital flops. See Tom Palmer, Dot-Corns Can Avoid the Venture
Capital Shakeout with Planning, Bus. J., Feb. 2, 2001, available at http://www.bizjoumals.com/
account/signin?uri=/kansascity/stories/2001/02/05/focus8.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2005)
(stating that kosmo.com raised $330 million).
195. Venture capitalist typically seek internal rates of return in excess of 25% in startups or
other high-risk ventures. JACK S. LEVIN, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY,
AND ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS 201.5 at 2-9 (Martin D. Ginsburg & Donald E. Rocap
eds., 2004) (suggesting that venture capitalists want 40% of the portfolio company's stock to
achieve higher IRRs).
196. See THE CATO INST., supra note 62, at 34; Smetters, supra note 50, at 30-31 (stating
that insurance is available for highly risky activities such as satellites, environmental liability,
and product liability).
197. RICO CZERWINSKI & RES STREHLE, SWISS RE, A DANGEROUS WORLD? (2005)
(containing an interview with Serge Troeber, which identifies dormant volcanoes in various
parts of the world as potentially causing mass catastrophes).
198. BRAUNER, supra note 162, at 8.
199. POSNER, supra note 15, at 24-25 ("A collision between one of these [potentially
hazardous near-earth objects] and the earth is expected to occur every 500 to 1,000 years.").
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fundamentally "a risk-taking industry, ' ° and there is nothing so uniquely
compelling about terrorism risk that it is categorically uninsurable.
Rather than any perceived notion of inassessibility, the greatest long-
term hurdle to insuring terrorism risk is economic feasibility of premiums.
Catastrophe risks, natural or manmade, pose higher capital costs than other
insurance events. Insurers must hold sufficient capital to cover their
anticipated losses. Although catastrophic terrorism is a low frequency event,
insurers must hold sufficient capital to protect against the potential for high
severity. In this way insolvency risk is minimized. Because an insurer's cost
of capital is more than the investment yield on that capital, the current
regulatory and tax schemes impose higher cost of capital on catastrophic
risk underwriting."0 ' These dead costs-"dead" in the sense that they do
nothing but support the inefficient holding of capital-must then be passed
to the insureds in the form of higher premiums.2"2 Therein lies the problem
of catastrophic insurance risk.
A simple stylized example illustrates the problem.0 3 Consider two types
of insurable interests: high frequency, low severity losses (e.g., auto
accidents or home fires), and low frequency, high severity losses (e.g.,
earthquakes and catastrophic terrorism). We make the following global
assumptions: overhead expense of operation is $100, which must be passed
through in the premium; risk based capital holding requirements equal the
Posner notes that the Tunguska meteor that exploded over Siberia, which could destroy an area
the size of a major city occur in frequencies of 1,000 years. Id. at 26-27.
200. THE CATO INST., supra note 62, at 34 (comment of Scott Harrington, University of
South Carolina). The risk taking is no doubt different in scale. The risk taken by venture
capitalists is measured by millions of dollars whereas the risks of insurers could be in the
billions. See supra note 65. But then again venture capital firms typically do not have billions of
dollars of capital.
201. CRIPPEN, supra note 37, at 3. Risk based capital is the amount of equity capital
insurers must hold for the level of risk underwritten and is generally subject to individual state
regulation. See, e.g., supra note 63.
202. See Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets,
and Uninsurable Risks, 64 J. RiSK& INS. 205, 215 (1997); Smetters, supra note 50, at 2 (stating
that the failure of insurance market to develop a solution to terrorism risk is the result of failed
government policies for tax, accounting and regulations that have "made it costly for insurers to
hold surplus capital").
203. See infra note 451 & tbl.5. The following figures are not meant to suggest current
market pricing or practices, but are used for example purpose only. The example at the
Appendix was derived from a similar example cited by Scott E. Harrington & Greg Niehaus,
Government Insurance, Tax Policy, and the Affordability and Availability of Catastrophe
Insurance, 19 J. INS. REG. 591, 598 (2001) (discussing a similar example problem of the effect
of capital costs and tax policy on premium prices for catastrophe insurance). See also CRIPPEN,
supra note 37, at 3 & n.10 (citing Harrington & Niehaus, supra at 591-612, and running
through a similar example).
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full value of the expected actuarial loss; post-tax cost of capital is 10%; °4
there is no underwriting profit so that the combined ratio is 100%;205
payouts on high frequency losses are spread evenly throughout the year;
pretax investment yield on capital and premiums received is 8%; 206
corporate tax rate is 25%;207 time value of money adjustments and loss carry
forwards are ignored.
We first consider the case of a high frequency, low severity risk where
losses are actuarially calculated at $500 per year. The insurer must hold
$500 of capital. The premium must include: the $500 anticipated loss and
the $100 of overhead expenses. Based on this consideration, the investment
income is $64.208 After corporate taxes, the profit to the shareholders would
be $48, or $2 short of a 10% return on capital. Accordingly, it must charge
an additional $2 in premium, which is the cost of capital delta. From an
operating perspective, the $500 of capital generated $666 of revenue from
premiums and investment income. The revenue is then split as follows: the
policyholders $500 in claim refunds (75%), operating costs of $100 (15%),
the insurer $50 (7%), and the government (taxes) $17 (3%). The net result is
that the insurer must charge $1.20 for every dollar of anticipated losses. The
cost of delivering compensation is 25% of total revenue, which is an
efficient method of delivering compensation.2 °9
We now compare the above results with the case of a low frequency,
high severity risk such as a natural or manmade catastrophe with a one in
204. The cost of capital is the opportunity cost of equity capital, which is the expected
return that must be provided to the equity investor in the insurer. See RICHARD BREALEY &
STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 190-93 (Bonnie E. Lieberman et al. eds.,
1981).
205. Insurers earn a profit in two ways: (1) underwriting profit, which is the positive
difference between earned premiums and losses plus overhead expenses, and (2) investment
income earned from unearned premiums and capital held by the insurer. Underwriting results
are typically measured by a combined ratio, which is [(Underwriting Losses + Overhead
Expenses) + (Earned Premiums)]. If the insurer has a 100% combined ratio, it is not making a
profit or loss off the underwriting business, but it is making a profit while it holds premium
monies it collected from its insureds. In this situation, the policyholders are in essence paying
the insurer to hold their money for them.
206. Because the assets of insurers must be liquid with relatively low level of portfolio risk,
most of the assets will be invested in investment grade bonds, which will over the longterm
yield lower returns than equity investments.
207. This rate assumes that the insurer will be able to get deductions that reduce the overall
effective corporate tax rate.
208. This is calculated by an 8% yield on $500 capital, and $300 premiums, which is the
weighted average balance of the premiums held on the balance sheet.
209. See supra note 130 (showing cost data for various insurance). The figures in this
example have been rounded up to whole numbers.
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100 year frequency with an expected cost of $50,000.2 2 The expected
annual loss is still $500, but risk based capital regulations require the
insurer to hold $50,000 of capital each year to cover the one time loss that
could occur in any given year.21 1 Based on this consideration, the insurer
must charge not only the $600 in premium for expected losses and overhead
expense, but also another $1,965 in cost of capital charge. Investment
income is $4,201. From an operating perspective, the $50,000 of capital
generated $6,766 of revenue from premiums and investments. The revenue
is then split as follows: operating cost $100 (1%), the insurer $5,000 (74%),
and the government (taxes) $1,666 (25%). The net result is that the insurer
must charge $5.13 for every dollar of expected losses.212 The cost of
delivering compensation is exorbitant as most of the premium collected
funds the shareholder return on excess capital held and taxes payable on the
investment income.
Because insurers cannot take a tax deduction on anticipated losses, it
cannot build its reserves without a tax penalty. 23 Although the expected
losses are the same for both typical and catastrophic risks, policyholders
must pay multiples of the actuarial loss estimates. 2 4 This spread represents
the dead capital costs associated with capital holding requirements and tax
policies. The costs increase on a nonlinear basis as the anticipated
catastrophe becomes more infrequent.21 5 Importantly, the tax revenue of
210. In the context of the twentieth century, 9/11 was a one hundred year man-made
catastrophe.
211. From the regulator's perspective, the insurer must hold this capital every year lest it
become insolvent in the one year the catastrophe strikes and the state must pay claims through
their guarantee fund programs. A typical program allocates the unpaid losses to the remaining
insurers through assessments.
212. See infra note 451 & tbl.5 (providing a complete breakdown of the calculations).
213. Only reserves allocated to actual or highly likely losses can be deducted from income,
thus reducing the corporate income tax. Davidson, supra note 143, at 149; see also HUBBARD &
DEAL, supra note 29, at 60 ("U.S. accounting rules preclude 'ear-marking' retained profits or
other capital funds as 'reserves' against future losses, if the actual events have not yet
occurred.") (quoting Dwight Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Markets Under Stress: The Case of
Extreme Event Insurance, ECONOMIcS FOR AN IMPERFECT WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOSEPH
E. STIGLITZ 10 (MIT Press 2003)).
214. See Harrington & Niehaus, supra note 203, at 598 fig. 1 (providing a graph of the
premium to the expected indemnity as a function of the probability of an event).
215. See id. at 598 fig. 1. It has been suggested that insurers should be permitted to take
unincurred but actuarially expected losses as a deduction against earnings. Id at 605-07. This
would offset the tax penalty. In a variant of this concept, it has been suggested that insurers
should be allowed to identify premiums allocated for terrorism risk and be permitted to build
reserves on a tax-free basis with a tax adjustment if there is an eventual reserve surplus.
Davidson, supra note 143, at 148-53. See also AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 29, at 23-
24 (proposing a prefunded, tax deferred reserve as provided in Letter of Property Casualty
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$1,666 is not as much of a windfall for the government as the number
would suggest. It assumes that policyholders would buy terrorism coverage
at significantly increased premiums rates. The market data thus far suggests
that this is not the case.2 16 The assumption of a large taxable revenue base is
a chimera for insurers would not be able to sell coverage at economically
infeasible prices. Thus, they would not be able to raise such capital in the
first place, nor hold it if such capital raising were even possible. There is
also a certain washing of the tax effects. While the government may collect
revenue from insurers, that revenue would be offset by insurance expenses
deductions taken by policyholders.217 Given these effects, about the only
safe conclusion is that the current tax policies increase premium prices,
which may reduce the demand for terrorism coverage.
Thus, terrorism risk poses significant financial problems. The question of
insurability must be separated from pricing. Terrorism risk is insurable.218
But extreme catastrophic risks, albeit insurable, pose the question of
Insurers Association of America); CRIPPEN, supra note 37, at 31-32 (describing these proposals).
Indeed, some European countries permit the tax deduction of expected catastrophe losses. See
Jaffee & Russell, supra note 202, at 212.
There are two potential objections to these approaches. First, the government may object to
the perceived loss of federal tax revenue. In considering a tax deferred reserving treatment, the
government estimated a tax revenue reduction of $12.4 billion over ten years. CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE FOR H.R. 3210, TERRORISM RISK PROTECTION ACT 9 (2001). There is a
bit of a Catch-22 situation, however. The current tax scheme increases the cost of catastrophe
insurance. If so, this may limit the "take up" of terrorism insurance, which reduces the revenue
base for insurers. See supra Part II.D. Any calculation of loss of tax revenue will depend on the
assumptions used to measure it. Second, and more to the point, there is a potential for abuse by
insurers. Given the lack of data and common understanding of terrorism risk, it would be
difficult to administer and enforce an insurer's allocation of reserves or unincurred losses,
unless significant penalties come into play. But penalties only make sense if a clear standard
exists to judge the taxpayer's decision. Given the significant unknowns involved in assessing
terrorism risk, a clear standard may not exist. It would become a question of judgment.
Ultimately, a scheme that relies on the taxpayer to self-allocate tax status would be highly
susceptible to substantial gaming of the tax rules, particularly when insurers would have better
information on the actuarial risk than the government. On the other hand, if the government
allocates the amount of tax-sheltered reserves, one question whether it can properly assess the
actuarial risks and levy taxes in a fair and efficient manner. It is again a bit of a Catch-22. This
particularly tricky situation, one susceptible to abuse by either the taxpayers or the government,
would suggest that a tax deferred scheme is not appropriate at this time. But see Davidson,
supra note 143, at 148-54 (arguing the case for a tax free reserving for anticipated catastrophic
losses).
216. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
217. The net effect of this washing is beyond the capabilities of a single legal scholar to
calculate.
218. This should be obvious from the fact that terrorism coverage is provided now, and was
provided even after 9/11 and before the enactment of TRIA. See supra note 75.
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whether traditional insurance is the most efficient means of transferring risk
and delivering compensation. Financial and tax costs have priced out a
significant portion of private market demand. These considerations raise the
issue of government's role in the business of catastrophe insurance.219
III. THE QUESTION OF GOVERNMENT'S ROLE
A. Current Legislative Dilemma
The insurance, economic and legislative histories continue to unfold, and
how the final chapter should be written remains open to debate. The
economic blow of 9/11 was softened by unprecedented insurance coverage
and massive ex post government welfare. 220 Whether insurance or
government funds (or both) will be available in the future is "highly
uncertain." '221 If TRIA is relegated to a footnote in history as a temporary
economic stabilization measure in face of an unprecedented national
tragedy, it would have little long-term impact.222 As of the writing of this
article, there are a number of uncertainties. Will TRIA be extended beyond
the sunset date? Will future legislation establish a more permanent,
government sponsored reinsurance program? Will the government throw
the entire problem back to the private sector? Will the private sector
formulate a long-term solution to catastrophic terrorism risk?
219. See J. DAVID CUMMiNS & NEIL A. DOHERTY, UNIV. OF PA, THE WHARTON SCH., CAN
INSURERS PAY FOR THE "BIG ONE"? MEASURING THE CAPACITY OF AN INSURANCE MARKET TO
RESPOND TO CATASTROPHIC LOSSES (1999), available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
papers/38.pdf (last visited April 3, 2005) ("Securitization would be the ideal solution to the
catastrophic risk problem, in part because this approach accesses a much larger pool of capital
than provided by the insurance/reinsurance industry.").
220. Of the $38.1 billion in quantified benefits paid for 9/11, the insurance industry and the
government accounted for 51% and 42%, in addition to an unprecedented 7% accounted for by
charity. DIXON & STERN, supra note 28, at xviii. In addition to the money, insurers provided an
essential transactional service of claims evaluation and processing, which reduced the
transactional costs of disbursing remedies and compensation. Id. at 135. Certainly, these
transactional costs would be lower than those involved in litigation.
221. Id. at 140. In analyzing the data on 9/11 compensation, the RAND Corporation noted
that insurance played a key role. See id. at xviii. It then asked the key policy question: "'What if
the insurers weren't there the next time?"' Devlin Barrett, 9/11 Victims Received $38.1 Billion,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 9, 2004, at A03 (quoting Lloyd Dixon, Rand Institute).
222. There is an argument that 9/11 permanently altered the expectations by providing such
unprecedented government subsidies. Virtually all of the families of 9/11 victims received
compensation through the Fund. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
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Although TRIA has a sunset date, it instructs the Treasury Department to
determine the "likely capacity of the property and casualty insurance
industry to offer insurance for terrorism risk after termination of the
Program, and the availability and affordability of such insurance." '223 This
language suggests that if Treasury finds continued market disruption or a
likely potential for one, Congress could extend the statute. 24 It is hardly
surprising that there is now significant lobbying effort underway by various
interest groups arguing for and against such an extension.225
223. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 108(d), 116 Stat. 236.
224. At the time of TRIA's enactment, some in Congress foretold the current legislative
uncertainty. Then Senator Phil Gramm commented at the time: "Two years from now, if we
don't change this bill, we are going to be back here, and the same people who are saying today
we have to have this bill are going to say: You have to extend this bill for another 2 years,
another 10 years, forever." REPUBLICAN POL'Y COMM., supra note 105, at 11; see also David
Rogers, Terrorism-Insurance Measure Gains Approval from Senate, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20,
2002, at A6 (stating that Senator Gramm opposed TRIA because of the burdens on public
funds).
225. The insurance and real estate industries have lobbied for an extension. See, e.g.,
REPUBLICAN POL'Y COMM., supra note 105, at 6 (noting that both the Mortgage Bankers
Association and the Coalition to Insure Against Terrorism have lobbied Congress to extend
TRIA); TILLINGHAST Bus. OF TOWERS PERRIN, TRIA UPDATE, CAPTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY
REPORT 1 (2004) ("There has been significant lobbying done by both the insurance industry and
business groups."); Weathering Well, supra note 74, at 62 (describing the insurance industry as
a "begging lawmakers to extend" the TRIA); Letter from NAIC to Michael G. Oxley, Chairman
of Financial Services 1 (Apr. 6, 2004), available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/acrobat/
sp04oxsn.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2005) ("We strongly urge Congressional action this year to
avoid the market disruptions that will occur in the absence of a federal backstop program."). A
study commissioned by a consortium of the major insurance lobbies argues that the extension of
TRIA would have overall net positive benefit to the economy. HUBBARD & DEAL, supra note 29;
see also NCCI HOLDING INC., NCCI HELPS WITH STUDY ON BENEFITS OF EXTENDING
TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT (TRIA) (2004), available at https://www.ncci.com/ncci/
web/news/statereg/NCCITRIAStudy.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
On the opposite side of the effort, an array of consumer groups, public think tanks, and
scholars from the finance, economic, insurance and legal fields have argued against extension.
See, e.g., SCOTT E. HARRINGTON & RANDALL S. KROSZNER, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y
RESEARCH, THE POSSIBLE EXTENSION OF THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT, available at
http://www.aei.org/include/pubprint.asp?publD=20578 (last visited Apr. 5, 2005) (Am. Enter.
Inst. For Pub. Pol'y Research, Statement No. 207, 2004) ("No convincing evidence indicates
that extending the program is necessary to avoid serious disruptions in commercial real estate
markets in major cities."); J. ROBERT HUNTER, CONSUMER FED. OF AM., THE TERRORISM RISK
INSURANCE ACT: SHOULD IT BE RENEWED? 2 (2004) ("CFA believes that there is no need to
extend TRIA when it expires at the end of 2005"); SHADOW FIN. REGULATORY COMM., AM.
ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, STATEMENT NO. 182, A PROPOSED FEDERAL
BACKSTOP FOR TERRORISM INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE (2002), available at
http://www.aei.org/publications/publD. 14325/pub detail.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2005) ("Given
those developments, the case for a federal backstop for terrorism insurance, which was not
clear-cut late last year [2001 ], is certainly less compelling now."); infra note 270.
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There is no compelling reason to extend TRIA. 226 The thought of
providing the insurance industry, well capitalized and financially healthy, a
permanent government subsidy would not sit well with an informed public
or prominent segments of the academic and policy communities.22 7 The
insurance industry has noted that the Bush administration favors a capital
market solution.228 This assessment is probably accurate in view of the
administration's position, for example, on the partial privatization of Social
Security, 229 the most obvious example of a mandatory government
sponsored program. It would seem philosophically incongruent to undertake
a universal insurance program that has all the potential for politicization of
funding and actuarial mismanagement. With that said, betting against a
powerful insurance lobby is always a perilous venture. 30
Beyond the immediate question of TRIA's future, however, is the
broader issue of defining the proper role of government. In a sense, the
extension of TRIA, unless made permanent, is irrelevant to the long-term
problem. An extension simply tables the matter-until perhaps legislative
inertia sets in and a temporary program is made permanent by legislative
inertia. The long-term issues would remain who should bear the cost of the
loss and how should the risk be allocated. Given that insurance "is an
Currently, Senators Robert Bennett and Christopher Dodd have introduced a bill, Senate Bill
2763, seeking to extend TRIA for another two years with a "run-off" third year to end on
December 31, 2008. See NCCI HOLDING, INC., TRIA UPDATE-THREE EXTENSION BILLS IN
CONGRESS & NEW TREASURY CLAIMS PROCESS (2004), available at https://www.ncci.com/ncci/
web/news/statereg/tria_3_bills.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). In the House, two bills, House
Resolutions 4634 and 4772, also propose to extend TRIA through 2007 and 2008, respectively.
Others in Congress, however, have expressed their belief that TRIA was an "example of bad
law leaving policymakers with a hard case." REUPBLICAN POL'Y COMM., supra note 105, at 12.
226. Much of the question concerning the renewal of TRIA will hinge on the findings and
recommendations of the Treasury Department, which is due by June 30, 2005. Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 108(d)(2), 116 Stat. 236.
227. See supra note 225.
228. "We also understand that the administration is interested in this [capital markets]
option as a possible solution for terrorism losses when TRIA sunsets." AM. ACAD. OF
ACTUARIES, supra note 29, at 23 (quoting PROP. CAS. INSURERS ASS'N OF AM., EXAMINATION
OF ALTERNATIVES TO TRIA AND PROGRAMS IN OTHER COUNTRIES).
229. See Press Release, White House, Specifics on the President's Plan to Strengthen
Retirement Security (Feb. 28, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/02/20020228-3.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
230. See Manms, supra note 98, at 2530 (noting that businesses formed the lobby group,
Coalition to Insure Against Terrorism, and "during the first six months of 2002 alone, the
insurance company spent $33.6 million" to lobby for the enactment of TRIA). Cf Gron &
Sykes, supra note 59, at 450 ("Although this program is ostensibly 'temporary,' political
pressures to leave this subsidy in place may prove irresistible.").
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industry with finite capital,"23' government policies can play a significant
role in how costs are apportioned among various interest groups. The
government can redistribute wealth through an ex post distribution from
general funds. It can provide catastrophic coverage through an ex ante
reinsurance scheme. Or it can incentivize the development of a private
market solution through the exercise of its regulatory and taxing powers.
Each choice has benefits and consequences that must be weighed.
B. Ex Post Government Subsidy
The government has a long history of providing subsidies to victims of
disasters or great tragedies.232 In view of the unprecedented national tragedy,
it was not surprising that the government responded to 9/11 with subsidies
on a massive scale. 33 Within days of the attacks, the government created the
September l1th Victim Compensation Fund. 234 The Fund has been
described as a "political compromise" that balanced the desire to provide
generous compensation to a large number of 9/11 victims, many of whom
had no or little life insurance, for the quid pro quo of limiting the liability of
the airline industry.23 Political motivations and economic necessity were
231. Hamburger & Oster, supra note 56, at A3 (quoting Maurice Greenberg, CEO of
American International Group).
232. See generally Lawrence M. Friedman & Joseph Thompson, Total Disaster and Total
Justice: Responses to Man-Made Tragedy, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 251 (2003) (discussing the role
of private charity, tort law and government subsidy in disasters through various disasters in
American history); Michele L. Landis, "Let Me Next Time be 'Tried by Fire' ": Disaster Relief
and the Origins of the American Welfare State 1789-1874, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 967 (1998)
(discussing early role of government subsidy in the wake of disasters); Saul Levmore,
Coalitions and Quakes: Disaster Relief and Its Prevention, 3 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 1
(1996) (discussing government relief after disasters); David A. Moss, Courting Disaster? The
Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy Since 1803, in THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHIC
RISK 307 (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1999) (discussing federal subsidy policy during disasters). A
recent study of federal relief for victims of hurricane showed that the government provided
about 20% of the total disaster compensation funds (including insurance proceeds). Shuford,
supra note 15, at 48.
233. In addition to government subsidies, 9/11 sparked a wave of private charity. Two-
thirds of all American households made charitable donations, which exceeded $2.9 billion.
DIXON & STERN, supra note 28, at 1. This charitable outreach was unprecedented in American
history. Id.
234. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (ATSSA), Pub. L. No. 107-42,
115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2003)) (signed into law on
September 22, 2001).
235. See DIXON & STERN, supra note 28, at 20-21; Levmore & Logue, supra note 54, at
286 (suggesting that the airline industry was the primary beneficiary of the fund's provision that
tort claims must be waived); George L. Priest, The Problematic Structure of the September 11th
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key factors as evident by the three primary recipients of public funds-New
York, the airline industry, and 9/11 victims. 236 The first two parties not only
received huge benefits, but were also shielded from potentially crippling
tort liabilities. Sympathy and pragmatism in the form of hard dollars
alleviated public suffering and yielded political capital (or at least prevented
its erosion).
The precedent set by 9/11 raises the question of whether catastrophic
terrorism risk should be dealt with on an ex post basis. Such relief comes
with the benefit of holding an option: if the catastrophe threatens the socio-
economic interests, the government can act; if not, the private market can be
made to internalize its costs. There is an inherent uncertainty to this
approach. Sophisticated commercial parties, who suffered a substantial
portion of the losses, are less likely to receive economic relief. For insurers,
the losses of 9/11 were simply a cost of business. No question that the cost
was extraordinarily high, but then again the industry was never in danger of
systemic failure.237 Arguably, the capital held by the industry before 9/11
served its purpose of paying losses arising from a fortuitous event.
Insurance is a business of risk, and the industry is not guaranteed a profit.
Large businesses did not receive direct government welfare but their
economic losses were somewhat alleviated by tax benefits and low interest
loans, benefits intended to stimulate economic recovery rather than to
compensate for losses.238 The losses of policyholders were the product of
Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAuL L. REV. 527, 529 (2003) (criticizing the fund on the
basis that "it lacks any internal rationale of definition or constraint" found in the systems of
compensation provided in society). The ATSSA capped the liability of airlines to the levels of
their insurance coverage. 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2003). The ATSSA required that a claimant under
the September 1 th Victim Compensation Fund must "waive the right to file a civil action (or
be a party to an action) in any Federal or State court for damages sustained as a result of the
terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001." Id. An amendment to the statute
enacted in November 2001 added other third-parties to the limitation of liability, including New
York City, the Port Authority of New York, and New Jersey. DIXON & STERN, supra note 28, at
18 n.6. In the end, 2879 claims out of 2976 deaths (representing 97%) were filed. Id. at 24-25.
The Fund paid out on average of $2.08 million per claim, and a total payout of approximately
$5.13 billion. Id. at 25. Victims received on average $3.1 million, with 69% coming from the
Fund, "23[%] from insurance, and 8[%] from charity." Id. at xxiii.
236. The federal government promised New York City $20 billion and "distributed $5
billion to the airlines and offered loan guarantees." DIXON & STERN, supra note 28, at 1-2.
237. See supra notes 7, 135.
238. See DIXON & STERN, supra note 28, at 118. Large business owners were eligible for
the Liberty Zone tax benefit, which provides tax benefits over an 11 -year period. Id. at 116. The
Liberty Zone tax relief is the first such tax benefit provided to a specified geographic zone in
response to a disaster. Id. (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SEPTEMBER 11: OVERVIEW OF
FEDERAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE TO THE NEW YORK CITY AREA 47, 89 (2003)).
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choices made on the purchase and allocation of insurance coverage. 239
Sophisticated commercial parties had deep pockets to absorb even large
losses and could negotiate alternative financial solutions after 9/1 1.240 There
is a limit to even the government's well of direct payouts, and given the
needs of New York and the thousands of 9/11 victims, the losses of the
insurance industry and commercial policyholders, though unfortunate, were
not the kind that engenders broad sympathy. 41
When losses lead to broader economic or societal disruptions, ex post
government relief is more likely to occur.2 42 The subsidies provided to a
broad array of victims in response to 9/11 supports this view.2 43 TRIA aside,
few have criticized the general tenor of government subsidies.2" Indeed, if
the government did not provide aid under these circumstances, when would
it ever be appropriate to dispense government welfare? Notwithstanding the
benefits of compensation and economic stabilization, the unprecedented
government welfare had other effects. It may have created expectations,
which buyers price into the premium, and the market price is then perceived
to be too high.2 4' This kind of a moral hazard, coined the "Samaritan's
239. See supra note 81; infra note 240.
240. For example, Deutche Bank, one of the world's largest banks, owned 130 Liberty
Street, a forty story office tower across the street from the World Trade Center, which sustained
heavy damages during the attacks. See Press Release, Lower Manhattan Development Corp.,
Deutsche Bank Settlement Reached (Feb. 27, 2004), available at http://www.renewnyc.com/
News/DisplayStory.asp-id-103.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2005). Subsequently, the Lower
Manhattan Development Corp. agreed to buyout 130 Liberty Street as a part of its development
of lower Manhattan. Id.
241. See Levmore & Logue, supra note 54, at 280 (suggesting a link between substantial
government relief and public sympathy). Broad based relief to commercial policyholders could
have resulted in criticism of the government as some would have argued that the funds should
have been used elsewhere.
242. It can be argued that the airline industry faced such a threat immediately after 9/11.
Given that the airlines are heavily leveraged, a substantial slowdown in travel threatened the
solvency of many carriers.
243. "One of the most striking findings is the large proportion of overall benefits that went
to businesses." DIXON & STERN, supra note 28, at 133. Businesses received $23.3 billion of the
$38.1 billion in disbursements so far, or 61%. Id. at xx, 133. "More than 85[%] of insurance
payments went to businesses." Id. at xx.
244. See, e.g., Manns, supra note 98, at 2550 (stating that TRIA "serves as a political and
economically viable solution that partly addresses the substantive economic challenges facing
terrorism insurance"). Even scholars who are generally against the policy of government
intervention in insurance have been rather tepid in their conclusions on the propriety of
government insurance in times of crisis. See Gron & Sykes, supra note 59, at 460 ("[W]e
stipulate that some sort of response was appropriate to avoid a regulatory shutdown of the
airlines after September 11.").
245. "Given this relationship between uninsured losses and the likelihood of government
relief, an incentive is created among individuals and businesses not to purchase insurance (or to
ARIZONA STATE LA W JOURNAL
Dilemma,' '216 raises the issue of whether government action has done more
harm than good. The stabilization benefits may have been offset by the
incentivization to pursue economic rent,247 and the disincentivization of a
private market solution.248 Judging by the intensity of the past and present
lobbying efforts, we can see how the expectation of government welfare
have already become entrenched in the insurance industry. 49
Ex post government action can be good or bad or both. There can be no
more of a definitive statement for there will (and should) always be a
government option to intervene if the circumstances call for a transitional
period of stabilization. 250 Government action is often subject to a mix of
political motivations, public sentiment, and the perceived need for
economic stabilization, which may or may not be accurate. There is always
the danger of unintended consequences, 25 ' and relief cannot always be relied
purchase less-than-full insurance) against disaster losses." Levmore & Logue, supra note 54, at
281. Levmore and Logue argue that the September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund establishes
a clear "precedent" to provide compensation for future victims of terrorism (at least with respect
to the loss of life). Id. at 278. This argument is unpersuasive as to purchasers of life insurance. It
is difficult to see how purchasers of life insurance would substantially factor terrorism risk into
their decision. The most likely buyers of life insurance, primary wage earners at the height of
their earning power, have sufficient incentive to buy life insurance even without consideration
of terrorism risk for they understand the risks to their family's income stream, and most
consumers understand that terrorism is but a tiny portion of the causes of premature death.
Similarly, those most unlikely to buy life insurance, young adults, would probably not expend
their limited funds on life insurance for the world is still their oyster.
246. James M. Buchanan, The Samaritan's Dilemma, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND
ECONOMIC THEORY (Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1975); Stephen Coate, Altruism, the Samaritan's
Dilemma, and Government Transfer Policy, 85 AM. ECON. REv. 46 (1995); see also, e.g.,
Levmore, supra note 232, at 20 ("As already suggested, individuals might purchase less
insurance the more they expect widespread losses and then relief"); Bryant J. Spann, Note,
Going Down for the Third Time: Senator Kerry's Reform Bill Could Save the Drowning
National Flood Insurance Program, 28 GA. L. REv. 593, 601 (1994) ("Perhaps the largest
disincentive to buying flood insurance is the availability of federal disaster relief.").
247. See infra note 260.
248. See infra note 276.
249. See supra notes 94, 225, 230.
250. See CRIPPEN, supra note 37, at 16 tbl.5 (noting $4.4 billion in federal aid after
Hurricane Andrew and $9.5 billion after the Northridge earthquake); Gron & Sykes, supra note
59, at 461 ("Quite the contrary, the government should and does assist those who have suffered
losses. It simply does so on the basis of an ex post assessment of priorities rather than ex ante
contracts with some subset of the population that has elected to purchase insurance.").
251. For instance, the series of four hurricanes hitting the United States during the summer
of 2004 was unprecedented. See infra note 449. The hardest hit state was Florida, and given the
2000 presidential election turmoil in Florida it was not surprising that federal relief was prompt
and plentiful. If the premiums for hurricane coverage rise to a certain point, one can easily see a
typical homeowner's thought process: "The last time my house was hit, the government stepped
in. Florida is an important state for any president or presidential hopeful. In the event of a
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on in times of crisis. In spite of these concerns, it is inappropriate to reject
categorically ex post government action for it is a vital component of
compensation in times of national crisis. To argue against this process is
impractical and, one could argue, ignores the democratic process inherent in
the distribution of wealth per public grace. Yet the uncertainties inherent in
ex post government action suggest that it is not a structural solution to the
systemic. problem of catastrophic terrorism risk. 52 Rather, such action is
interstitial in nature.
C. Ex Ante Government Insurance
A government pool is the insurance industry's favored solution.253 Many
in the industry see the war against terrorism as a long-term problem in
which the best outcome is a stalemate. 54 The major market players are
European based reinsurers who drive the capacity and pricing of catastrophe
and terrorism risk. 255 It bears noting that many European countries,
including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Austria and Spain, have
adopted a government sponsored risk pool approach.25 6 These programs
complete disaster, I will be covered. So why should I buy this expensive insurance coverage? Or
perhaps I can buy a cheaper policy with limited coverage and the government will pick up the
loss difference."
252. It is difficult to determine whether government will provide subsidies and in what
form and amount. Levmore, supra note 232, at 32 ("As it turns out, it is difficult to predict the
scope of post-disaster relief because so much depends on the level of what I have called
'sympathy' for victims."). Levmore identifies a few factors: a well organized interest group,
geographic concentration of victims, general public's ability to identify with the victims, moral
hazard considerations, and the level of insurance coverage. Id. at 3-8, 18.
253. Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge earthquake were so severe that state
governments were compelled to create government sponsored insurance schemes. See generally
DAvi M. D'AGOSTINO, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, CATASTROPHE INSURANCE RISKS: THE ROLE
OF RISK-LINKED SECURITIES AND FACTORS AFFECTING THEIR USE 37-40 (2002) (describing the
Florida and California programs). Florida owns Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, which
is the biggest insurer against hurricane damage, and also has a pool funded by premiums from
insurers that provides reinsurance if claims exceed $4.5 billion up to a cap of $15 billion.
Weathering Well, supra note 74, at 62. The California Earthquake Authority sells earthquake
coverage and has a fund of over $7 billion. Id.
254. See, e.g., Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman, to Shareholders of Berkshire
Hathaway, Inc., supra note 43, at 7.
255. These reinsurers include Munich Re, Swiss Re, Hannover Re, General Cologne Re,
SCOR, and Converium. BAUER & ENZ, supra note 32, at 21 fig.7. Aside from reinsurers, some
of the world's largest insurers and financial institdtions are' also European-based, including
Allianz, AXA, ING, Prudential (UK), UBS, Credit Suisse, and Deutche Bank.
256. Even before 9/11, several governments had such programs in place because of
persistent problems with terrorism. In response to the IRA bombings in 1992 and 1993, the UK
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vary in their structures, the important differentiation being whether the
program is mandatory (e.g., Spain and France) or voluntary (e.g., UK and
Germany), but the common denominator is the provision of public funds
government created Pool Re, a voluntary mutual risk pool. BRAUNER & GALEY, supra note 38,
at 28 app. 1.1. See generally www.hm-treasury.gov.uk (last visited Mar. 11, 2005); Bice, supra
note 92, at 448-63 (discussing Pool Re). The UK government acts as the reinsurer of last resort,
though there has yet been a draw on the government. Pool Re covers only certain geographic
districts and "target risks." Premiums paid into Pool Re are determined by the participants
themselves. Effective January 1, 2003, the maximum industry retention is set at £30 million per
event and £60 million per annum, with individual insurer's retentions being based on individual
market share. Over the next four years, the retention schedule provides a steady increase to £ 100
million per event and £200 million per annum in 2006. Spain, on the other hand, runs a
mandatory program. Robert C. Meder, Global Terrorism Coverage, RISK MGMT. MAG., May 1,
2002, available at http://www.rmmag.com/MGTemplate.cfm?Section=MagArchive
&template=/Magazine/ArchiveDisplayMagazines.cfm&IssuelD= 162&AID = 1479&Volume=49
&ShowArticle=l (last visited Apr. 5, 2005). Spain established Consorcio de Compensaci6n de
Seguros (CCS), which guarantees "'extraordinary risk"' including terrorism. See BRAUNER &
GALEY, supra note 38, at 28 app.l.1. After deregulation in 1990, insurers can get private
insurance, in which case CCS acts as an indemnity. CCS is mandatory because all policyholders
must pay CCS premium. Id. CCS was called upon when terrorist bombed the Madrid train
system on March 11, 2004. The attacks resulted in 192 killed, and claims of about £35 million.
Ignacio Machetti, The Spanish Experience in the Management of Extraordinary Risks:
Consorcio de Compensaci6n de Seguros, in OECD CONFERENCE, supra note 36, at
www.oecd.org/document/34/0,2340,fr_2649_37411_337535701_1_137411,00.html (last
visited Mar. 10, 2005).
In the wake of 9/11, other European and Western countries have moved to create such
programs. Austria, France, Germany and Australia have recently enacted government sponsored
risk pool and reinsurance programs. Effective January 1, 2003, Austria provides automatic
coverage of risk up to E5 million, risk from "e5 to £25 million can be ceded to the pool with
payment of additional premium, [and] risk exceeding £25 million must be covered on a
facultative basis." BRAUNER & GALEY, supra note 38, at 29 app. 1.2. Effective January 1, 2002,
France set up Gestion de l'Assurance et de la Rdssurance des Risques Attentats det Actes de
Terrorisme (GAREAT), a state controlled mandatory risk pool under which the primary insurer
retains £400 million, the next two layers of risk E 1.1 billion and £250 million in excess of the
£1.5 billion "are placed in the international reinsurance market," and the government guarantees
losses over the £1.75 billion through Caisse Centrale de Reassurance. Id. Effective November 1,
2002, Germany through Extremus Versichergungs-AG, a consortium of private insurers,
provides voluntary coverage for losses in excess of £25 million per insured with an annual
aggregate limit for any one insured is £1.5 billion. Id. Effective July 1, 2003, Australia adopted
a mandatory program in which reinsurance coverage for loss of or damage to commercial
property is provided through the Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation with an aggregate
cover up to Australian $10.3 billion when the pool is fully funded. See THE AUSTL. GOV'T, THE
AUSTL. REINSURANCE POOL CORP. WEBSITE, available at www.arpc.treasury.gov.au (last
visited Mar. 9, 2005); see generally AM. ACAD. OF ACUTUARIES, supra 34, at 20-30 (describing
the various programs by other governments); Boran, supra note 92, at 548-58 (describing the
programs of the UK, Spain, and South Africa).
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and/or government management. 257 Accordingly, many of the key players in
the insurance market have experienced and benefited from a "partnership
between the private and public sectors,""' a euphemism for a government
cost-sharing program, and they seek the same in the United States which is
the largest insurance market. In this vein, the industry has signaled its
unwillingness to assume the majority of the risk over the long-term without
government participation.25 9
The reasons cited for a government program are the severity of the risk,
the increase of overall capacity with the addition of government funds, and
the further spreading of risk to deeper pockets. 260 Only the federal
government, it is argued, has capital deep enough to absorb multiple shocks
of catastrophic terrorism.26" ' Given that the industry has failed to propose a
permanent solution to terrorism risk and the market in terrorism risk
continues to be uncertain, perhaps an extension of TRIA is the path of least
resistance in that there would be less uncertainty in the short term with a
federal backstop.262 The immediate problem is that without an extension the
257. AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 34, at 29 ("Note the principal dichotomy in
approaches is whether individual insurer participation is voluntary or mandatory in each of these
plans to get the benefit of the government backstop.").
258. OECD CONFERENCE, supra note 36, at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
41/56/33962469.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2005). 1 do not suggest that the agenda of European
insurers and reinsurers are different from American or Bermuda companies. In fact the opposite
is probably true. I only suggest that European based companies have significant sway in setting
the industry position by virtue of their market shares.
259. See, e.g., BRAUNER & GALEY, supra note 38, at 24 ("Consequently, the state should be
more than merely a supervisor and regulator. It should also take on the role of an insurer or
reinsurer by assuming certain functions .... "); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 103,
at 9 (indicating that insurers are unwilling to sell terrorism coverage without a cost-sharing
program); ZANETTI ET AL., supra note 2, at 19 ("The state as the insurer of last resort is in a
better position to deal with extreme loss potentials than are private insurance companies with
their limited capital and capacity."); Warren Buffett, Use FDIC Model to Protect Insurers from
Terrorism, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Nov. 28, 2001, at 9A, available at 2001 WL 100792260
(suggesting that the government create an insurance scheme similar to the FDIC).
260. BRAUNER & GALEY, supra note 38, at 23. Some even argue that private market
reactions have created externalities that conflict with the "public interest" and that are only
correctable through market intervention and selective use of policy. See DARIUS LAKDAWALLA
& GEORGE ZANJANI, INSURANCE, SELF-PROTECTION AND THE ECONOMICS OF TERRORISM 30-32
(RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Working Paper, 2003).
261. Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman, to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.,
supra note 43, at 8 ("Only the U.S. Government has the resources to absorb such a blow.")
262. This is essentially the argument made in a study that was sponsored by various interest
groups of the industry. HUBBARD & DEAL, supra note 29. The study argues: "Over time, it may
be possible to develop alternative approaches to TRIA that are structured in a different way.
However, these alternatives are not in place today, and not extending TRIA may well results
[sic] in negative economic consequences." Id. at 86.
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previously seen market effects of constrained capacity and increased prices
may return in some measure. An extension keeps the status quo. In the
event of another catastrophe, the argument goes, it is better to have an
organized reinsurance program in place, lest another disaster will have a
disproportionate impact on those who were priced out of the market or did
not purchase insurance due to moral hazard.263 The appeal of laissez faire
economic policy is offset by the risk to the government, the economy, and
the public." 4
The problem with the above argument is two-fold. First, it is a self-
fulfilling prophecy. The existence of a government risk share program
would surely disincentivize the development of an alternative solution.
Indeed, a skeptic would suggest that the insurance industry did not pursue a
private market solution within the three-year window provided by TRIA in
favor of pursuing a long-term strategy to extend TRIA and make it
permanent.2 65 Second, the argument overstates the case for extending TRIA
or enacting another government insurance scheme in its place. The evidence
supporting the main argument for TRIA-market stabilization-is tepid at
best. 66 While terrorism coverage is available, there is still a divide between
offered price and perceived risk, the net result being that the take up rate has
been low and risks are still adversely concentrated.267 All things considered,
the statute's expiration should not dramatically change the overall risk
distribution. Policyholders largely assumed the risk before and after 9/11
and they will likely continue to do so upon the expiration of TRIA.
Insurance will be available but with tighter coverage limits and at higher
premium levels. The experience of Hurricane Andrew suggests that after the
initial shock and market withdrawal, capacity eventually increases with
263. See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 34, at 7-8 ("Insurers may reduce their
uncertainty by adopting a strategy of avoiding the risk through exclusions or through coverage
limitations to the extent they are permitted by law. To the extent that the insurer mitigates its
risk through coverage limitations, the policyholder assumes that risk by implication."). See also
supra note 262.
264. There are three general views of government intervention in the markets. Laissez faire
economic policy posits that private markets, however imperfect, are more efficient than
government intervention. BROWN ET AL., supra note 52, at 4-5. The public interest theory
regulation posits that private markets can produce suboptimal allocation of economic resources
and that government intervention can improve the market equilibrium. Id. at 5. The third view,
market enhancement policy, takes the middle position and posits that regulations should
facilitate the development of a private market solution to market inefficiencies or failures. Id. at
5-6.
265. See KUNREUTHER & MICHAEL-KERJAN,'supra note 29, at 12 ("[N]othing is more
permanent than the temporary.").
266. See supra Part II.D.
267. See supra note 113.
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recapitalization and prices eventually decrease without government
intervention. Even before Congress enacted TRIA, the market was
stabilizing into a new equilibrium.2 68 Of course, market stabilization does
not mean a return to the old paradigm.2 69 A rational price correction, several
years removed from the raw emotions and reflexive shock of 9/11, is not a
bad thing. Before 9/11, the industry grossly underpriced the risk. Given the
current understanding of terrorism risk, everyone understands that coverage
is no longer "free."
A broad range of scholars, consumer groups, and thinktanks have argued
against a permanent, government run program.27° Any federal reinsurance
program "would be costly to taxpayers."27' While insurers may believe that
government reinsurance is "free" capital, some have argued that they cannot
profit from the subsidized capital. This explains why upon the passage of
TRIA the market reacted negatively to insurance stocks.272 Because the
insurance market is generally competitive, the economic rent would flow
268. See supra note 105.
269. See supra Part II.A.
270. See generally Gron & Sykes, supra note 59; Levmore & Logue, supra note 54;
Smetters, supra note 50; supra note 225 (discussing opposition of consumer groups and
conservative thinktanks). In light of the ambivalent data, it is difficult to argue definitively that
as a temporary stabilization measure TRIA was bad legislation, provided it remains temporary.
271. CRIPPEN, supra note 37, at 24. The Congressional Budget Office concludes that the
uncertainty of the actuarial risk will create political pressure to subsidize terrorism risk
premiums, ultimately costing the American taxpayers. Id. In estimating the cost of H.R. 3210, a
predecessor of TRIA, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the expected costs to the
government would be $9 billion for three years. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 215, 4.
272. The financial market study concludes that "the net impact of [TRIA] may well have
been negative," given the negative correlation of stock prices on the industries that are most
saffected by the passage of the statute. BROWN ET AL., supra note 52, at 3, 37. These industries
are real estate, construction, banking, transportation, and utilities. Id. at 19. The study provides
several explanations for the counterintuitive phenomenon. One, TRIA did not benefit insurers
because of the competitive nature of the market, and in fact may have had an adverse effect by
terminating their option to not provide terrorism risk. Id. at 37; see also CRIPPEN, supra note 37,
at 2 ("The market for P&C insurance appears to be competitive nationally .... ). Second, TRIA
may have reduced the market expectation of ex post government assistance. BROWN ET AL.,
supra note 52, at 37-38. Third, TRIA may have prevented or delayed the development of
private market solution to terrorism risk, which would be more efficient than the government
scheme. Id. at 38. The negative stock price reaction to TRIA is interesting when compared to
the positive stock price reaction to the creation of the California Earthquake Authority. See
David C. Marlett & Carl Pacini, Insurer Stock Price Responses to the Creation of the California
Earthquake Authority, 18 J. INS. REG. 80, 99 (Fall 1999) ("[W]e found statistically significant
positive insurer share price reaction at the time of release of new information favorable to the
implementation of the CEA.").
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upstream to policyholders. 73 Any expected value of federal funds would be
priced into the premium, and thus such a program is really subsidized
insurance. Accordingly, the availability of potentially underpriced terrorism
insurance may provide a disincentive for policyholders to avoid or control
risk, 27 4 or otherwise not engender sufficient economic stake to avoid moral
hazards.275 In the long term, there is a potential downside for both the
government and the industry.
Also, subsidized insurance programs have historically "crowded out" the
private sector with cheaper than economically feasible pricing.7 6 While the
short term effect is reduced prices, the lack of a competitive market leads to
273. BROWN ET AL., supra note 52, at 21; see also KUNREUTHER & MICHAEL-KERJAN,
supra note 29, at 18 (suggesting that the most likely explanation for the negative market
reaction to TRIA is the statute's requirement that insurers provide terrorism coverage when they
would not have provided it otherwise). TRIA could be a detriment to insurers because TRIA
makes coverage mandatory, thus terminating the insurers' option to provide coverage or not
provide coverage. BROWN ET AL., supra note 52, at 21. Economic rent is the redistribution of
wealth through government action. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN ET AL., TOWARD A THEORY OF
THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY ix (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980).
274. Since 9/11, policyholders and businesses have taken significant risk avoidance or
mitigation measures, and have invested significant resources to private security measures. See,
e.g., C. Michael Armstrong, United We Stand, WALL ST. J., March 9, 2004, at B2, available at
2004 WL-WST 56922302 ("Virtually every company has strengthened physical and cyber
security and updated their emergency response plan. On average, they have increased security
spending by 10% since 9/1."); Peter Grant & Motoko Rich, Lower Manhattan is Fighting for
its Future as Jobs Disappear and Companies Move Elsewhere, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2002, at
B 1, available at 2002 WL-WSK 3405757 (discussing the effects of 9/11 on commercial activity
in downtown New York); Randall Smith & Kate Kelly, Financial Community's Migrations
Since 9/11 Accelerate a Trend, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2002, at Cl, available at 2002 WL
3405786 (noting Wall Street securities firms have moved out of downtown New York); see also
Elise M. Bloom et al., Competing Interests in the Post 9/11 Workplace: The New Line Between
Privacy and Safety, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 897, 915-20 (2003) (describing security
measures taken by companies). Although these measures constitute a cost to the economy, they
are voluntarily born by policyholders and businesses, and they contribute to the reduction of
terrorism risk.
275. See CRIPPEN, supra note 37, at 31 ("By subsidizing flood insurance, for instance, the
federal government has encouraged building in hazardous areas, putting more real estate at risk
and raising the cost of post-disaster assistance.").
276. See THE CATO INST., supra note 62, at 7 (quoting Glen Hubbard, who noted the
problem of government programs crowding out private markets); CRIPPEN, supra note 37, at 28
(noting that "it might crowd out private insurance suppliers"); KUNREUTHER & MICHAEL-
KERJAN, supra note 29, at 12 (noting that subsidized government coverage for the airline
industry in the wake of 9/11 had the effect of "crowding out the emergence of private
solutions," in this case a proposal for a risk retention group by the airline industry). But see
HUBBARD & DEAL, supra note 29, at 62 ("First, TRIA is not generally perceived to have
crowded out the private sector. In fact, the most common perspective is that exactly the opposite
is true. By providing more definitive loss parameters, TRIA has facilitated the participation of
the private sector at current levels.").
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reduced capacity and increased prices in the long term.277 There is more to
the crowding out effect than simply price distortions. A government
monopoly or centralization tends to anesthetize the market. 78 Any federal
cost sharing reinsurance program would likely create an economic
disincentive for the reinsurance market to develop a private market solution.
The perception of free capital would effectively extinguish any incentive to
develop a private market solution, including financial innovations like
securitization. 1Given that the rationale for securitization is a lower cost of
funds,28 ° securitization would be unviable if it has to compete with the
government's cost of funds.28' Market anesthetization is already evident in
the failure to develop a private market solution (the second of TRIA's goals)
and the industry's lobbying efforts to extend TRIA.282 Subsidized insurance
will tend to distort market incentives and may increase the costs to the
economy over a long period. The precise effects are unpredictable, and
would inject a significant level of uncertainty. Thus, government action can
also inject a systemic risk to the insurance market and the economy.2 3
Individually, the above reasons are significant. Collectively, they are
compelling. But perhaps the most compelling reason to refrain from
enacting a government reinsurance program is the abundant evidence that
277. This assumes that the government does not monopolize the entire sector of terrorism
coverage and underprices the risk with subsidized premiums.
278. See Christopher M. Lewis & Kevin C. Murdock, The Role of Government Contracts in
Discretionary Reinsurance Markets for Natural Disasters, 63 J. RISK & INS. 567, 584-85
(1996).
279. See infra notes 297-299 & accompanying text (discussing a possible contingent
capital program). The insurance industry would argue that a government backstop would not be
"free" funds because they are then obligated to provide terrorism coverage. This argument
would not be persuasive because nothing would preclude them from charging rates that are
rational and supported by actuarial principles but with the benefit of a capped loss. If a
government backstop would force insurers into a loss-making proposition, then one would not
expect such heavy lobbying effort by the industry.
280. See infra Part V.A.
281. "Capital market products, especially catastrophe bonds whose principal and interest
would be suspended if a disaster occurred, would be at a competitive disadvantage against a
subsidized federal program." CRIPPEN, supra note 37, at 28.
282. See supra note 225.
283. Government regulations and programs can by themselves be a source of systemic risk
to the economy. See Rolf Nebel, Regulations as a Source of System Risk: The Need for
Economic Impact Analysis, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 273, 276-83. While regulations
may seek to mitigate market imperfections, they may sometimes cause their own distortions and
aggravate existing market deficiencies by introducing distortion of competition, supply
distortions, moral hazards, procyclicality, or system risk. Id. at 276.
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the government is a poor assessor and transferor of risk.284 There are several
reasons for this. First, the government is but a single entity, and a single
department within an agency typically manages any given government
program. These micro-agencies, subject only to bureaucratic oversight,
cannot compete with the private market, which is subject to the collective
forces of supply and demand, innovation and strategy, and incentives and
disincentives. The private market is more nimble, intelligent, and diligent
than government in turning a profit and improving efficiency within a
market.285 Second, the government generally is not motivated by pure profit,
a significant handicap in operating a business. Its actions are motivated by
the political self-interests of the individual politicians or bureaucrats, and
the underlying rationale of police power, i.e., the need to protect its citizens,
to provide welfare on a case by case basis, and to redistribute wealth. These
motives are alien in the private market, which only seek the most efficient,
profitable outcome, producing the lowest costs.
The historical efficacy of government sponsored insurance programs has
been mixed. 286 Experience shows that the government "has difficulty
managing risk efficiently., 2 7 It makes little effort to control adverse
selection and is unable to price actuarial risk.2 88 For example, federal crop
284. See Gron & Sykes, supra note 59, at 462; Manns, supra note 98, at 2544-45; George
L. Priest, The Problematic Structure of the September 11th Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L.
REV., 527, 527-29 (2003).
285. This is not a statement against the competency of personnel in government agencies.
Rather, the collective intelligence of a market system in which an enormous amount of
information is absorbed is superior to the central planning of individuals or a small group of
individuals. Of course, this is the decisive advantage of a free market of self-interested
economic actors as first and best articulated by Adam Smith. See generally ADAM SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin Carman ed., 1994).
286. Deposit insurance administered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is often
cited as a successful government insurance program with positive net benefit to the general
economy. See William M. Isaac, The Role of Deposit Insurance in the Emerging Financial
Services Industry, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 195, 198-99 (1984) (noting that both Milton Friedman and
John Kenneth Galbraith credited deposit insurance as bringing order and stability to the
American banking system) (citing M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1867-1960 434 (1963) and J. KENNETH GALBRAITH, MONEY: WHENCE IT
CAME, WHERE IT WENT 197 (1975)). The success of deposit insurance can be attributable to
several reasons. Banks are heavily and centrally regulated, and so the government is in the best
position to understand the risk and control it. Also, because participation is mandatory, the risk
is evenly spread throughout a large pool of similarly situated insureds and there is little chance
of adverse selection and moral hazard. It is highly questionable whether universal terrorism
coverage is desirable or even a possibility.
287. CRIPPEN, supra note 37, at 27.
288. Priest, supra note 284, at 527-28; see also Manns, supra note 98, at 2544 (noting that
the government charges as little as 5% of the actuarial risk for flood insurance).
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and flood insurance programs have had problems of adverse selection,
moral hazards, poor underwriting and mismanagement.289 In both programs,
the risks are not subject to the ordinary, actuarial assessments, and have
been undermined by low participation and price distortions.29 When the
government enters a market, "it tends to create subsidies and cross-subsidies
which are not that desirable because of the incentive distortions."29 It does
not assess and price risk so much as engage in wealth redistribution "under
an insurance guise. '
The problems of adverse selection and the Samaritan's dilemma can be
remedied by mandating universal coverage. But universal coverage is
problematic on multiple levels. It would create a significant centralized
bureaucracy. The effectiveness of this bureaucracy would be questionable
in light of the government's experience in running insurance programs.
289. See Flood Insurance: Information on Financial Aspects of the National Flood
Insurance Program: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty. Opportunities, House
Comm. On Banking & Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. 1-11 (1999) (statement of Stanley J. Czerwinski,
Assoc. Dir., Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Issues, Resources, Community, & Econ. Dev. Div., U.S. Gen.
Accounting Office); David F. Rendahl, Federal Crop Insurance: Friend or Foe?, 4 SAN
JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REv. 185, 205-07 (1994) (describing the problems with crop insurance);
Smetters, supra note 50, at 47 (describing the problems with flood insurance); see generally
Flood Insurance: Being Eaten Away, ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 1993, at 32 (stating that the national
flood program "encouraged so many of them to build their farms in the path of the mighty
Mississippi"); Charles T. Griffin, The Natural Flood Insurance Program: Unattained Purposes,
Liability in Contract and Takings, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 727 (1994) (discussing the national
flood insurance program). Government programs often start with good intentions, but have
unanticipated market distortions. Consider for example flood insurance. See National Flood
Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-03 (2000); see generally FED. EMERGENCY MGMT.
AGENCY, FLOOD INSURANCE: INTRODUCTION TO THE NFIP, at www.fema.gov/nfip/intnfip.htm
(last visited Mar. 8, 2005). Flood insurance was enacted to spread losses through subsidized
insurance and to guide the development standards on floodplains. See Spann, supra note 246, at
596-98. As of 2001, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) had 4.5 million policies in
force with over $570 billion in coverage. See Smetters, supra note 50, at 47. Government flood
losses average about $800 million per year due to subsidized premiums. Id. at 47. Moreover, the
prevalence of national flood insurance does not ensure that the risks are adequately covered by
insurance, thus eliminating the need for ex post government relief. See Spann, supra note 246,
at 593 (stating that the Midwest Flood of 1993 caused $15 billion in property damage, requiring
a $5.7 billion emergency aid to victims). The same problems have been noted in the Federal
Crop Insurance Program. See Levmore, supra note 232, at 24 n.47 (noting that the government
subsidizes 30% of premiums, but the participation is still a low 25%, putting "'political
pressures that always come to bear when natural disasters strike a wide path').
290. See Spann, supra note 246, at 596-604 (explaining the problems of flood insurance);
Rendahl, supra note 289, at 205-07 (problems of crop insurance).
291. THE CATO INST., supra note 62, at 19 (statement of Anne Gron); see generally Richard
A. Epstein, Catastrophic Responses to Catastrophic Risks, 12 J. RISK & INS. 287 (1996)
(arguing against government intervention in insurance market).
292. Priest, supra note 284, at 229.
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Government underwriting is often not done on a pure actuarial standard, but
is tainted by political and other public interest motivations. Economically,
universal coverage makes sense only if a substantial portion of the economy
is subject to risk. Although terrorism is capable of striking anywhere, it is a
substantial risk for only parts of the country. This is certainly true of
catastrophic terrorism. Philosophically, universal coverage means
government coercion in matters that should be private economic choices.
Coverage may not be the most preferred use of funds for many
policyholders, who may choose to assume the risk and allocate funds to
other endeavors. Some policyholders may experience irrational "myopia,"
choosing not to purchase insurance until they first experience an adverse
event.293 But there are rational reasons to opt out of coverage. Commercial
policyholders from Fortune 500 to Main Street businesses routinely make
allocations of scarce capital. Policyholders may not purchase insurance if
the actuarial value is unknown with respect to the premium. This is simply
the corollary to the market exit by insurers upon information ambiguity.
294
Even if the actuarial risk can be assessed, insurance premiums (particularly
terrorism coverage) are a discretionary expense and each policyholder has
its own capital allocation priorities. Accordingly, most policyholders would
want the freedom to choose, to weigh the costs and benefits rather than have
that decision be imposed upon them by government coercion.
Aside from a shared risk pool concept, other proposals have been
suggested. One proposal is the sale of government sponsored excess of loss
reinsurance contracts.295 Under this proposal, the government would auction
coverages wherein it assumes a portion of the excess of loss, which is
capped, while the primary insurer or reinsurer would assume the remaining
risk.296 Because the program is federally backed, there would be no credit
293. See Howard Kunreuther, Mitigating Disaster Losses Through Insurance, 12 J. RISK &
INS. 171, 171 (1996).
294. See supra note 110.
295. Insurance and Terrorism Hearing, supra note 136 (statement of J. David Cummins,
Harry J. Loman Professor of Insurance and Risk Management, The Wharton School, University
of Pennsylvania); see also CRIPPEN, supra note 37, at 21-23 (describing a similar auctioning of
XOL policies).
296. Insurance and Terrorism Hearing, supra note 136 (statement of J. David Cummins,
Harry J. Loman Professor of Insurance and Risk Management, The Wharton School, University
of Pennslyvania). Cummins also makes the following suggestion:
[G]overnment should explore ways in which it could encourage the
development of private markets for catastrophic risk without providing
Federal financing backing. For example, it should investigate the possibility
of lowering regulatory barriers that may exist to securitizing insurance risk
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risk. But this program is susceptible to the same kinds of negative attributes
of an ex ante government intervention. Moreover, the auction could allow
any insurer or reinsurer to participate in providing terrorism coverage, even
those with marginal credit. Of course, a prescreening of participants, using
some objective standard like credit ratings, may solve this problem but it
does not stretch the imagination to see how this screening process too could
be subject to government interference. Thus, an auction does not promote
price efficiency, and may incentivize some insurers to engage in "bet the
company" type of underwriting.
Another possible solution could be a contingent capital program, which
is sometimes used in the insurance industry.297 A contingent capital program
uses debentures or derivatives to trigger a capital call upon a specified
event. 298 The government could charge a fee on an annual basis in
consideration for a promise to provide funds, charged at the government's
cost of funds. In this way, the private market is still incentivized to provide
terrorism coverage, and participating insurers are guaranteed of capital flow
in the event of a catastrophe. The goal is to preserve access to capital. The
capital is not "free" in the sense of a pure giveaway; rather it is subsidized
capital because the government provides a guarantee of funds, which will
ensure that participating insurers are not forced into insolvency and that
state guarantee funds are not tapped as a result of a liquidity crisis. But this
type of program could also be subject to the same incentives described
above.
Neither an excess of loss auction nor a contingent capital program
present a long-term solution. These programs do not change the
fundamental economics of providing terrorism coverage, and they call on
the deployment of government funds. Government participation under both
plans amount to capital support of the industry, but does not enhance
pricing efficiency, incentivize a more permanent market solution, or
facilitate the entry of other market participants.
and taking control of this aspect of insurance regulation to simplify the
regulatory system.
Id.
297. A contingent capital program is one of the alternative risk transfer (ART) methods that
has been developed. See supra note 26.
298. See id. In a contingent surplus note, the insurer issues debt securities, which may be
converted into surplus notes at the option of the insurer. Lewis & Davis, supra note 26, at 116.
In a contingent equity arrangement, the insurer purchases an option to call on pre-committed
funds at a pre-arranged rate upon the occurrence of a defined event. Id. at 124. In the banking
industry, lenders often charge a commitment fee, a small percentage of the total revolving credit,
in consideration for a firm commitment of funds.
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Someone must bear the cost of terrorism. Any apportionment of the risks
and costs must be efficient, meaning that each interest group should be
incentivized to assume the costs of terrorism. September 11 th exposed the
weakness in the insurance system. Higher premiums and reduced coverage
mean that owners and policyholders must assume more risk.299 It is a basic
concept of finance and insurance that concentrated risk is not a good
thing.300 Without an alternative mechanism to distribute the risk, we can
reasonably assume that government would again assume a large portion of
the costs of a future catastrophe. In light of the post-9/1 1 reality, this would
be tantamount to an indirect social insurance. These conclusions assume
that the mechanisms of risk distribution remain unchanged. However, if the
market can distribute the risks to a broader and deeper pool of risk bearers,
then the equation changes. Losses become more dispersed, liquidity and
credit concerns are alleviated, and the role of government shrinks. This is
the promise of securitization.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE MARKET
A. Brief Primer on Securitization
Securitization is a structured financial transaction where an expected
cashflow from receivables (an illiquid asset) is securitized into a liquid bond
traded in the public securities market.3"' The typical assets are receivables
299. The concentration of too much risk on owners and policyholders is not a desirable
result. For example, the earthquake in Kobe, Japan, in 1995 caused $147 billion in economic
losses, of which only $4 billion was covered by insurance. D'AGOSTrNo, supra note 253, at 12
fig.2; see also CRIPPEN, supra note 37, at 9-10 (stating that only 40% of affected homeowners
had earthquake insurance during the Northridge earthquake, with $43 billion of economic
losses).
300. See infra note 309 (discussing Markowitz's theory of portfolio diversification).
301. See generally TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING,
FINANCIAL ASSET POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATIONS § 1 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
While the technical details of the transaction can be complex, the basic structure is simple. A
pool of expected cashflows, say credit card receivables, is sold in an arms length, "true sale"
transaction to a special purpose vehicle (SPV), typically a trust. See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ,
STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION §§ 4.1-4.12.3
(Adam D. Ford ed., 3d ed. 2003) (discussing the "true sale" requirement). The SPV seeks to
achieve bankruptcy remoteness so that the originator's liability risk (the enterprise risk) does not
flow into the SPV. Id. §§ 3.1-3.5 (discussing the bankruptcy remoteness aspect). An investment
bank analyzes the receivables and models the expected cashflows. Based on this analysis, the
issuer (the SPV) and the investment bank typically structure several different bonds, or tranches.
These tranches typically have different terms, e.g., coupon and maturity. They are also
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generated from the sale of mortgages (both residential and commercial),
credit cards, auto loans, student loans, and home equity loans. 302
Securitization was first developed in the early 1970s when the federal
government issued mortgage-backed "pass through" securities. 3°3 Since then,
the market has grown to over $6.4 trillion in capitalization.0 4
In theory, any stream of receivables can be securitized. °5 Securitization
finances the asset generation activity with the deeper, cheaper capital
available in the markets. The rationale for securitizing a pool of assets lies
in a cost of capital differential. If the cost of funds needed to generate the
assets (i.e., the originator's cost of capital) is more than the cost to
securitize the assets (i.e., the interest payments on the bonds), securitization
benefits all concerned.30 6 By securitizing the receivables, the originator
structured in a way that their credit risks are different. Some bonds have priority rights to a
preset bracket of receivables payments, and so the credit risk is minimized. Other bonds have
residual rights to whatever cashflows that may remain, and so the risk is far greater. Each tranch
is rated by professional rating agencies, the most common being Moody's investors Service,
Standard & Poor's, and Fitch Ratings. The bonds are then priced so that the proceeds give the
investors their expected returns based on the ratings. The receivables are serviced by the
originator or a third-party servicing firm, which pays out on the bond terms. See STEVEN L.
SCHWARCZ ET AL., SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS § 1.03, at
6-16 (2004) (describing a typical securitization transaction). By now this process is so
standardized that the cost of securitization has been greatly reduced and securitization is a
standard structured financing technique that improves liquidity and reduces capital costs. See
infra note 327 (discussing the transaction costs of securitization as compared to the issuance of
equity).
302. See ANDREW DAVIDSON ET AL., SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURING AND INVESTMENT
ANALYSIS 4 (2003) (providing market breakdown, mortgages comprising 81% of the market).
303. FRANKEL, supra note 301, § 2.4.2.
304. As of June 30, 2004, asset backed securities and agency mortgage backed securities
had a total of $1.77 trillion and $3.53 trillion, respectively, totaling $5.3 trillion. See generally
THE BOND MARKET ASSOC., at www.bondmarkets.com (last visited Mar. 8, 2005) (providing
securities data). In addition, there is also the commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
market, which is about $1.1 trillion. The Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities Market
Flourishes as Supply Tops $130 Billion, BOND MKT. ASs'N, June 23, 2004 at
www.bondmarkets.com/story.asp?id=1402 (last visited Apr. 5, 2004).
305. The market has securitized such oddities as media royalties, oil and gas assets, and
anticipated rock concert receipts. See Charles E. Harrell et al., Securitization of Oil, Gas, and
Other Natural Resource Assets: Emerging Financing Techniques, 52 Bus. LAW. 885 (1997)
(discussing oil and gas assets); Kim Clark, On the Frontier of Creative Finance: How Wall
Street Can Securitize Anything, 135 FORTUNE, Apr. 28, 1997, at 50 (discussing "Bowie bonds"
collateralized by receipts of David Bowie concerts).
306. SCHWARCZ, supra note 301, § 1.3, at 1-9. Cost of capital is the weighted average cost
of debt and equity. All capital has a cost. The cost of debt is intuitively obvious; it is the cost of
the interest expense. The cost of equity is the investor's opportunity cost of capital that must be
provided and that is typically calculated by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). See
BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 204, at 142-50; John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and
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secures funding for the receivables at a cheaper rate than its own cost of
capital.3"' The originator can then use the "freed up" capital to originate
more assets or return it to shareholders.308 Market investors benefit because
the securitization allows them to participate in the economics of the
underlying transactions without exposure to the unique credit risk of the
the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REv. ECON. &
STAT. 13 (1965) (discussing the CAPM); William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of
Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FiN. 425, 433-42 (1964) (discussing the
CAPM).
307. A stylized example illustrates how securitizations maximize the efficiency of using
cheaper capital available in the capital markets. To keep the example simple, we do not assume
taxes or operating expenses, consider time value of money, or risk and return associated with
the residual; and the numbers used do not reflect current market pricing. A credit card issuer
(originator) generates $1,000 in receivables with an anticipated profit of $100. The customers'
cost of borrowing is $100 on $900, or 11.1%. The origination is supported by $500 of debt at a
cost of 8% and $500 of equity at a cost of 12%, and the weighted average cost of capital is 10%.
The profit from holding the receivables on the balance sheet would be $100, and the debtholders
would earn 8% and the equityholders would earn a return on equity (ROE) of 12%. Now,
instead of holding the receivables on its balance sheet, the firm securitizes them. Because the
assets and liabilities associated with the receivables are sold to the SPV, the firm no longer
needs $1,000 in capital. Instead it may need only $200 in capital, say $100 in debt and $100 in
equity. The "freed up" $800 of capital can then be used for other activities (perhaps more
origination of receivables) or returned to the debtholders and shareholders. Assume that the
bondholders of the securitization require an 8% return on the $900 credit, which is $72.
Accordingly, the receivables are sold in an arms-length transaction to the SPV for $72, and the
SPV then prices and issues the bonds. In essence, the bondholders are lending the $900 to the
credit card holders at an 8% rate instead of the 11.1% rate charged by the originator. The
originator earns the $28 gain on the sale of the receivables, which constitutes the cost of capital
differential between it and the SPV. Ordinarily, this gain on sale would be subject to tax, but for
this example we assume no taxes. See infra Part V.C (discussing the tax aspect of securitization).
It could then pay its debtholders the $8 in interest, and its shareholders could keep the remaining
$20, a 20% ROE if it could keep all the profits. But because the market in credit cards is
competitive, the firm is expected to pass on most of the cost savings to the customers. For
instance, if $7 of the $8 capital cost saving is passed on to the customers in the form of a
cheaper rate, then the firm yields a ROE of 13%, still superior to the 12% if the receivables
were held on the balance sheet, and the cost of borrowing by the firm's customers on a going
basis is lowered by 80 basis points, from 11.1% to 10.3% (= $93 + $900). Thus, securitization
reduces the cost of borrowing for the customers, increases the return on capital for the originator,
and allows market participants to invest directly in the underlying economics of the transaction
without assuming the enterprise risk of the originator as would be the case if they invested
directly in the stock of the originator. Missing from these calculations is the transaction costs,
which are a tiny fraction of the overall deal value, unlike cost of raising equity capital, which
are typically several percentage points of the deal value. See supra note 301. Of course, this
example is stylized and in the real world the margins are razor thin. Securitization is a bulk
business, commoditizing trillions of dollars of receivables. See infra note 308.
308. Thus, most companies that generate receivables have an ongoing program of
securitizations. See, e.g., CITIGROUP, INC., 2003 FoRM 10-K 46 (reporting that the company
securitized total assets of $1.158 trillion).
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originator, and an investment in a securitization provides portfolio
diversification. 309 Consumers benefit because reduced cost of capital
ultimately flows to the users of credit in a competitive market. Thus,
securitization provides cheaper capital by stripping the originator's credit
risk from the risks associated with the assets, thus promoting the efficient
use of capital.
The financial community is continuing to make innovations in this
area, 310 and some notable financial problems have been solved by the
"alchemy" of securitization. 311 For instance, in the 1980s, the U.S.
government issued "Brady bonds," which securitized illiquid sovereign
bank loans of Latin American nations into collateralized public bonds. 3 2
And in the 1990s, insurance companies and financial markets used
securitization to increase the capital supporting catastrophic insurance risks.
309. See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952). Harry Markowitz
proposed the Efficient Portfolio Theory, which showed mathematically that it was superior to
diversify one's investments in an efficient portfolio rather than to concentrate all investments in
a single basket. See id. at 77 ("[A] rule of behavior which does not imply the superiority of
diversification must be rejected both as a hypothesis and as a maxim."). Any given investment
is subject to two forms of risk. Market risk is the general, systemic risk that can adversely affect
all stocks. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 204, at 121. Unique risk is the risk associated with an
investment in a particular company, i.e., the specific firm's enterprise. Id. The Capital Asset
Pricing Model suggests that a firm must compensate an investor for both market and unique risk.
Id. at 180-89; see generally Robert J. Rhee, The Application of Finance Theory to Increased
Risk Harms in Toxic Tort Litigation, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 111, 122-25 (2004) (discussing the
Efficient Portfolio Theory and the Capital Asset Pricing Model).
310. See supra note 305. Structured finance has been exported internationally. See Claire
Hill, How Investors React to Political Risk, 8 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 283, 291-93 (1998)
[hereinafter Hill, How Investors React]; Claire A. Hill, Latin American Securitization: The Case
of the Disappearing Political Risk, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 293 (1998) [hereinafter Hill, Latin
America Securitization]; Roy B. True, Risk and Insolvency Issues in Japanese Asset
Securitization, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 505 (1996); Yuliya A. Dvorak, Comment,
Transplanting Asset Securitization: Is the Grass Green Enough on the Other Side?, 38 HOUS. L.
REV. 541 (2001). Some have proposed that securitizations be used to reduce political risk of
investments in foreign firms, including the risk of terrorism. Political risk is risk associated with
an investment in a particular country. Factors of political risks are many, including corruption,
military status, racial tensions, religion, civil war, indigenous law, and terrorism risk. Hill, Latin
American Securitization, supra at 315-16 n. 90.
311. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, I STAN. J. L.
Bus. & FN. 133 (1994).
312. See generally Ross P. Buckley, The Facilitation of the Brady Plan. Emerging Markets
Debt Trading from 1989 to 1993, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1802 (1998).
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B. Natural Catastrophe Securitization
Natural disasters have inflicted catastrophic losses throughout the history
of humankind. 313 Whether natural disasters pose catastrophic insurance
losses depends on the frequency of disasters, the level of insurance, and
property values. These factors converged in the late 1980s and 1990s, a
time period where destructive catastrophes surged.3 14 The 1990s saw the
two most devastating natural catastrophes in terms of insurance losses.
Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge earthquake created significant
disruptions in the insurance market,315 sparking innovations in the private
market.316 One major innovation was the invention of the catastrophe bond
("Cat bonds") in which catastrophic risk was securitized into a bond.
In its simplest form, a catastrophe securitization is a collateralized
reinsurance obligation. The transaction structure is similar to traditional
securitization, 317 with some important differences. 318 In a traditional
securitization, a special purpose vehicle ("SPV") is used to package a pool
of receivables that fund the bond payout. The receivables are sufficiently
similar and the law of large numbers apply so that cashflow modeling has
become a reliable process. As a result, rating agencies routinely provide
313. One of the most famous ancient natural catastrophes was the volcanic eruption of
Mount Vesuvius in 79 A.D., which completely destroyed the prosperous seaside Roman cities
of Herculaneum and Pompeii. The complete destruction of two small, albeit wealthy, cities
today would probably result in losses of hundreds of billions of dollars. Cf A Dangerous World?
Interview With Serge Troeber, Swiss Re (Jan. 15, 2005) (suggesting that Mount Vesuvius,
which is near Naples, is now overdue for an eruption and poses a chance of a mega-catastrophe
in the near future). In more recent American history, the San Francisco earthquake of 1906 is
estimated to have been 8.3 on the Richter scale, and wiped out 35% of the insurance premiums
for that year. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THE SEVERITY OF AN EARTHQUAKE, at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/earthq4/severitygip.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2005); see generally
supra note 32.
314. Catastrophic losses spiked in 1987 and the trend has continued ever since. Grace et al.,
supra note 36, at 556. From 1989 through 2001, the industry paid out on average $9.7 billion
per year in catastrophe loss claims. D'AGOSTINO, supra note 253, at 8. More than 68 million
people live in hurricane zones, and 80% of Californians live near earthquake faults. Id.
315. Hurricane Andrew resulted in the bankruptcies of twelve small insurers. Lewis &
Davis, supra note 26, at 113.
316. See supra MUNICH RE ART SOLUTIONS RISK TRANSFER TO THE CAPITAL MARKETS:
USING THE CAPITAL MARKETS IN INSURANCE RISK MANAGEMENT, 3 (2001) (discussing various
techniques of risk transfer including securitizations, insurance derivatives and other insurance
linked securities); note 26 (discussing ART techniques).
317. See supra Steven Kaplan & Guillaume Lefebvre, CAT Bonds: Tax Treatment of an
Innovative Financial Product, 16 J. TAX'N FIN. INST. 5, 5-7 (2003) (discussing Cat bond
securitization); note 301 (discussing traditional securitization structure).
318. See Tamar Frankel & Joseph W. LaPlume, Securitizing Insurance Risk, 19 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 203, 205 (2000) (describing some of the differences).
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credit ratings, which are crucial to the marketability of the bonds to the
investment community.319 In an insurance securitization, the returns to
bondholders are funded by a combination of riskfree return on bond
proceeds and ceded premium. Since the securitization collateralizes the
reinsurance obligation, a catastrophe securitization is really a structured
note transaction.
The transaction structure typically works like this. Instead of executing a
standard treaty with a reinsurer, the originator of the premium (the insurer)
cedes all or a portion of the premium to a special purpose reinsurance
vehicle ("SPRV"). 32' Due to regulatory and tax restrictions, SPRVs
typically are established offshore in the Cayman Islands or Bermuda.3 21 All
phases of the transaction, including meetings and communications, must
occur offshore to avoid triggering American tax liability.3 22 The SPRV
covers any liabilities from the reinsurance agreement by issuing a bond. The
proceeds from the bond issue are deposited into a collateral trust, and its
assets serve as a guarantee for any reinsurance obligation of the SPRV. The
trust invests the assets in fixed income products typically via an interest rate
swap that provides a rate of return fixed to LIBOR in exchange for the
floating return of the trust assets.3 23 The investor's return is measured as a
319. I do not suggest that Cat bonds are not or cannot be rated. Because natural catastrophe
data exists and modeling techniques are sufficiently accepted by the market, most Cat bonds are
rated. See Lewis & Davis, supra note 26, at 130 ("[T]he rating agencies will play an
increasingly important role in building investor confidence in these transactions.").
320. This process can be done directly between an insurer and an SPRV under a
reinsurance treaty, or through an intermediary reinsurer under a retrocession. From the
perspective of an insurer, the benefit of the latter is that the reinsurer would assume any basis
risk in a nonindemnity transaction. See infra notes 332-333.
321. WILLIAM DUBINSKY & DAVID LASTER, Swiss RE, INSURANCE-LINKED SECURITIES 6
(2003); MUNICH RE ART SOLUTIONS, supra note 316, at 6-7 (2001); Frankel & LaPlume, supra
note 318, at 204. Under current U.S. tax scheme, the investment income earned by the SPRV
and the interest income earned by the investors are taxed according to the standard two-tier
corporate tax scheme. See Grace et al., supra note 36, at 563 n.4 (noting that only two onshore
SPRVs have been formed); Kaplan & Lefebvre, supra note 317, at 6 (stating the primary tax
reason for locating the SPRV offshore is the avoidance of the double corporate taxation scheme
under U.S. tax codes); Vimit Kapoor & Puneet Singh, Indian Institute of Management,
Alternative Risk Transfer Structuring and Efficacy, DHAN, Feb. 2003, at www.iimcal.ac.in/
community/Finclub/dhan5/art51-cr.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2005) (noting the problem of
double taxation, leading the issuance of bonds in tax havens, and also noting the tax treatment
of the bonds as either debt or equity); D'AGOSTINO, supra note 253, at 4 ("The SPRVs are
typically located offshore for tax, regulatory, and legal advantages.").
322. Davidson, supra note 143, at 163. This aspect of the issuance also raises the
transaction costs of insurance securitizations.
323. An interest rate swap is an agreement whereby two parties agree to exchange variable
interest rates, the most typical being the swap between a fixed and floating rates. BREALEY &
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spread over LIBOR, and funding for the spread is provided by the ceded
premium. Interest on the bond is paid quarterly, and the cedant pays the
premiums on a matching basis (and so it does not pay in advance for
coverage).324
Cat bonds are fixed in terms of amount of capital at risk allowing
insurers to exist as secondary risk bearers.325 Investors have little credit risk,
unlike other fixed income investments, because nonpayment of premiums
on a matching basis would result in a cancellation of the policy, a default of
the bond terms, and a termination of the risk to the bondholders.326 Investors
must assume a greater risk with Cat bonds, however, since information on
natural catastrophes is not as voluminous or transparent as commoditized
receivables. The transaction cost of issuance is higher than investment grade
corporate bonds, but significantly lower than the cost of issuing equities.327
The risks from natural catastrophes can be dissected and packaged in a
number of ways. First, the treatment of principal can be different. In a
principal-protected bond, only a portion of the principal is at risk and the
remaining portion is paid back after a period of years, typically a term of
five or ten years.328 In a principal-at-risk bond, the investor puts at risk the
entire principal of the bonds,329 typically a term of three to five years.330
MYERS, supra note 204, at 643. The London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is the short term
rate at which banks borrow funds from other banks in large market sums. The rates vary
depending on the general interest rate environment and the term. Currently, LIBOR is around
2.0% to 3.0% depending on the term. See BRITISH BANKERS' Assoc., HISTORIC BBA LABOR
RATES (2005), available at http://www.bba.org.uk/bba/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=141&a=627 (last
visited Mar. 10, 2005) (showing historic British Bankers' Association LIBOR rates). Because
most Cat bonds pay coupons on a quarterly basis, the USD 3-month LIBOR is the relevant rate.
DUBINSKY & LASTER, supra note 321, at 7 n.1.
324. DUBINSKY & LASTER, supra note 321, at 7.
325. Frankel & LaPlume, supra 318, at 205.
326. Id.
327. The transaction costs of issuing natural catastrophe bonds are about 2% of the deal
value. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30, at 21. These costs include underwriting
fees, legal and accounting fees, modeling costs, and fees charged by rating agencies. Id. The
costs compare favorably with the cost of issuing equities, which range from 5% to 7% for an
initial public offering of equities. See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory
of Why Initial Public Offerings Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REv. 17, 69 n. 193 (1993). It has
been the author's experience as an investment banker that IPOs tend to cost about 7%. See T.J.
Jenkinson & H. Jones, The Bookbuilding Debate, CAP. IDEAS (OXFORD ECON. RESEARCH
ASSOCS.), January 2004, available at http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/downloads/tjhjbookbuilding.pdf
(last visited Apr. 4, 2005) ("Banking fees in the USA are clustered tightly around 7% of the
proceeds for medium-sized IPOs, while, in Europe, the fees are somewhat lower.").
328. MUNICH RE ART SOLUTIONS, supra note 316, at 6.
329. Id. Under current U.S. tax regulations, whether a bond is a principal protected or
principal at risk may trigger different tax regulations. See infra note 362.
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Second, Cat bonds can come in multiple tranches with varying risk.331 The
risk covered by each tranche can be any agreed coverage such as specified
geographic, peril, or severity limitations. Third, liability can be triggered in
two ways. On an indemnity based deal, the parties agree on a trigger based
on a percentage of the ceding company's own book of business. Under this
structure, there is no basis risk, i.e., no mismatch of the liability on the book
of business and the payout based on the index to which the deal is linked.332
This mimics traditional reinsurance, which is typically indemnity based
because treaties are between well-developed, symbiotic business
relationships. But Cat bond investors have no vested interest in the
underlying business relationship with the insurers other than a financial
return. The inability of the investor to oversee or control the underwriting
and claims processes creates a moral hazard. Accordingly, investors
demand a nonindemnity structure, where liability is triggered by an agreed
index rather than the actual loss. 333 Given that the pool of investors is
limited, investor preference prevails and Cat bonds are typically structured
on a nonindemnity basis.
Insurance securitization fits a market niche. It provides an additional
layer of capital to the catastrophe market where investors assume a portion
of the risk alongside policyholders and (re)insurers. 3 4 The industry benefits
because low frequency, high severity risks are shared by a broader and
deeper pool of capital. Insurers benefit because securitization provides an
additional source of capital and is an alternative to reinsurance, and so they
can underwrite more risk. Indeed, securitization offers the tantalizing
prospect of disintermediating the insurer altogether. "' Investors benefit
330. DUBINSKY & LASTER, supra note 321, at 7.
331. For example, in June 2002, Swiss Re issued a security called "Pioneer" which came in
six tranches, each tranche covering five different types of perils in various geographic regions of
the world. See id. at 12 (describing the bond terms). These perils included hurricanes in North
America, windstorms in Europe, earthquakes in California, earthquakes in central United States,
and earthquakes in Japan. Id.
332. ZANETTI ET AL., Swiss RE, SIGMA No. 1/2004, NATURAL CATASTROPHES AND MAN-
MADE DISASTERS IN 2003, Swiss RE 16 (Thomas Hess & Aurelia Zanetti eds., 2004).
333. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30, at 13 (stating that Cat bonds are
typically on a nonindemnity basis as a result of the investor's lack of information on the
underwriting and claims process). Triggers can be based on industry index, modeled loss, or
parametric. DUBINSKY & LASTER, supra note 321, at 8-11 (describing the various triggers).
334. The catastrophe risk is analyzed by various research firms like Applied Insurance
Research, Risk Management Solutions, EQUECAT, Guy Carpenter, Milliman & Robertson,
Property Claims Services and Tillinghast Towers Perrin. Kaplan & Lefebvre, supra note 317, at
7 n.15.
335. In May 1999, Oriental Land, which owns and operates Tokyo Disneyland, directly
issued a $200 million first-ever deal to securitize earthquake risk by a corporate policyholder.
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because (1) the bonds have traditionally offered attractive yields,336 and (2)
the bonds are uncorrelated with the general market, providing essential
portfolio diversification function.337
There is a growing interest in Cat bonds.338 The reasons are several:
hardening prices in the reinsurance market, particularly after 9/11; a
demand for fully collateralized protection to minimize counterparty credit
risk; a growing interest by hedge funds devoted to alternative investments;
the need of (re)insurers for capital; and the need of fixed income portfolio
funds to diversify their portfolios.339 In an era of global warming and more
volatile weather patterns,3 40 insurance securitization may need to take a
broader role in spreading risk. But thus far Cat bonds constitute a fraction of
the available capital, 3 41 when compared to the approximately $200 billion of
capital supporting primary underwriting of lines and another $200 billion in
reinsurance surplus. 342 From an insurer's perspective, the appeal and
Kapoor & Singh, supra note 321, at 2; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra at 30, at
20 (noting the issuance of Cat bonds by Oriental Land).
336. See D'AGOSTINO, supra note 253, at 4 ("The investor's reward for taking risk is a
relatively high interest rate paid by the bonds."); LENAIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 11
("Catastrophe bonds pay higher interest rates than other bonds with a similar credit rating, as the
yield differential compensates for their relative illiquidity, model risk and their non-traditional
nature.").
337. D'AGOSTINO, supra note 253, at 11; ZANETTI ETAL., supra note 332, at 14; Kaplan &
Lefebvre, supra note 317, at 6 n. 1. Under portfolio theory, diversification can reduce the risk of
a portfolio. See Markowitz, supra note 309, at 89-91.
338. Cat bonds constitute the bulk of insurance linked securities, of which $9.5 billion have
been issued. ZANETTI ET AL., supra note 2, at 14. Swiss Re data indicates that the market grew
from $783 million outstanding in 1997 to $4.3 billion outstanding in 2003. Id. at 15.
339. Id. at 14.
340. See STEPHEN MYERS & OLYMPIA SNOWE, THE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, THE
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE AUSTL. INST., MEETING THE CLIMATE CHALLENGE:
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE TASKFORCE (2005). The general
acceptance of global warming is apparent from the substantial investments made by industry to
address the problem and capitalize on it. See, e.g., Jeffrey Ball, Deep in the Sahara, BP Tries to
Put Dent in Global Warming, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2005, at Al; Abrahm Lustgarten, Getting
Ahead of the Weather: How Companies are Protecting Themselves Against the Effects of
Extreme Events and Long-Term Changes, FORTUNE, Feb. 14, 2005, at 87.
341. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30, at 14 ("[O]utstanding catastrophe
bonds accounted for only 2.5% to 3.0% of worldwide catastrophe reinsurance coverage."). In a
December 21, 2004 interview with William Dubinsky of Swiss Re, he suggested that the Cat
bond market is larger than the publicly available data would suggest because many deals are
done on a private basis. Telephone interview with William Dubinsky, Swiss Re (Dec. 21, 2004).
342. See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 29, at 12 ("The U.S. P/C industry's surplus
stood at $347 billion at year-end 2003."); CRIPPEN, supra note 37, at 4 ("[A]t the end of 2000,
the top 25 global reinsurers, with more than 80 percent of the market, had $208 billion of
surplus."); HUBBARD & DEAL, supra note 29, at 34 (noting that $199 billion of $347 billion of
surplus in the U.S. P/C sector was devoted to commercial lines).
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feasibility of reinsurance through Cat bonds depend on its pricing relative to
traditional reinsurance. Since their inception in 1996, Cat bonds were slow
to develop because the reinsurance market was in a soft price cycle for
much of the 1990s and traditional reinsurance was cheaper than
securitization.343 As reinsurance prices harden, Cat bonds provide a more
appealing alternative, and vice versa.
3 44
The cyclical nature of reinsurance alone does not explain why insurance
securitization has not experienced a period of rapid expansion culminating
in a mature, stable market like it did for other kinds of securitizations.345
The stunted growth is attributable to several other factors: (1) uncertainties
as to the accounting treatment of SPRVs, (2) uncertainties as to the
appropriate regulatory framework if securitizations are done onshore, (3) a
lack of a "pass through" tax treatment or other tax incentives, and (4) an
underdeveloped information market on natural catastrophes which limit the
size of the investment community.3 46 These limitations have driven the Cat
bond market offshore, where few regulatory burdens exist, favorable tax
treatment dominates, and a pool of sophisticated investors are willing to
undertake catastrophe risk for superior returns.
C. Terrorism Catastrophe Securitization
After 9/11, several scholars, primarily from the insurance and finance
disciplines, suggested the possibility of transferring catastrophic terrorism
risk to the capital markets though securitization.347 The benefits would be
significant. The capital market may be able to price the risk better than any
individual insurer or a pool of insurers. Some of the vast amount of capital
available in the capital markets could support terrorism risk underwriting.
48
343. See supra note 72.
344. DUBINSKY & LASTER, supra note 321, at 13.
345. See infra Part VI.
346. D'AGOSTINO, supra note 253, at 5.
347. See, e.g., THE CATO INST., supra note 62, at 19 (Anne Gron commenting that "there
could be a market-based financial security kind of solution"); KUNREUTHER & MICHAEL-
KERJAN, supra note 29, at 13 (suggesting the potential for terrorism bonds while setting forth
the reasons why such a market has not emerged); Davidson, supra note 143, at 145 ("The
capital market is another promising area."); Smetters, supra note 50, at 1 (suggesting that a
capital market solution would be the most efficient means to transfer the risk); supra note 219.
348. As of October 31, 2004, the New York Stock Exchange, the largest securities
marketplace, listed over 2,700 companies and had a market capitalization of over $19.7 trillion.
See THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, MARKET STATISTICS, at http://www.nyse.com/
Frameset.html?displayPage=/marketinfo/1022963613722.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2005). The
total global market capitalization was $33.6 trillion. Id. This figure includes market
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Aside from the federal government, only the market can readily absorb
mega-catastrophes that exceed $100 billion.349 Securitization also disperses
the risk to many investors rather than concentration in a few insurers or
even a risk pool of well capitalized participants like Lloyd's of London.
Lastly, when the risk is transferred to the market, it allows the government
to participate in the process as an investor rather than as an insurer or
welfare provider. Such participation would increase liquidity and potential
stabilize the market in times of crisis.
While the theoretical possibility is appealing, a structured financial
transaction is currently impractical.35 ° The suppression of a securitization
market is rooted in transaction and capital costs.35' The current regulatory
and tax environments increase the transaction costs of securitization and
have "retarded the proliferation of an otherwise promising market." '352 These
costs typically are not incurred in traditional insurance and reinsurance, and
so securitizations historically have been more costly. There are regulatory,
accounting, tax, and information costs. First, there is the lack of information
on terrorism risk.353 The current data is insufficient to extrapolate accurate
actuarial models.354 Rating agencies will not provide a rating without an
understanding of the underlying risk. While most investors are comfortable
with financial risk,355 they would be wary of investing in terrorism bonds,
capitalization of NYSE, NASDAQ, Tokyo Stock Exchange, London Stock Exchange, Euronext,
Deutsche Borse, and American Stock Exchange. In comparison, the global capital base
supporting the property and casualty insurance is about $300 billion, or less than 1% of the
global market capitalization. COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SEC. ASS'N, supra note 59, at 46
(estimating capital in the P&C sector to be about $300 billion); BROWN ET AL., supra note 52, at
7 (same).
349. See supra Smetters, supra note 50, at 1 (noting that the U.S. capital markets routinely
lose or gain $100 billion on a daily basis, and often several trillion dollars on a monthly basis);
note 52 (providing estimates of future terrorism losses).
350. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30, at 30 (consensus of insurance and
financial market participants believed that a market in terrorism bonds "was not feasible at this
time"); infra notes 353-354, 370.
351. See D'AGOSTINO, supra note 253, at 4 (explaining the transaction costs involved).
352. Davidson, supra note 143, at 161; see also supra Part II.E.
353. See KUNREUTHER & MICHAEL-KERJAN, supra note 29, at 13-14 (stating that "a
combination of ambiguity aversion, myopic loss aversion, and fixed costs of education on a new
type of asset" has impeded the development of a terrorism bond market); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30, at 29 (noting investor reluctance to develop cost-effective
technical expertise in terrorism risk).
354. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30, at 7 ("[T]he view of most financial
market participants we contacted was that the [terrorism] models are too new and untested to
support catastrophe bonds related to terrorism.").
355. The significant developments in the field of finance theory over the past fifty years
have led to a transparent, generally accepted understanding of financial risk. Among other
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particularly if rating agencies cannot rate them. 356 Second, regulatory
uncertainties have imposed significant costs, forcing the issuance process
offshore in most cases. 35 Both state insurance and federal securities
regulators have legitimate claims to primary regulation with vastly different
schemes and priorities. 358 Third, there are significant accounting issues.
Accounting standards may make it more difficult for SPRVs to achieve
entity independence, thus increasing the costs. 359 Also, state insurance
regulators may not recognize reinsurance coverage under a nonindemnity
Cat bond for the purpose of determining capital holding requirements.360
Fourth, it is still unclear at what pricing point terrorism coverage can be
both profitable for insurers and economically feasible for policyholders.
Last, and most importantly, it is unclear whether the SPRVs would be taxed
or a "pass through" treatment would apply,36' or whether the Cat bonds
things, option pricing theory, the efficient portfolio theory, and the capital asset pricing model
were developed. See infra note 364.
356. See THE CATO INST., supra note 62, at 49 (noting the comment of Larry Gluck,
General Accounting Office, that "I don't know that investors will ever understand terrorism risk
enough to put money into covering it").
357. Kaplan & Lefebvre, supra note 317, at 6 (stating that legal and regulatory reasons are
behind the offshore issuances).
358. See Frankel & LaPlume, supra note 318, at 209-18 (discussing the various potential
regulatory schemes that may affect insurance securitizations).
359. One of the issues is whether a SPRV would be subject to the Financial Accounting
Standard Board (FASB) Interpretation No. 46, issued in January 2003 and revised in December
2003. See FIN. ACCT. SERV. BD., FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 46: CoNSOLIDATION OF VARLABLE
INTEREST ENTITIES (2003), available at http://www.fasb.org/fin46r.pdf (last visited Mar. 10,
2005). Interpretation 46 was issued in response to the abuses of the Enron Corporation in hiding
debt in off-balance sheet entities. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30, at 26.
Interpretation 46 requires "consolidation of variable interest entities" with the primary
beneficiary if one of two conditions is'met: (1) equity investors have not invested in an entity
capable of standalone status defined as 10% of the total assets, "or (2) equity investors lack any
of the characteristics of a controlling financial interest" such as the risk and rewards of
ownership. Id. at 26, 43-44. It is unclear whether Interpretation 46 would apply to catastrophe
bonds. Id. at 27.
360. See D'AGOSTINO, supra note 253, at 22-24, 41-43. In addition to meeting GAAP
accounting standards, which are promulgated by FASB, insurers must also satisfy statutory
accounting standards set forth by NAIC and the individual state insurance regulators. At the risk
of oversimplifying the matter, the key difference between the two accounting schemes is that
GAAP assumes the firm is a going concern and so uses accrual accounting while statutory
accounting stresses liquidity and so cash accounting is key.
361. Kaplan & Lefebvre, supra note 317, at 6 (suggesting that an onshore SPRV would be
subject to the risk of double taxation).
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would be treated as debt or equity.362 The cumulative uncertainties of these
issues are great.363
Uncertainty is not necessarily a barrier to an active, liquid market in a
security, though it can be an impediment. The single greatest innovation of
the financial market of the past fifty years is the quantification of risk.364 In
the capital markets, the assessment of risks is so well developed that there is
a high degree of transparency in the pricing of securities. Some securities
are highly risky, and thus the risk premium is greater. The market in high
yield bonds and private equity securities come to mind. Similarly, terrorism
risk poses great uncertainties. The uncertainty is not simply limited to
assessing the actuarial risk of terrorism, but also includes the uncertainty
arising from informational asymmetries among policyholders, insurers and
investors, and the uncertainty of the regulatory and tax environment. But a
high degree of uncertainty does not kill a deal, or a market, so long as the
risk is appropriately priced.3
65
A lesson can be learned from the short history of natural catastrophe
bonds. When catastrophe securitizations were first introduced into the
market in the mid-1990s, they carried the hope of creating an alternative
insurance market. The notion of transferring insurance risk to the capital
market was theoretically appealing. Since then, the Cat bond market has
grown steadily. As of January 2004, the available data indicates that more
than sixty bonds were issued with $7.5 billion in capital at risk.3 66 In 2003,
362. See id. at 8-16 (discussing the uncertainties surrounding the tax treatment of Cat
bonds and the various factors applicable to the tax characterization analysis); see generally
William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical
Analysis anda Proposal, 26 TAx L. REv. 369 (1971).
363. See Lewis & Davis, supra note 26, at 120 (stating that "complexity is a liability" in
securitization transactions).
364. Berstein notes that "the revolutionary idea that defines the boundary between modem
times and the past is the mastery of risk .... " PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE
REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 1 (1996). "Throughout most of the history of stock markets... it
never occurred to anyone to define risk with a number. Stocks were risky and some were riskier
than others, and people let it go at that. Risk was in the gut, not in the numbers." Id. at 247; see
also Christopher Farrell, Three Wise Men of Finance, Bus. WK., Oct. 11, 2004, at 20 (noting the
pioneering works of Markowitz, William Sharpe and Merton Miller, and their theories on
efficient portfolios, option pricing, and capital asset pricing as having profound impacts on
modem finance).
365. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 52, at 7 ("Raising capital to pay losses following a large
loss event also is difficult because informational asymmetries between capital markets and
insurers regarding loss exposure and reserve adequacy would raise the cost of capital to
potentially prohibitive levels.").
366. See ZANETTI ET AL., supra note 332, at 14.
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more than $2 billion were issued and with over $4.3 billion outstanding.3 67
These advances notwithstanding, the promise of catastrophic risk
securitization has not been fully met. Cat bonds still constitute only a small
percent of the capital supporting worldwide catastrophe insurance.368 And
the question must be asked whether government action can stimulate a
nascent financial market.
V. A GOVERNMENT ENHANCED MARKET SOLUTION
A. Form of Government Action
Regulatory and tax reforms are crucial to facilitate the convergence of
the insurance and capital markets. The capital markets are the most efficient
means of assessing and transferring risk and the government should
stimulate a private market solution by promoting a securitization market. So
far this has been discussed on a preliminary, theoretical basis.3 69 But the
reality of a terrorism bond market in the near future is highly impractical.37°
Terrorism bonds would have a high cost of issuance, would be illiquid,371
367. Id. Among these securitizations was coverage for the cancellation of the 18th FIFA
World Cup soccer tournament, to be held in the summer of 2006 in Germany. Catastrophe
Securitizations in 2003 Reveal Increased Innovation, Modest Growth in Volume, INS. J. (2004)
(addressing coverage provided by Golden Goal Finance Ltd). This bond insured against natural
and terrorism related catastrophes. KUNREUTHER & MICHAEL-KERJAN, supra note 29, at 14 n. 16.
Subsequently, a second terrorism related bond was issued by Swiss Re in 2003 for catastrophic
mortality risk. Id.
368. See D'AGOSTINO, supra note 253, at 4 (risk-linked securities constitute less than 0.5%
of catastrophic insurance in 2000); KUNREUTHER & MICHAEL-KERJAN, supra note 29, at 13
(suggesting that the Cat bond market accounts "for less than 3% of worldwide catastrophe
reinsurance coverage").
369. Several scholars in the financial economics and insurance fields and public thinktanks
have proposed the idea of a terrorism bond. See, e.g., LENAIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 11 ("The
use of mechanisms to transfer insurance risks to the financial markets, e.g., in the form of bonds
with terrorism-contingent payment structures, could play an important role in increasing
coverage against terrorism."); supra note 25.
370. See THE CATO INST., supra note 62, at 5 (reflecting that Glenn Hubbard, Council of
Economic Advisors, felt the possibility was a "bit farfetched"); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
supra note 30, at 7 (noting the issuance of terrorism bonds as "challenging" according to
financial market participants). "We concur with the conclusion that terrorism risk would likely
be very difficult to securitize, but believe that efforts are being made to model the risk." Id. at
48 (quoting Letter from Ernst Csiszar, Vice President, Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Cos., to Davi M.
D'Agostino, Director, Fin. Insts. & Cmty. Inv., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office (Sept. 5, 2003)).
371. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30, at 29 (noting investor skepticism
of terrorism bonds due to lack of information on the risk and illiquidity of these bonds).
509
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
and would be more expensive than traditional reinsurance.372 They must
provide an enhanced yield to compensate for the additional risk and would
be priced at high yield (or "junk") bond levels.373
Regulations and tax play a significant role in suppressing or stimulating
a market in terrorism bonds. Government action should reduce the
regulatory costs and provide tax incentives to downstream investors, which
will reduce the cost of securitization. The benefits of reduced costs and
enhanced investment yield will then flow upstream to policyholders,
making it more economically feasible to purchase terrorism coverage. There
is no question that transaction cost savings and tax benefits from these
reforms would constitute indirect ex ante subsidies. But we assume that
government will always have some role in the economic development in
this area. It is doctrinaire to believe that the government need not play any
role in the business of insurance or economic protection against terrorism.
Indeed, even government inaction, leaving the whole problem back to the
private market as if 9/11 never happened, would constitute a form of action
that creates its own costs and consequences. If so, any action taken will
always have benefits flowing to some party. The questions are: Who should
receive the benefits? What form should those benefits take?
Government stimulation of a private market certainly is not
unprecedented. "' Government action can incentivize private market
solutions ranging from the profound to the practical.375 Indeed, it is telling
372. "Some insurance company officials and state authority representatives estimated that
the total costs associated with catastrophe bonds could be as much as twice as high as traditional
reinsurance." Id. at 20.
373. "In a nutshell, an insurance-linked bond has all the appearance of a junk bond." ERIC
BRIYS & FRAN(OIS DE VARENNE, INSURANCE: FROM UNDERWRITING TO DERIVATIVES 35 (2001).
Uncertainty of terrorism requires a "risk-premium" in investor yield that may make the cost of
issuance "prohibitive." U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 30, at 7. "[T]he yields on
catastrophe bonds have generally equaled or exceeded the yields on some risky fixed-income
investments, such as high-yield corporate debt." Id. at 21. Natural catastrophe bonds have
returned 9.07% in 2002, 9.45% in 2001, and 11.42% in 2000, which are high-yield returns. Id.
at 12 n.22 (using data from Cochran, Caronia Sec., LLC).
374. The New Deal is an example of one such action, albeit on a massive scale. One of my
colleagues at Washburn has noted that New Deal legislation on housing and tax policies
stimulated housing growth and ownership. Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics
of the New Deal at 70, 62 MD. L. REv. 515, 559-61 (2003).
375. See Steven A. Ramirez, Fear and Social Capitalism: The Law and Macroeconomics of
Investor Confidence, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 31, 73 & n.261 (2002) (noting government's role in
creating the internet) (citing http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml); MATT HERMES,
C1EMCASES.COM, GATORADE BECOMES A REALITY, at http://chemcases.com/gatorade/
gatoradel 1.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2005) (noting that the University of Florida invented
Gatorade).
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that the process of securitization, an indispensable financing technique, was
actually initiated by the government. The first structured financing occurred
in 1970, when the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae)
issued publicly traded "pass-through" securities.376 That securitization exists
is proof that a partnership between government and private market need not
take the form of direct subsidies, but the stimulation of a market solution.
B. Regulatory Ambiguities
At the confluence of insurance and capital markets is an ambiguous
regulatory framework. The uncertainty begins at the starting point of
insurance regulation.377 States historically have regulated the business of
insurance. 378 In an era of financial modernization, one marked by
consolidation and globalization of the financial services industry,37 9 this
376. SCHWARCZ, supra note 301, § 1.2, at 1-8. These securities gave the holder a fractional,
undivided interest in the right to interest and principal of a pool of mortgage loans. Id.
377. "The most important factor inhibiting the development of risk-linked securitization is
state-level regulation." Smetters, supra note 50, at 37. Smetters goes on to note that only a few
states have enacted regulations to promote securitization. Id. at 38.
378. Congress granted state authority insurance under the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (2000). Under the statute, the "business of insurance, and every person
engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation
or taxation of such business." Id. § 1012(a). See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41
(1987) (discussing the "business of insurance" requirement); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (same); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co.,
440 U.S. 205 (1979) (same). The concept of state regulation was in flux in the earlier part of the
twentieth century but, with the eventual settlement of the issue embodied in the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, it has gained the force of inertia throughout the years. See Kimball, supra note 12,
at 509-10.
379. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). Among other
things, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB) repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, a
Depression era legislation that erected a Chinese Wall between banking, securities, and
insurance businesses. GLB allows companies like Citigroup to cross market retail banking,
insurance and securities products; the mergers of commercial banks and securities firms such as
the merger of Chase Manhattan and JP Morgan; and the entry (albeit small) into the banking
business by insurers like MetLife (acquisition of Grand Bank) and PacificLife (acquisition of
College Savings Bank). I note that I was the investment banker who advised on the Grand Bank
and College Savings Bank transactions, which were among the first post-GLB bank acquisitions
by traditional insurers. Thus far, aside from Citigroup, there has not been a major combination
of banks and insurers, primarily because the acquisition of insurers (which are the logical targets)
would be dilutive to earnings, making a substantial merger or acquisition difficult. Due to the
financial incompatability of banks and insurers, however, even Citigroup has abandoned the
business of insurance. See Mara Der Hovanesian, Citi: A Whole New Playbook: Chuck Prince is
Moving Away from Sandy Weill's Empire-Building Strategy, Bus. WK., Feb. 14, 2005, at 72-73
(noting that Citigroup has sold off most of its insurance assets).
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peculiar regulatory scheme is anachronistic.38 The primary rationale for not
doing away with the system is that so much has been invested in the system
already, a regulatory "sunk cost," in the absence of any compelling political
or economic reason there seems to be no justifiable reason to uproot the
fifty state insurance departments.38 1 It is beyond the scope of this article to
discuss whether insurance should be primarily regulated at the state or
federal level. That issue is better left for another day.382 Rather, this article
limits the discussion to the regulation pertaining to terrorism insurance.
380. Cf Kimball, supra note 12, at 509 ("If the question were still undetermined, it is quite
possible that American insurance regulation would develop at the federal level.").
381. Scholars have from time to time reexamined the issue and have arrived at different
conclusions. Compare Kimball, supra note 12, at 510 ("That question is not an easy one to
answer, for there are strong arguments on both sides."), with Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance
Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 13, 88 (1993) (concluding that the insurance industry "requires
less federal involvement than conventional wisdom might suggest").
382. For now, I simply note that insurance is a global business and certainly affects
interstate and international commerce in a profound way. Insurance is increasingly dominated
by large, well-capitalized companies that operate in multiple states and indeed multiple
international markets. Smaller insurers and reinsurers are increasingly at a disadvantage; they
are disfavored in the financial markets with lower valuation multiples and by consumers due to
their credit risks. It is commonly known that European insurers and reinsurers are generally
larger and operate on a more global platform than their American counterparts, and that the
capital markets favor larger capitalized companies with a size premium on valuation (all else
being equal). Given this business reality and the recent overhaul of financial institution
regulation under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, state regulation of insurance seems rather
antiquated. There is little question that federalization of insurance would be, in the long run,
more efficient. See Kimball, supra note 12, at 511 ("Doubtless federal regulation would be less
expensive than state regulation in the aggregate, for there is a large amount of duplication in the
present regulatory effort among the states."). Despite the "complexity and cumbersomeness" of
state regulation, however, the insurance industry has not made a concerted push for
federalization. In a March 24, 2005, interview with Cheye Calvo of the National Conference of
State Legislatures, he opined that insurers are ambivalent to federalization. The American
Insurance Association, a trade association representing large commercial stock companies,
favor an optional federal charter, whereas the Property Casulty Insurers Association of America
and the National Association of Mutual Companies, both of which represent smaller insurers,
favor state regulation with deregulation of Tate filing as the preferred reform.
One wonders if the ambivalence is attributable to "the spectre [sic] of the wide-ranging and
generally effective twentieth-century federal agency." Id. at 510. There is a firmly established
working relationship between the industry and state regulators, which is coordinated by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, and it is easy to see how "agency capture"
could occur more easily at the local state level than at the federal level. See Marlett & Pacini,
supra note 272, at 84 (discussing George Stigler's "agency capture" theory); George J. Stigler,
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. 3 (1971). State regulation has the effect of
dispersing regulatory power. This has the added benefit of dispersing the efforts of consumer
groups and other watchdog organizations, which must muster similar lobbying resources
applied by the industry in terms of scope of coverage. Also, I note that a more benign
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The securitization of any insurance risk could be considered the
"business of insurance."383 A terrorism bond is an insurance obligation; and
the bondholders act as reinsurers, though the obligation may not be on an
indemnity basis. Absent an express federal override, catastrophe
securitizations and SPRVs would likely fall under state regulation.38 4 The
implication is that states must provide a concerted approach.
With respect to terrorism risk, the case for federal regulation and
supremacy is compelling. The fundamental concern of state regulators is
liquidity, the insurer's ability to pay claims. Traditional reinsurance fits well
within this scheme because it provides coverage on an indemnity basis. If a
reinsurer fails, the ceding insurer is still obligated to policyholders.386 As
noted before, most securitizations are done on a nonindemnity basis,
meaning that there is basis risk between the actual loss and payment based
on the index trigger.387 Because this risk may ultimately be passed to
insureds or state guarantee funds, state regulators are wary of a potential
gap in reinsurance coverage.388 In the case of terrorism risk, however, this
concern is myopic in the sense that the interests of the state and its
policyholders take precedent over national economic interests. We expect
nothing less from a state regulator, and likewise nothing more. There also is
explanation for the lack of interest in federalization may rest on the fact that insurers are
generally adverse to informational uncertainty. See supra note 62. Federalization of insurance
regulation would bring in the short to medium term significant uncertainties, and insurers may
prefer to deal with inefficiencies of state regulation than face potentially profound changes
under federal regulation.
383. Three factors determine whether an activity can be classified as an insurance business:
"first, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk;
second, whether the practice is an integral part of the relationship between the insurer and the
insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry."
Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982).
384. Frankel & LaPlume, supra note 318, at 210-12. But there remain thorny questions
about how the SPRVs are regulated in terms of capital levels and insurance obligations. Id. at
213-14.
385. Presumably, this would take place through the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC), which propose model insurance laws and regulations. Between natural
and terrorism catastrophes, large segments of the country are susceptible. See D'AGOSTINO,
supra note 253, at 10 fig. I (providing a map of the US and rating the areas of potential
exposure to natural catastrophes). Consider, for example, the cities of Phoenix, Las Vegas, New
York, Washington, D.C., Boston, and Chicago. These cities are rated low risk for natural
catastrophes, but obviously they could be prime targets for terrorism. Thus, terrorism risk
cannot be localized to state level policies.
386. Id. at 43.
387. See supra Part IV.B.
388. See Smetters, supra note 50, at 39 (noting "considerable resistance" to regulations
promoting nonindemnity securitizations).
514 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J.
no guarantee that states can provide a uniform approach to securitizations.
Even though catastrophe securitizations have been issued since 1996, only a
few states have thus far passed legislation dealing with the issue.389
The regulatory ambiguity begins at the state level but does not end there.
There are two potentially competing bodies of federal law. Because
securitizations may leave basis risk, terrorism bonds are arguably
securities,3 9 and so subject to regulation under federal securities laws and
the SEC. '9' Bondholders do not underwrite the risk and do not pay
policyholders directly on an indemnity basis. Rather, they provide capital to
the insurer, similar to holders of stock or bonds of an insurer. Under this
view, the bonds are more like securities rather than insurance instruments
and should be regulated by the SEC. On the other hand, an insurance
securitization has a derivative like quality.3 92 Like a derivative, its value
derives from some other thing, in this case a catastrophe index that triggers
the obligation. 393 So another ambiguity is whether terrorism bonds are
"futures contracts" or "commodity options," which are regulated by the
CFTC.394 Thus, even if federal law prevails, it is unclear which agency
would have primary jurisdiction of a terrorism bond.395
389. Some states have enacted statutes that purport to reduce the regulatory costs of
insurance securitization. See Frankel & LaPlume, supra note 318, at 220-23 (discussing
Protected Cell Acts enacted by Rhode Island and Illinois and citing Protected Cell Companies
Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-64-1 to 27-64-12 (1956) and 25 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§
5/107.06a, 5/179A-1 to 5/179A-40 (West 1999)). These statutes protect the assets within a
protected cell of the insurance company so as to protect them from bankruptcy and liability of
the insurer. Id. at 221.
390. See id. at 213-15 (discussing the insurance and securities characteristics of catastrophe
bonds); Smetters, supra note 50, at 38 (indicating that "state jurisdiction over securities with
basis risk is not clear").
391. Securities under federal law are regulated under the Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, title
I, § 1, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, title I, § 1, 48 Stat.
881 (1934).
392. A derivative is a financial instrument that "derives" its value from some other thing.
See generally JOHN Cox & MARK RUBINSTEIN, OPTION MARKETS 1 (1985); JOHN HULL,
OPTIONS, FUTURES AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 1 (James Boyd ed., 1997) (1989).
393. See supra note 333 & Part IV.B.
394. Commodities Exchange Act of 1936, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). The Commodity Futures Trading Commission has
exclusive jurisdiction over the trading of commodity futures and commodity options on all
commodities. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
395. The SEC and CFTC often compete for exclusive jurisdiction of various financial
instruments. See generally John D. Benson, Comment, Ending the Turf Wars: Support for a
CFTC/SEC Consolidation, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1175 (1991); Mark Frederick Hoffnan, Note,
Decreasing the Costs of Jurisdictional Gridlock: Merger of the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 681
(1995).
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These regulatory uncertainties impede the development of a cost
efficient, repeatable transaction structure. Any securitization, and
particularly one as unique as terrorism bonds, would incur significantly
more regulatory costs than what are now "standard" catastrophe
securitizations. The capture of exclusive jurisdiction in such a prominent
field would be significant for any federal agency, and so the issuance of
such bonds would face significant scrutiny. Given this reality, there is a
disincentive to be the first innovator and incentive to freeride on the labor of
others or to avoid these issues altogether. In part due to these ambiguities,
natural catastrophe securitizations have typically been issued offshore.
To stimulate a private market in terrorism risk securitization, the
government must clarify and streamline the regulatory scheme. The first
step is to federalize the securitization process. Terrorism risk is, first and
foremost, a national issue that should be governed by national policy.396 The
federal government's perspective would be broader, dealing with not only
the immediate regulatory issues pertaining to the business of insurance but
also issues pertaining to capacity, pricing, national good, security, efficient
working of the economy, and capital markets. No single state regulator or
group of regulators has the competency, will or power to address these
issues. The uneven post-9/1 I response by state regulators in approving new
terrorism exclusions proves the point that state regulation of such an
important interest would be unwise.397
There are many issues involved in streamlining the regulatory scheme.
The regulation should provide the precursors to an active market: the
formation of SPRVs; the protection of SPRVs and their assets from
bankruptcy and liabilities of the sponsoring insurers or reinsurers; reserving
requirements of SPRVs; and streamlined reporting and oversight to a
primary regulator. Guidelines addressing these issues would provide clarity
that is currently lacking and would reduce the burdens of pursuing
securitizations onshore.398
396. Cf Davidson, supra note 143, at 135-42 (arguing that a "national framework" is
needed to address catastrophic insurance risks).
397. See supra note 69 (stating that a minority of jurisdictions, constituting 35% of the
market, have refused to approve a new terrorism exclusion). I note that this is a relatively minor
task when compared to the issues involved in securitizing terrorism risk.
398. See generally Todd V. McMillan, Securitization and the Catastrophe Bond: A
Transactional Integration of Industries Through a Capacity-Enhancing Product of Risk
Management, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 131 (2001) (discussing the regulatory framework of traditional
asset-based securitizations and insurance securitizations and attempting to harmonize some of
the conflicting regulatory schemes).
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C. Tax Enhancements
The securitization of terrorism risk must "involve fundamental tax
reform."3 99 The basic problem is that securitizations are subject to potential
double taxation, first of the premium receipts and investment income of the
SPRV and then on the distribution to the investors. 400 Such taxation
effectively would kill any development of an onshore securitization market
for the economic rationale for securitization-a cost of capital differential-
would not hold. From the perspective of an investor, it would be far cheaper
to participate in the coverage of terrorism risk through an equity investment
in a reinsurer rather than a securitized bond. Because the capital and tax
costs are so great, most securitizations are done in tax friendly jurisdictions
with little governmental regulation.4 °1
The basic framework of tax issues has been well developed. The first
point of taxation is at the transfer of receivables from the originator to the
SPRV, which may trigger a gain on sale.4 2 The transfer of balance sheet
assets to a SPRV could be considered a tax sale or a loan secured by the
receivables.43 Also, gain recognition could be an issue if the originator had
not recognized revenue because the "receivable" is the right to receive a
399. THE CATO INST., supra note 62, at 38 (comment of Scott Harrington, University of
South Carolina); see also D'AGOST1NO, supra note 253, at 26-28 (describing the tax problems
associated with insurance securitizations); REPUBLICAN POL'Y COMM., supra note 105, at 9 &
n.50 (noting the tax problem associated with securitizations) (citing Scott E. Harrington & Greg
Niehaus, Government Insurance, Tax Policy, and the Affordability and Availability of
Catastrophe Insurance, 19 J. INS. REG. 591 (2001)); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra
note 30, at 48; Davidson, supra note 143, at 145 (stating that securitizations "are greatly
impeded by U.S. tax law"); Letter from Ernst Csiszar, Vice President, Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Cos.,
to Davi M. D'Agostino, Director, Fin. Insts. & Cmty. Inv., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, supra
note 370 ("It would appear that at least one major stumbling block to the wider use of risk
linked securities remains the uncertainty regarding their tax treatment.").
400. See Frankel & LaPlume, supra note 318, at 218 (discussing the tax problem); Kapoor
& Singh, supra note 321. This discussion assumes that the investors of a Cat bond are qualified
institutional investors. See infra note 439.
401. See supra Part II.E. Bermuda has no corporate income tax, and there are no taxes on
dividends, gains, or capital assets. See Ben Seessel, Comment, The Bermuda Reinsurance
'Loophole': A Case Study of Tax Shelters and Tax Havens in the Globalizing Economy, 32 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 541, 545 & n.8 (2001) (discussing the tax advantages of a Bermuda
domiciled company). Because of these tax advantages, it has become a major center for
insurance. Two major reinsurers, ACE Ltd. and XL Ltd., are domiciled in Bermuda, and several
U.S. reinsurers have recently relocated there, including PXRE, Folksamerica Reinsurance, and
Everest Reinsurance. Id. at 544 n.5. Moreover, a substantial portion of the new capital raised
after 9/11 was placed in Bermuda.
402. SCHWARCZ, supra note 301, § 5:1, at 5-2.
403. Id. § 5:2.2 at 5-7. There is no bright line test on whether a transfer is a sale or a loan.
Rather, the determination is based on a number of factors. See id. § 5:2.2 at 5-7 to 5-9.
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future revenue stream, which has not accrued and so is not an accounting
asset.40 4 In an insurance securitization, the reinsurance agreement between
the insurer and the SPRV, and the ceding of premiums therein,40 5 would not
be an issue because a reinsurance tax treatment would apply. The insurer
would recognize income on that portion of the premium that is earned and
not ceded to the SPRV.
40 6
The second point of taxation is at the SPRV entity level, which may
trigger corporate income tax.417 "It is generally desirable to avoid taxation of
the [SPRV] because it does not have an external funding source to pay the
tax." 408 This tax issue has been resolved favorably for traditional
securitizations. The special purpose vehicles are generally sheltered by tax
legislation.409 All taxable items-income, gain, deduction, loss, and credit-
"pass through" to the security instrument holders, who are the true risk
bearers of the underlying mortgage or credit transaction. 4' ° This pass
through treatment recognizes that the special purpose vehicle simply
facilitates the transfer of the assets from the originator to the bondholders,
and it was the regulatory reform needed to grow traditional securitization
markets.41 There is, however, no similar pass through treatment for SPRVs
404. Id. § 5:2.2 at 5-7.
405. The transfer of premiums could also be from a reinsurer to the SPRV per a
retrocession agreement.
406. For a reinsurer, the ceded premium is "taxable income to the reinsurer and tax
deductible to the ceding insurer." Grace et al., supra note 36, at 584. In the event that a
reinsurance obligation is triggered, the reinsurance payment is deductible as an expense to the
reinsurer and a taxable income to the insurer. Id. at 584-85. The reinsurer pays taxes on the
difference between revenues and expenses, and the dividends to shareholders are taxed at the
individual level. Id. at 585. Thus, in a typical reinsurance transaction, the equity holders of the
reinsurer are the ultimate risk bearers. Id.
407. SCHWARCZ, supra note 301, § 5:1, at 5-2.
408. Id. § 5:2.3 at 5-11.
409. There are two sets of statutory provisions that govern "financial asset securitization
investment trusts" (FASITs) and "real estate mortgage investment conduits" (REMICs). See
I.R.C. §§ 860A-L; Financial Asset Securitization Investment Trust of the Small Business Job
Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, sec. 1621(a), §§ 860H-860L, 110 Stat. 1755,
1858-66 (1996) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 860H-860L) (receivables); Tax Reform
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 671, §§ 860A-860G, 100 Stat. 2085, 2308-18 (1986)
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 860A-860G) (mortgages); see also FRANKEL, supra note
301, §§ 8.15.1, 8.15A.l. Without the application of either, mortgage securitization for example
would be taxed. SCHwARCZ, supra note 301, § 5:1, at 5-3 n.3.
410. SCHWARCZ, supra note 301, § 5:3.2, at 5-26 to 5-27.
411. The "CMBS market was very small a decade ago," but the market was substantially
stimulated by deregulation and tax reform. Smetters, supra note 50, at 3.
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in an insurance securitization." 2 If the securitization is brought onshore, the
SPRV may be considered a "per se" corporation "subject to entity level tax"
even though it is only a special purpose vehicle without an external source
of finding.4 ,3
From a tax perspective, the SPRV receives cash inflow from two sources,
the investment income from the bond principal and the ceded premium.
With respect to the investment income, there is a problem of double
taxation.4"4 Given this, there is no logical reason why a bondholder would
invest in an instrument subject to entity level tax and then personal level tax
upon distribution when the alternative is to invest directly in a risk free
investment and be subject only to personal tax. The tax consequences of
treating the ceded premiums depend on whether the Cat bonds are treated as
debt or equity instruments.4"5 If the bonds are considered debt, then the
income from the invested principal and ceded premiums would be offset by
interest deductions to the bondholders. Under this scenario, tax liability is
minimized.4"6 But if the bonds are considered equity, as is the case in a
majority of the principal at risk Cat bonds,417 then the interest payments to
bondholders cannot be deducted, and the investment income and ceded
premiums are taxed as corporate income without a deduction of the interest
payments to bondholders.1 8 This treatment creates a disparity between an
equity investment in the reinsurer's stock and a fixed income investment in
the SPRV's bonds. An equity investment in a reinsurer is subject to the
standard two tier taxation: corporate income tax and personal income tax on
distribution. Because an investor in a SPRV would be institutional, and
itself subject to corporate tax, an investment in an insurance securitization
412. Grace et al., supra note 36, at 587. From the perspective of the bond market, the tax
costs is the principal reason why securitizations have not been prevalent onshore. D'AGOSTINO,
supra note 253, at 51 (citing Letter from George Miller, Senior Vice President & Deputy
General Counsel, and Michel C. David, Vice President & Assoc. General Counsel, the Bond
Market Assoc., to Davi M. D'Agostino, Director, Fin. Mkts. & Cmty. Invs., U.S. Gen.
Accounting Office (Sept. 5, 2003)). The Bond Market Association suggests the enactment of a
"pass through" legislation similar to FASIT and REMIC.
413. Davidson, supra note 143, at 163.
414. Frankel & LaPlume, supra note 318, at 218.
415. Under federal income tax law, a transaction is taxed in accordance with its economic
substance rather than the form. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935).
416. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 301, § 5:2.3, at 5-11; Frankel & LaPlume, supra note 318,
at 218. A debt is defined as an unconditional obligation to pay a specific sum of money on
demand or on a specific date. Kaplan & Lefebvre, supra note 317, at 9.
417. Kaplan & Lefebvre, supra note 317, at 14.
418. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 301, § 5:2.3, at 5-11; Frankel & LaPlume, supra note
317318, at 218.
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would be subject to a third layer of taxation.4" 9 These unfavorable tax
possibilities make "the securitization uneconomic" if brought onshore.42
Even if the pass through issue is resolved sensibly, a terrorism bond still
may be a distant possibility. The impracticality is shown by comparing
traditional reinsurance with catastrophe securitization. From the perspective
of an investor who wishes to invest in terrorism coverage, an investment in
a reinsurer will be less risky because of the diversification of the reinsurer's
book of business. As we have seen, the insurer must charge a premium that
is multiples of the actuarial risk due to the capital holding requirements and
tax costs.42' An investment in a terrorism bond is a pure play on terrorism
risk. Because of the great uncertainties, there would be a risk premium
charged on top of the capital costs. A terrorism bond must offer yields on
par with high yield bonds and most likely in excess of the yields seen for
national catastrophe bonds. In other words, the cost of capital on a pure play
investment in terrorism risk will be more than the cost of capital of a
diversified reinsurer.
To illustrate this problem, we can continue with the previous cost of
capital problem used earlier in this article.422 Recall that an insurer must
charge a premium of $2,565 to insure against a one in 100 year event with
an anticipated loss of $50,000 and return a cost of capital of 10% to its
shareholders. For simplicity, we assume that the insurer cedes all premiums
to a reinsurer, and therefore the profit and loss of the reinsurer is
coextensive with that of the cedant. We can then compare this result to the
procurement of reinsurance through securitization. The bondholders must
provide $50,000 in principal at risk to the SPRV.423 Although an insurance
company with hundreds of millions or billions of dollars in assets can
diversify its investment portfolio to achieve higher investment yields, the
bond proceeds must be protected from credit and market risk. The proceeds
419. See Grace et al., supra note 36, at 585 ("Thus, at this point the SPRV transaction
would be subject to three levels of taxation: once at the SPRV, once at the taxable institutional
investors, and once at the personal level.").
420. Davidson, supra note 143, at 163; see also Frankel & LaPlume, supra note 318, at 218
(stating that double taxation "would render insurance securitization impractical"). The third
point of taxation is at the individual investor level, which may trigger income tax as either
interest received from bonds or returns on equity. ScH-wARCZ, supra note 301, § 5:2.4, at 5-18 to
5-20.
421. See supra Part II.E.
422. See id.; infra tbl.5. I again provide the caveat that this is a stylized example and is not
an example in actual pricing. Moreover, any transaction would be far more complex than simply
the factors identified here.
423. We assume that the parties would structure a transaction to minimize any potential
basis risk between the triggering index and the actual loss.
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would be put into a trust and invested in a fixed, risk-free LIBOR rate. We
assume a 3% LIBOR return.424 Principal at risk natural Cat bonds have
historically yielded "250 to 750 basis points" spread over LIBOR.425 As a
frame of reference, we can assume the midpoint of 500 basis points. This
means that a natural Cat bond must yield 8%. A terrorism bond would
surely trade at a premium over this benchmark given the greater risks and
modeling uncertainties, and thus its yield would resemble that of a lower
credit junk bond. For simplicity, we assume a 300 basis point premium,
meaning an 11% yield on the bonds, a cost of capital that is slightly higher
than that of the reinsurer. The income to the SPRV would be $1,500 from
investment income and $2,565 from ceded premium. Even without
accounting for the tax liability that would pass through to the institutional
investor, we see that the securitization would fall short of the 10% return on
capital requirement.426 In this example, reinsurance is a cheaper option than
catastrophe securitization. This is consistent with the historical development
of the insurance securitization market wherein securitizations had to
compete with cheaper reinsurance rates during the "soft" cycle of the 1990s,
thus suppressing the market.
If a pass through treatment cannot produce the types of yields that would
entice investors, then additional tax incentives are needed. Tax incentives
would increase the effective yield on a bond investment, and so close the
pricing disparity. Thus far, there has not been a call for stimulating investor
appetite through tax enhancements, either by the industry or academics,
presumably because the perception is that the government would be averse
to the possibility of losing tax revenue. The general concept of stimulation
of markets through tax incentive is, of course, not a new idea. The clearest
example of this would be the tax deduction for mortgage interest on
residential homes. Also, compelling public policies may be served by tax
enhancements, e.g., tax exempt treatment of municipal bonds.427
424. See supra note 323.
425. Kaplan & Lefebvre, supra note 317, at 7; see also DUBINSKY & LASTER, supra note
321, at 22. Principal protected Cat bonds have returned on average 100 to 300 basis points
above LIBOR. Id.
426. A large portion of the shortfall comes from the fact that a reinsurer would be able to
invest its capital in investments that would yield greater returns. These returns are possible
because of the size of the insurer's investment portfolio and the benefits of portfolio
diversification. On the other hand, the proceeds from a bond issue must be fixed to a risk free
rate and the return then is calculated as a spread over this known rate. In this way, the
bondholders can properly assess the risk versus return of this investment as opposed to some
other investment.
427. 26 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
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My argument is based on the reality that terrorism coverage through
reinsurance is cheaper than through securitization. Perhaps at some point in
the future, the market environment would be such that securitization would
provide a cheaper alternative. But that is not the case now, nor will it be in
the foreseeable future. Either costs of securitization must be lowered or its
rewards must be enhanced, or both, to stimulate the market. Regulatory
reforms address the former, and tax enhancements address the latter.
No question that a tax incentive is a form of government subsidy of
private insurance.42 8 It is an indirect way in which the government can
provide ex ante subsidies. It is only a subsidy, however, if the government
loses an opportunity to collect revenue. Two potential opportunities come to
mind: a tax on (re)insurer that applies to capital holdings, and a tax on the
investment income by bondholders. With respect to the former, it is highly
speculative that (re)insurers would choose to hold excess capital with the
specific purpose of entering the market in catastrophic terrorism. Without a
federal backstop, the industry would ensure that the extreme risks are
controlled through coverage limitations. Under these conditions, there is a
question whether premiums would be economically feasible or optimal for
policyholders. Moreover, higher premium revenues by insurers would be
offset by higher insurance expenses by policyholders. Thus, with or without
a tax incentive, the loss of potential premium revenue is probably an
insignificant issue.
On the other hand, there is no question that an investment in a tax
enhanced instrument, like municipal bonds, presents a lost opportunity.
With a fixed amount of capital, an investment in a tax enhanced instrument
is less dollars devoted to taxable instruments. It is here, on the investor side,
that the subsidies would have a direct effect. When compared to a
government sponsored risk pool concept, the benefits of this scheme are
clear. A government sponsored risk pool incentivizes (or mandates) the
insurance industry to provide terrorism coverage. But it does not incentivize
other parties to enter the market. The market players-policyholders,
insurers, reinsurers, and government-remain the same, except that the
government now ponies up funds to cover losses. It is a loss redistribution
scheme. This would not be the case if the capital market enters as a risk
bearer. It would then be a risk redistributing scheme.
Tax benefits on the investment end may incentivize capital market
investors to join the risk pool. Unlike upstream subsidies to policyholders,
428. See Levmore, supra note 232, at 24 ("[A]s a budgetary matter, it may even be
worthwhile for the government to subsidize the purchase of certain kinds of insurance in order
to reduce the pressure for post-disaster relief.").
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which create the moral hazards of subsidized insurance, downstream tax
subsidies would minimize the potential for market pricing distortions. In a
nonindemnity transaction, policyholders and insurers are still incentivized
to manage their risks for the reinsurance pricing is determined by the
market. By reducing capital costs, tax subsidies promote the convergence of
premiums to actuarial pricing. Market investors would not be beneficiaries
of subsidized bond coupons so much as recipients of appropriate
compensation for the assumption of extreme risks.
The key benefit of a tax incentive is that the scheme is reviewable and
renewable on an ongoing basis. Tax incentives can be reasonably flexible in
terms of legislative cycles. They should in fact be temporary, and like TRIA
they are subject to the same lobbying forces that could push a temporary
legislation to the permanent. While legislative review cannot react quickly
to the changing markets, tax benefits can be reviewed over a period of time
as the markets change. Just the way TRIA was meant to buy the market
some time, tax benefits should be provided to stimulate a potential market.
There are many important questions that this article cannot answer. How
much will the tax incentives cost in lost revenue? Will any tax incentive
bridge the price gap? How large would the market be? What would be the
tangible benefits to the economy? In the event of an attack, how much
would the government save in anticipated ex post subsidies? These
questions are complex. It is beyond the capabilities of a single legal scholar
to provide the answers or to even suggest credibly what they may be.
Clearly further studies are needed in the economic and finance fields
particularly. Even so the answer may be as elusive as trying to predict the
frequency or severity of terrorism losses. Ultimately, there may not be a
simple answer, but only policy preferences that are decided on a political
level, considering the practical necessities.
D. Investment in Risk Pool
Aside from the benefit to the insurance market, a market in terrorism
bond can have several incidental benefits. For one, it gives the government
an opportunity to invest in the underlying risk. The provision of subsidies is
far more palatable politically if the government has a chance for gains as
opposed to a certain loss. 429 Rather than simply a policy option, such an
429. That government can profit from the private sector is not unprecedented. For example,
the government received stock options in the Chrysler bailout that later turned out to be quite
profitable. Id. at 6 n.12; see also Warren Brown, Chrysler's Driving Wheel Bids Farewell:
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incentive may be a policy necessity. Government participation in the market
would create liquidity that would otherwise not exist. Although Cat bonds
have grown as a market since the mid-1990s, they remain illiquid
investments for two reasons: they are not publicly traded, and only a
relative few sophisticated investors are comfortable with the insurance
risks.43 °
Illiquidity is a problem for any financial innovation because once an
investor commits to an investment it will have a difficult time exiting from
or selling the investment. Due to this risk, illiquid investments typically
command a liquidity premium that must be offered to the investors, further
raising the cost of capital on the instrument. The market has seen a liquidity
problem in insurance innovations in the past. Catastrophe securitization is
not the only alternative risk transfer method that the industry has been
explored."' For a period of time, the market also experimented with
insurance derivatives. In 1995, insurance-linked catastrophe loss option
contracts began trading on the Chicago Board of Trade. 432 Trading was
"light overall," making the options illiquid.433 Due to low demand and
illiquidity, the CBOT eventually delisted the options in 2000. 44 The
experience with catastrophe options shows that liquidity is a significant
issue.
By investing in terrorism bonds and perhaps establishing an
infrastructure for its trading among interested investors, the government
could serve as a quasi-market maker and maintain a minimum level of
liquidity among the group of investors.435 The government could affect the
market rates similar to the way its actions can affect yields on other fixed
income instruments, interest rates, and foreign exchange rates. While
government domination would not be a good thing for the reasons discussed
in Section III.C., participation could increase the size and growth of the
market, improve market liquidity, and alleviate temporary market instability.
Iacocca's and Automaker's Resurgence Were Intertwined, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1992, at H1
(stating that the government earned $350 million in exchange for $1.2 billion loan guarantees).
430. See infra note 439 (stating that Cat bonds are typically issued in private placements
under Rule 144A).
431. See supra note 26.
432. D'AGOSTINO, supra note 253, at 36.
433. Lewis & Davis, supra note 26, at 127.
434. D'AGOSTINO, supra note 253, at 36.
435. A market maker is a party that stands ready to buy or sell shares on a continuous basis
at publicly quoted prices. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, MARKET MAKER, at www.sec.gov/
answers/mktmaker.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2005) (last modified March 17, 2000). In an
exchange such as the New York Stock Exchange, market makers maintain liquidity in the shares
traded.
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There is also the benefit of creating an information market. A public
market is the most effective means to incorporate vast, complex data into a
price. The derivatives market is highly accurate in predicting the underlying
value of assets. While it is difficult to foresee a highly liquid, public market
in terrorism bonds in the near future, their trading values may reveal
information that would be relevant outside of financial loss or gain. To the
extent that terrorism bond prices will fluctuate with political and national
security developments, the information deduced from the price movements
may indicate the market assessment of terrorism risk. This potential for
market based information on terrorism was the impetus for a short-lived
Defense Department program designed to create a futures market in
terrorism. 436 This program would have allowed market participants to trade
futures contracts on a diverse array of political events, including
assassinations and wars. While arguably based on the finance theory that a
highly liquid derivatives market is an accurate predictor of market
movements, 437 the program was so farfetched and tin-eared to political
sensibilities that it was quickly pulled once it was publicly disclosed.438
436. The program, the Policy Analysis Market, was devised by the Defense Advanced
Research Project Agency (DARPA). The program was headed by Admiral John Poindexter, the
former National Security Adviser under the second term Reagan administration.
437. See POSNER, supra note 15, at 175 ("The theory [of an information market] is fine but
its application to terrorism is questionable."). There is some market evidence that the futures
market is an accurate predictor of political events. TradeSports Exchange, LTD, based out of
Ireland, traded "Saddam Hussein futures," and, based on the pricing, the future's market
predicted there was only a 43% chance that Hussein would be deposed by March 31, 2003, but
an 82% chance he would be removed from power by May 30, 2003. Smetters, supra note 50, at
41-42. According to a Stanford University study, Saddam Hussein futures closely tracked the
spot oil market prices, which are considered a good barometer of Middle East politics. See
James M. Pethokoukis, More Markets for Mayhem, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 1, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 2022188; Andrew Leight et al., What do Financial Markets Think of War
in Iraq? (2003) (unpublished manuscript), at http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/zitzewitz/
Research/iraq.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2005) (Stanford study). The application of an information
market in terrorism is problematic, however. The futures market as a predictor of the future
depends on high volume, liquid flow of information. TradeSport has 21,000 members, a
sufficiently large market of participants. See Julie Hanson, The Market of the Future: Futures
Markets Have Been Used to Successfully Predict Elections and Sporting Events, So Why Not
Terrorism?, CSOonline.com, Oct. 2003, at http://www.csoonline.com/read/100103/
wonkmarket.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2005) (providing data from John Delaney, CEO of
TradeSports.com); see also TRADE SPORTS TRADING & BETTING EXCHANGE, at
http://www.tradesports.com (last visited Mar. 7, 2005). One question is whether a futures
market in terrorist acts, as envisioned by the Defense Department, would ever generate the type
of high-volume trading associated with sports events.
438. Some members of Congress described the program as "unbelievably stupid." Josh
Meyer, Trading on the Future of Terror: A Market System Would Help Pentagon Predict
Turmoil. To Critics, It's "Gambling" on Security, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 2003, at Al. The
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While betting on death and destruction for the predictive value of
information can seem downright creepy, a terrorism bond market would not
be susceptible to such moral condemnation. In fact, an investment in
terrorism bonds could be publicly construed as advancing the national
interest. 439 A terrorism bond shares similar investment characteristics of a
junk bond. The market in junk bonds tends to be more illiquid with fewer
and more specialized investors. For both junk and terrorism bonds, the
underlying "bet" is on the financial health of the obligor. The informational
benefit may not be as pointed as a futures contract for a specific time, place,
manner, and result.440 But price fluctuations and trading behavior can yield
significant information about market beliefs, particularly if the risks are
segregated as they would be in a multi-tranche issue.
Cat bonds have been split into various tranches for various natural risks
and geographic regions, 441 and there is no reason why terrorism bonds
cannot do the same. Indeed, the concept of diversification of risk would
militate that a bond should be based on a diversified portfolio of insured
assets. A lesson can be learned from the CMBS market. CMBS bonds can
be issued on a single asset or a pooled group of assets.442 Single asset bonds
are more risky, whereas pooled assets diversify the risk. 43 Like a pooled
asset CMBS, a terrorism bond would likely pool the risk with
diversification of geography, economic assets, and perils. If these risks are
segregated into different tranches, the trading value of the various tranches
could yield significant information on the market's belief of the current
terrorism risk. Of course, these preliminary conclusions presuppose the
program fared no better in the popular press. See Michael Shnayerson, The Danger List, VANITY
FAIR, Dec. 2004, at 245 ("The Policy Analysis Market was probably the stupidest idea ever
proposed by an official of the U.S. Government.").
439. This is not to suggest that retail investors should invest in terrorism bonds. Catastrophe
bonds are typically issued as private placements with an investor pool limited to sophisticated
institutional buyers. See D'AGOSTINO, supra note 253, at 18 & n.24 (noting that most Cat
securitizations are Rule 144A private placements); DUBINSKY & LASTER, supra note 321, at 6
(same); Kapoor & Singh, supra note 321, at 6 ("[I]t is usually preferred that institutional
investors are targeted given their levels of sophistication and understanding of such issues.").
Investors are sophisticated institutional investors who may want the additional portfolio
diversification of an asset that is uncorrelated with the markets and/or who may have an appetite
for higher risk and higher yield investments.
440. Under the DARPA program, we can imagine a future contract for the following bet: a
terrorist attack in Manhattan, causing at least $ 10 million in property damages, occurring on or
before September 11, 2006.
441. See, e.g., supra note 331.
442. Orlans, supra note 29, at 104-05.
443. Id. at 105.
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existence of a public or quasi-public market with sufficient volume to create
reasonable liquidity.
VI. A CAVEAT ON MARKET GROWTH EXPECTATIONS
While securitization may be the long-term solution for mega-catastrophic
events, manmade or natural, it is wholly unrealistic to believe that it is a
ready-made solution. The history of financial innovation suggests that new
financial products take time to grow into a mature market.4" Many interest
groups must work together to make the innovation possible: issuers, market
intermediaries, rating agencies, investors, and other professional service
providers. In the case of catastrophe securitizations, we also must consider
the primary insurer and policyholders. And in the case of terrorism
securitization, the government must be a key participant.
The history of securitization suggests that each asset class takes many
years, perhaps in excess of ten years, to mature into a high volume, liquid
market.445 Using publicly available data, I constructed the below graph to
show the historical development of some of the prominent securitization
asset classes: mortgages, home equity, student loans, and credit cards.
444. For instance, the concept of a derivative was discussed by Aristotle, who described
futures contracts that monopolized the ancient olive press market as a "financial device, which
involves a principle of universal application." Artistotle, Politica, in THE BASIC WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE, 1113, 1142 (Richard McKeon ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., Modem Library 2001)
(1941). Yet it was not until the 1990s that derivatives grew into a mature market. See MERTON
H. MILLER, MERTON MILLER ON DERIVATIVES 3 (1997) (stating that the 1990s saw a
tremendous growth of the derivatives market); Niall Ferguson, Who's Buried by Higher Rates?,
FORTUNE, June 14, 2004, at 70 (noting that, since December 2000, "the gross market value of
over-the-counter derivative contracts has grown from $3 trillion to nearly $8 trillion" according
to the Bank for International Settlements).
445. See DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 302, at 4 (showing data reflecting rapid growth of
manufactured housing, student loans, home equity loans, and equipment leases).
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Growth Patterns of Securitizations
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The lower, flatter two lines show securitizations for credit cards and
mortgages from 1990-1998, representing a period when these assets have
grown into a mature market. The top lines show three asset classes at
various times in the market that have been identified as the early growth and
expansion periods, along with a composite line representing all three asset
classes. Calculations of internal rate of return, or the compounded annual
growth rate, show that in the growth and expansion periods noted above,
home equity, student loans, and mortgage asset classes grew at compounded
rates of 32%, 46%, and 26%, respectively. This compares with 11% and 9%
for credit cards and mortgages, respectively, in the mature years. From the
above chart, we see that the development of a securitization class takes
three distinct phases: (1) an initial growth phase in which an asset class is
introduced to the market and a steady growth of the asset class, (2) a rapid
expansion stage that indicates a market acceptance and appetite for the asset
class, and (3) a mature stage in which the market reaches an equilibrium." 6
446. The methodology for analyzing the data is this. We know that various asset classes are
introduced to the market at various time periods and that the market size of each asset class
differs. For instance, while the precursors to agency-backed mortgage back securities (MBS)
were introduced in the 1970s, they started to grow as a market in the 1980s; similarly, home
equity securitizations started in the mid-1990s. Moreover, the size of the student loans is tiny
compared to that of mortgages. Because of these timing and size differences, I fit the data into a
common reference time period to facilitate a like-for-like comparison and measured growth in
terms of percentages. Years one through nine represent the following years for each asset class:
home equity (1996-2004:Q2), student loans (1997-2004:Q2), MBS growth years (1981-1989),
200%
0% -
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Even with the most favorable combination of government action, the
"gestation" period involved in developing a new class of securitization
suggests that a terrorism bond market would not develop for many years.
Given the complexity of the issues and the informational unknowns, the
development may in fact take longer than other classes. Time is needed by
the interest groups to develop an acceptable transaction structure and
methodology and to understand the nature of the investment risk. But the
development stage is not completely removed from the public policy
choices. Government action can enlarge or contract the development period.
Under the current scheme, there is no question that government (in)action
has stalled the development of a capital market solution. Conversely, a
market can be stimulated by significant tax advantages that compensate
investors for the significant risks and information uncertainties. It is a
matter of a policy choice.
VII. CONCLUSION
September 1 th created a fundamental long term insurance problem. We
now understand that terrorism can be catastrophic, and the possibility of a
mega-catastrophe cannot be discounted as a flight of imagination. The 9/11
attacks showed that terrorism can inflict losses exceeding even the most
MBS mature years (1990-1998), and credit cards (1996-2004:Q2). The chart shows
securitization growth as measured by the percent increase of total outstanding volume per asset
class referenced to the initial year's volume (Y-axis), measured over a selected time period
representing a similar period in the development of that particular asset (X-axis). Under this
methodology, the initial reference year is Year zero.
This methodology was limited by the publicly available data. The data was obtained from
the Bond Market Association (BMA). See THE BOND MARKETS ASW'N, at
http://www.bondmarkets.com (last visited Mar. 7, 2005). In response to inquiries, the BMA
stated that it does not have data before 1995 on asset back securitizations. Also, the resulting
data will vary somewhat depending on the initial reference year chosen, but the underlying trend
should still be evident even if the reference year is changed to another within the same general
period. Volumes (in $ billions) for home equity in the years 1995 to 2004 (Q2) are: 33, 52, 90,
124, 142, 152, 185, 287, 346, 411. Id. Volumes (in $ billions) for student loans in the years
1996 to 2004 (Q2) are: 10, 18, 25, 36, 41, 60, 74, 99, 109. Id. The student loan data for Year 9
would be the corresponding volume for 2005, and thus that data point is missing. Volumes (in $
billions) for MBS in the years 1980 to 1989 are: 111, 126, 176, 244, 289, 373, 534, 672, 750,
876. d. Volumes (in $ billions) for MBS in the years 1990 to 1998 are: 1024, 1161, 1274, 1350,
1442, 1570, 1711, 1826, 2018. Id. Volumes (in $ billions) for credit cards in the years 1995 to
2004 (Q2) are: 153, 181, 215, 237, 258, 306, 362, 398, 402, 401. Id. The "MBS (Growth),
Home Equity, Student Loans" category was derived by simply adding the outstanding volume
in each class without any adjustments. Id. (stating that MBS contributed the majority of the
volume).
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severe natural catastrophes. In the confusion of post-9/l 1, the insurance
industry exited the market for terrorism risk. This exodus created capacity
and pricing distortions in the market, and these disruptions rippled
throughout the general economy. In response, Congress enacted TRIA.
Market prices have come down from the fearful early days of the fallout.
Whether TRIA had anything to do with this price stabilization is neither
here nor there since the take up rate still remains relatively low. In this
regard, the statute has had mixed results even by the government's own
assessment.
It is an open question whether TRIA will be extended beyond its sunset
date. This is the clear policy preference of the insurance industry. But many
have argued against an extension, contending that government intervention
into what should be a private market would only exacerbate the problem.
Direct subsidies to the insurance industry would not offer much in the way
of addressing terrorism risk or incentivizing a solution for it. It is simply a
scheme to transfer wealth from the government to the insurance industry
and to the policyholders. If we assume that TRIA will not be extended after
2005, the private market must formulate a solution to transfer terrorism risk.
The industry in its current business and financial configuration cannot
assume the bulk of terrorism risk. With 9/11 as a precedent, there will be
great pressure and temptation to provide ex post government relief to those
who bore the loss in the next catastrophic attack.
This article suggests that the private market can find an alternative risk
transfer through the capital markets. Such a solution, however, faces many
implementation hurdles: regulatory uncertainties and costs, informational
uncertainties and costs, price competition from traditional reinsurance, and
investor unfamiliarity and skepticism. The government can enhance and
stimulate the conditions necessary for the convergence of insurance and
capital markets. It can reduce the costs of securitization and enhance pricing.
It can streamline the regulation of insurance and securitization so that
regulatory costs are reduced, and it can provide tax incentives to increase
investment yield. There is a compelling policy that is served. The tax
subsidies are provided directly to the interest group that is most needed to
stimulate a capital market solution-the investors. With the effective
investment yield increased, the benefit of the tax policy would flow
upstream to the underwriting and pricing of terrorism risk.
While securitization is a promising avenue to expand industry capacity
and ultimately reduce prices, it cannot address short term needs. Given the
growth history of traditional securitizations, the difficulties in developing
the natural catastrophe market, and the unique challenges of terrorism, a
market in terrorism bonds is many years away even under the most
529
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optimistic assessment and favorable conditions. A capital market solution,
however, is impossible with the regulatory and tax reforms, which are
needed now.
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VIII. APPENDIX
Table 1: Top 10 Most Costly Terrorism Attacks
447
Victims Date Event
9/11/01
4/24/93
6/15/96
2/26/93
4/10/92
7/24/01
2/9/96
4/19/95
12/21/88
9/17/70
WTC and Pentagon attacks
Bombing of NatWest tower
Bombing in Manchester
WTC garage bombing
Bombing in London
Bombing of Colombo Airport
Bombing of London's Docklands
Bombing in Oklahoma City
PanAm bombing over Lockerbie
Three nlanes hiiacked, bombed
19,000 At least
3,000
907 1
744 --
725 6
671 3
398 20
259 2
145 166
138 270
127 --
Country
US
UK
UK
US
UK
Sri Lanka
UK
US
UK
Jordan
Table 2: Top 10 Most Deadly Terrorism Attacks448
Victims Losses
(US$ M)
Date Event
9/11/01 WTC and Pentagon attacks
10/23/83 Beirut bombing, US Marine barracks
3/12/93 Series of 13 bomb attacks in Mumbai
12/21/88 PanAm bombing over Lockerbie
8/7/98 Bombings of US embassies
4/19/95 Bombing in Oklahoma City
11/23/96 Hijacking of Ethiopian airliner
9/13/99 Bombing of block in Moscow
6/4/91 Arson of warehouse in Addis Ababa
1/31/99 Cevlinco House Bombing. Columbo
US
Lebanon
India
UK
Africa
US
Indian Ocean
Russia
Ethiopia
Sri Lanka
447. ZANETTI ET AL., supra note 2, at 17 tbls. 4-5 (giving aata indexed to 2001 value;
property damage and business interruption loss).
448. Id. (giving data indexed to 2001 value; property damage and business interruption
loss). This list does not include the September 3, 2004, attack on a school in Beslan, Russia,
which killed 350 people; the October 12, 2002, bombing in Bali, Indonesia, which killed 202
people; or the March 11, 2004, bombing of the Madrid train system, which killed 192 and
inflicted €35 million in insurance losses. Id. at tbl.5. Most of the insurance losses involved in
the Madrid train bombing were covered by the Spanish government's insurance pool. See supra
note 256.
Losses
(US$ M)
Country
At least
3,000
300
300
270
253
166
127
118
100
100
19,0
00
6
138
145
45
6
& s/ •
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Table 3: Top 10 Most Costly Natural Catastrophes"9
Event
Hurricane Andrew
Northridge earthquake
Typhoon Mireille
Winterstorm Daria
Winterstorm Lother
Hurricane Hugo
Storm and floods
Winterstorm Vivian
Typhoon Bart
Hurricane Georges
[Ariz. St. L.J.
Country
US, Bahamas
US
Japan
France, UK et al.
Western Europe
Puerto Rico, US
France, UK et al.
Western Europe
Japan
US, Caribbean
Table 4: Top 10 Most Deadly Natural Catastrophes45 °
449. ZANETrI ET AL., supra note 332, at 38 & tbl.10 (giving data indexed to 2003 value;
property damage and business interruption loss). The list in Table 3 does not include the series
of hurricanes (Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne) that hit the American southeast and Florida
in August and September 2004. Collectively, this quartet caused insurance losses of $29 billion,
exceeding the losses of Hurricane Andrew and approximating the losses from 9/11. AURELIA
ZANETrI ET AL., Swiss RE, SIGMA No. 1/2005, NATURAL CATASTROPHES AND MAN-MADE
DISASTERS IN 2004: MORE THAN 300,000 FATALITIES, RECORD INSURED LOSSES 17 (Thomas
Hess & Aurelia Zanetti eds., 2005).
450. ZANETrI ET AL., supra note 332, at 39 & tbl.10 (giving data indexed to 2003 value;
property damage and business interruption loss). This list does not include the tsunami that hit
India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Thailand, and Somalia on December 26, 2004, with an estimated
number of killed and missing of over 280,000, making it the second deadliest catastrophe since
1970. ZANET7I ET AL., supra note 449, at 3.
Losses
(US$ M)
20,900
17,312
7,598
6,441
6,382
6,203
4,839
4,476
4,445
3,969
Victims
43
60
51
95
110
71
22
64
26
600
Date
8/23/92
1/17/94
9/27/91
1/25/90
12/25/99
9/15/89
10/15/87
2/25/90
9/22/99
9/20/98
Victims Losses Date Event Country
(US$ M)
300,000 -- 11/14/70 Storm and flood Bangladesh
250,000 -- 7/28/76 Earthquake in Tangshan China
138,000 3 4/29/91 Cyclone Gorky Bangladesh
60,000 -- 5/31/70 Earthquake Peru
50,000 161 6/21/90 Earthquake in Gilan Iran
41,000 -- 12/26/03 Earthquake in Mam Iran
25,000 -- 9/16/78 Earthquake in Tabas Iran
25,000 -- 12/7/88 Earthquake Armenia
23,000 -- 11/13/85 Volcano in Nevado del Ruiz Colombia
22,000 242 2/4/76 Earthquake Guatemala
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Table 5: Stylized Example of the Cost of Capital and Tax Problem45
Risk Based Capital Held by Insurer
Income Stream
Premiums for Expect Losses
Premium for Overhead Expenses
Investment Income from Premiums @ 8%
Investment Income from Capital @ 8%
Losses
Overhead Expenses
Premium Delta for Cost of Capital Shortfall
Investment Income from Premium Delta @ 8%
Pretax Income
Tax Expense @ 25%
Net Income
Return on Equity (ROE)
Ratio Analysis
Total Premiums Collected
Premiums Collected / Expected Loss
Revenue
Overhead Expenses / Revenue
Tax Expense / Revenue
Expected Loss / Revenue
Net Profit / Revenue
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
500 50,000
500 500
100 100
24 44
40 4,000
(500) 0
(100) (100)
2 1,965
0 157
67 6,667
(17) (1,667)
50
10%
602
1.20
667
15%
3%
75%
7%
5,000
10%
2,565
5.13
6,767
1%
25%
NA
74%
451. The above table is a stylized example that highlights the different cost of capital and
tax consequences on two types of insurable interests. Scenario 1 represents high frequency, low
severity events. Scenario 2 represents low frequency, high severity events. The example does
not consider the impact of loss carry-forwards, which may alleviate the tax impact on the capital
costs. Grace et al., supra note 36, at 584 (loss carry forward will minimize some of the tax
burdens associated with the capital costs of covering catastrophe risk). Over the long term, a
loss carry forward would reduce the premiums by reducing the tax burden. Therefore, the $5.13
in premium for an anticipated one dollar of losses may be an overestimation. Also, the
calculations for investment income from premiums for Scenario 1 used a $300 weighted
average figure on the assumption that losses and expenses are evenly paid throughout the year.
For Scenario 2, $550 was used on the assumption that the $500 for losses are not paid out and
only the $100 collected for overhead is paid out evenly throughout the year.

